THE POTENCY OF P. R.
Our
Captive Culture
and the Bio-Social
Forces that Will Free Us
The subject of public relations is equivocal and full
of contradictions. Edward Bernays, the
man most responsible (in the view of most practitioners) for its founding,
called PR a social science "In which public interest rather than financial
motivation is the primary consideration.”
But then Bernays said that by his method "It is now possible to
control and regiment the masses according to our will, without their knowing
it.” He called this "the
engineering of consent.” This phrase
has been the unconscious watchword of the public relations industry. Its
implicit contradictions will be addressed later.
Tedone talks about "practical publicity" as
the "business of attracting public attention to any group, person, product
or cause.” Bernays often referred to
himself as the "No. 1 publicist.”
Tedone says, "its simple if you have enough money", however he
claimed to address only "volunteer publicists who are working for worthy
causes.” In actual practice, PR is the
handmaiden of any person or organized group with "enough money"--with
few exceptions. This became manifest
soon after the subject was organized as the Public Relations Society of America
(PRSA) in 1948. It is instructive to
review some of its positions, by reference to excerpts from the Public
Relations Journal.
It was soon clear that the main concern of PR has
been (1) with means and techniques of communication and persuasion--little
attention being given to ends, and (2) primary concentration on business and
industry. The early exuberance of the
PR practitioners was represented by A.
Center, who revealed both when he boasted that "PR practitioners
are positioned at the elbow of policy makers in high places”, but he
warned: "Communication skills have
been put to causes and objectives of questionable public value. Services have often been rationalized as
though the ability to issue public information about an employer or to
influence a segment of opinion were in themselves sufficient ends.”
Commitment to the profit system was taken for granted
in the Journal. For example, Seifert
told the readers what PR must do "If it is to take its rightful place
defending the corporation's policies.”
In the same vein Wilck avowed that "PR is basically a management
function" and Ingram contended that the reason PR hasn't grown bigger is
"because too many practitioners are not ready to assume the roles of top
management functionaries.” More
recently, White proclaimed, "The business of PR is business. PR must serve the marketing mix or it does
not deserve to exist.”
Sensing that some observers might confuse PR with
(business) propaganda, J. McLaughlin, a PR instructor, attempted to enumerate
their similarities and differences, but the most important similarity was
prominent by its absence. Both are dominated by a special interest, which is by
no means necessarily harmonious with the general interest. A PR theorist, E. Lane, candidly asked the
practitioners, "How much time do you spend in evaluating, researching and
programming your propaganda efforts?"
He raised this question under the heading: "Social science: Its Lack of Application Is Starving Public
Relations.”
The Journal periodically had articles appealing for a
closer relation with the social sciences.
Lewis saw social science as a tool, and concluded: “PR is merely applied
social science.” Bailey advocated
"putting behavioral science to work" and listed some obstacles to
doing so. The biggest obstacle appeared
in quite an unexpected way--not identified as such. Another PR expert was cited who identified the "right"
decision in PR as being "the conclusion the practitioners' client or
organization supports.” Such a bald
statement of pre commitment to special interest inevitably runs afoul of
science.
The PR people fail to recognize a most elementary
attribute of all science. It is the freedom from commitment to any existing
doctrine, organization or vested interest.
Many scientists have recognized this requirement, but perhaps the
Nobelist Henri Poincare expressed it most vividly when he said, "In
science it is necessary to be independent--utterly independent.” (“Utterly”
seems a little overoptimistic, but conformity to profit and commitment to
doctrines are contrary to science.)
With little doubt, being the handmaiden of "free
enterprise" was, and is much superior to being the handmaiden of
communism, but it is possible to be neither.
Rather early in its history, the PR Journal held a conference on PR and
the social sciences, in which some leading behavioral scientists
participated. The results were
interesting. Prof. Lyman Bryson of
Columbia University told the practitioners, "If you are engineering
consent, then I think the social sciences would like to warn you that you
should begin with a basic analysis of three levels upon which consent moves in
a society like ours.” He then described
which ones were most amenable to control (by them).
Professor Samuel Stouffer of Harvard advised that
people's attitudes could be changed more easily by working on their emotions
than on their intellects. He described
his experiments on using the emotion of fear.
Professor Rensis Likert of Michigan said, "The basic question for
all PR is: What principles are applicable to the problem of influencing
people's ideas, opinions or behavior... what motivates people and how can their
behavior be changed by changing the motivational forces acting on them?"
Changed, but by whom and for what end?
All of these top social scientists accepted the PR
aim of changing behavior without once raising the question of the kind of
change or the ends toward which the change was to be directed. Thus their recommendations could be used to
sell Hitler, communism, crime or total war, unless they were to show clearly
how this was contra-indicated. 0f course
the ultimate criterion for PR would be profit, but all the cases above (except
communism ?) have been perceived as possibly profitable by someone. It is intriguing that the PR Journal did not
repeat this project. Perhaps Bailey,
cited earlier, was close to the mark when he said that PR can't find the
"right" social scientists and their interests are different.
About this time the Journal printed a straightforward
statement by a prominent practitioner, K. Miller who asserted: “The principal assumption is that the PR
practitioner will be able to create on any desired scale a climate of opinion
and emotion that is most favorable to the cause or the client he
represents.” Even the Journal found
this a little startling, but not so much that it felt obliged to address
seriously the basic problems of ends and power.
It is clear that improved communication is vitally
needed between various segments of the population and the various nations. As Jackson, past president of PRSA argued:
“PR is devoted to the essential function of guiding and improving human
relationships.” Perhaps the word
"devoted" should be replaced with "is often concerned"
because as we have already seen, special interest frequently overpowers general
interest. Subordinating communication to
profit and the price system, failing to carefully consider its possibly
dangerous consequences, when power is antithetical to science as well as
democratic government, does not represent sound guidance and improvement of
human relations. It is possible to form
an elementary theory capable of identifying not only the short sighted and
dangerous ends but also those which are more constructive. That has been the aim and function of
several chapters in this book.
Bennis and Mitroff estimate that PR as "the
deliberate manufacturing of slanted information accounts for up to 70% of what
passes for news and information in our society.” Then how do we distinguish between PR and propaganda? In theory, PR uses accurate communication
with no misinformation or misrepresentation.
As noted, most spokesmen claim to be governed by the general interest of
the population-- both in contrast to the out and out propagandist. In many cases there may be no
difference. Pimlott long ago contended
that "It is chiefly because PR specialists are paid propagandists that
society has to take cognizance of them.
They are paid propagandists on any view of the term.”
The propaganda devices of 50 years ago are still in
practice, but more sophisticated methods are in operation, as described by
Pratkanis and Aronson. They focus on
"Manufacturing Credibility".
The manufacture of credibility can lead to a personality cult. "Instead of thinking about important
issues for ourselves we turn to credible looking leaders. Sadly it is often the
case that credibility has been subtly manufactured and sold for propaganda
purposes, and the media often serve as unwitting handmaids in this charade.”
The PR "flacks" argue that their operations
are defended by the first amendment to the constitution, the right of free
press and free expression. However both
democracy and science require that all such freedom be out in the open and
publicly identified as to the source, not in secret as the PR agencies like to
operate as much as possible--touted by Bernays and more recent operatives. All PR operations would be publicly
identified, with the possibility of determining who was financing the
project. Otherwise PR can be propaganda
in disguise.
Wilcox, Ault and Agee (in PUBLIC RELATIONS) maintain
the public relations are essential to facilitate communication and
understanding. Perhaps. Food is also essential to facilitate good
health, but not just any food or any amount.
PR "food" can cause illness; its opposite can help with
communication and human understanding, but how does society attempt to insure
the constructive side and how do we distinguish between them? Most professions have a code of ethics,
which helps in this process. The PRSA
has its code, a high sounding document, but one which is often ignored, as has
been seen. An important difference is that in most professions the code is
law-enforced, but not in the public relations industry. (This of course is not a guarantee, but only
a facilitation)
Two examples may be used to show how PR is involved
in deception, both political and economic.
A study ("Fine Print") by Dilulio and Kettl of Brookings,
identified misstatements and misrepresentations in the 1994 Contract With
America, promoted by Gingrich Republicans.
The Contract assumed that "Washington bureaucrats have state and
local governments and private contractors on a choker chain welded by minute
regulations that leave them with little or no discretion, but... empirical
research on intergovernmental affairs reveals that the rule is more nearly the
reverse. Federal programs are more
often scuttled by state and local decisions.
Federal bureaucrats are neither always the dominant partners in
intergovernmental administration nor the sole culprits in clear-cut cases of
waste, fraud, abuse or outright failure.
The Wisconsin Plan was hailed as a model program for
reducing welfare but "It involved more government, not less.” Studies show that nationally initiated
contract style welfare reform can be achieved only where significant resource
increases are made in the governmental bureaucracies that administer the new
program.” The passion for de-regulation
results in projects out of control, such as the Savings and Loan disaster. The problem is to insure that necessary
government monitoring is itself objective, fair and effective. Dilulio and Kettl predicted that much
deregulation and the coming reduction in federal monitors to correct errors
will lead to more fraud, such as that which occurred in Medicare, overruns in
the superfund, malfeasance at HUD and defense procurement scandals. This is in addition to those cases where the
contractors themselves drafted testimony for DOE officials establishing policy.
Cases cited in FINE PRINT showed that "nationally initiated contract-style
reforms can only be achieved where significant resource increases are made for
the administration of new programs, which includes careful monitoring. The only agency available for (and concerned
with) such monitoring is the government.
In the U.S there are testing groups and independent
organizations to aid in the process of guiding us through the barrage of
special interest, e.g., Common Cause, Consumers Union, League of Women
Voters. Business interests soon formed their
own groups, made to sound objective and in the public interest. Megalli and Friedman made a study under the
title MASKS OF DECEPTION: Corporate Front Groups in America. They focused on 36 of these bogus operations
engaged in "putting up a good front".
First the question naturally arises: By what criteria
and common practices did they identify such a front group? The following attributes were applied: (1) The use of scientific sounding names,
for example American Council on Science and Health covered for agriculture,
science and technology. This group was
actually established to argue in favor of pesticides and other commercial
products. (2) Select a title that
suggests concern for the public, e.g. "Consumer Alert") but opposes
those government regulations which were established to protect citizen
safety. (3) Use of "buzz
words" to make the reader feel good, and which deflect questioning and
criticism, such as "responsible", "sound",
"sensible"-–attached only to their own programs, (4) Employ language
that provides no indication of a group’s connection with a business. Example
given: National Tort Reform Association-pushing for legal changes to help its
members. (5) Hidden agenda: Aims different from or even opposite to what it
actually pursues in legislation and public treatment, for example the A.C.G.S.
mentioned earlier, claimed to be an unbiased group of scientists, but it is
always pro-industry on radiation, pollution, pesticides etc.
Another indication of bias is when a front group will
have top industry executives on its board.
Keep America Green includes representatives from Mobil, Caterpillar,
Dow, Procter and Gamble, Phillip Morris et al, organizations well known for
diverting attention and support from such issues as wetlands preservation, acid
rain, ozone depletion and the like.
Space limitations permit only one of the MASK cases to be more than
mentioned. In 1989, a pesticide, Alar,
sprayed on apple trees was found to present a serious cancer risk, especially
in children--the biggest apple eaters.
Headlines soon appeared playing down the need for concern. The spokesperson quoted in these articles
would usually be Dr. Elizabeth Whelan, PhD.
Whelan is executive director of the ACSH, a self- proclaimed
"public education group directed and advised by 200 other prominent scientists,
physicians and policy experts.”
On March 14, 1990, The Wall Street Jounal published
an article by Whelan entitled "Apple Dangers are just so Much
Applesauce.” The Journal added a
comment that ACSH was funded 10% by Uniroyal Chemical, which produced
Alar. It did not mention that other
funders included Dow Chemical, Nutrasweet, Kraft, Pepsi, General Mills and the
National Starch and Chemical Foundation--all associated with the food and drug
business. As expected, Whelan denied
any danger of cancer and any effect of the funders on ACSH
operations...appealing to her panel of 200 scientists. Further inquiry by the Committee for Science
in the Public Interest revealed that most of these individuals were employees
of industry or paid consultants. Never at
any time were statements issued which disagreed with or challenged the
funders. The rule of thumb regarding
special interest has been: Those who are never subject to disagreement are more
subject to purchase and conformity.
(Alar was later withdrawn)
A panel of eight independent and respected
scientists was asked by the Committee
for Science in the Public Interest to review eight publications of the
ACSH. These were found to be full of
errors, omissions and misrepresentations.
To be sure, not all or even most companies are short sighted and greedy,
environmentally or otherwise but the real test is not verbal but
operational. Knowing the actual
evidence reduces captivity on all sides.
There are many examples of deception in public affairs today, but a
prime illustration must be the tobacco industry. Cases are continually in the news displaying tobacco company
pressures to promote and defend their product to a maximum and cancel any
discoveries or authoritative statements that are unfavorable. This practice has been described
voluminously in two different books, from which we may extract salient points.
The liaison between the PR and tobacco industries
began at an early date. At a 1953
meeting of tobacco CEOs with Hill and Knowlton PR, it was agreed to “spend
large amounts of money every year into the indefinite future to prevent, not
sworn adversaries but science and public health officials from warning the
people of a potential hazard in the normal manner.” They established a new PR organization (TIRC) "larger than
the American Cancer Society or the National Academy of Science in financial
terms.” Its program "was one of
the most effective in PR history.” It
worked for 40 years and the government "took no steps the industry didn't want.” We continue with information provided by
Hilts in his book SMOKESCREEN.
Surprisingly, this account is based on memos between the tobacco
executives themselves, revealing the misrepresentations and machinations of the
industry on the following contentions, cited by page):
1. Cigarettes do not cause lung cancer and other ills.
(No references needed to this nonsense)
2. Nicotine is not addictive. (p. 64, 122, 147, 174)
3. The companies do not adjust the nicotine in cigarettes
(p. 171-2)
4. The companies do not target youth in their advertising.
(p. 68, 98-100)
5. Companies bear no responsibility for "getting hooked".
It is just the free, individual choice (p.
219)
All the above assurances were
proved false, but only after years of challenge plus documents provided by
technicians working on the projects.
The companies fought off repeated suits against them, related to the
above contentions. The method described
by Hilts was to use elaborate stalling tactics, dragging out the suit for years
until the poorer plaintiffs ran out of money.
Finally, thanks to whistle blowers like Wigand and Williams, as well as
entry into the court scene by some states, the facts were brought forth
publicly and the prospects of suit-success increased.
How to explain the enormous success of the
companies? Stauber and Rampton cut
quickly to the heart of the matter. It
was the incredible power of the PR machine, employing top experts whose
prodigals of ingenuity” skyrocketed tobacco sales. When scientific evidence of the dangers appeared, the PR wizards
“launched what must be considered the costliest, longest running and most
successful crisis management campaign in history.” They even managed to get a top cancer expert to head their program--Dr. Clarence Little, who was totally committed
to the genetic theory of cancer causation.
His success was striking. Polls
showed that 65% of Americans were favorable toward the tobacco industry-PR
claims.
The American Cancer Society called the PR strategy
"a delaying action to mislead the public.” Bernays, the instigator of the strategy later said that if he had
known of the dangers he would have refused the job. The PRSA's ethical code states that "a member shall conduct
his or her professional life in accord with the public interest " but when
38 PR firms were polled, only nine of them would refuse a tobacco
contract. More recently, Philip Morris
employed a PR agency (Dolphin) to develop what was called a National Smokers'
Alliance. It created and maneuvered
Proposition 188 onto the ballot in California.
This called for "tough, statewide smoking restrictions". However if carefully read, it actually
eliminated many anti smoking ordinances already on the books. Californians ultimately caught on to the
scam and defeated it.
Hilts maintained that tobacco company success was
caused, not just by the power of money:
"There is a strong lobby working for tobacco and almost no
opposition.” He also added that voting on tobacco bills in congress occurred
without the knowledge of the electorate.
"Representatives do not have to answer for their votes back home”
even though public opinion was strongly opposed to the practices listed
earlier. The fallacy in this argument
is that a strong lobby only exists because of the vast profits to be made and
the consequent expenditures possible for lawyers, suits and buying off
legislators.
Another treatment of the tobacco business and its
effects is provided by Kluger--in his book ASHES TO ASHES. It is very inclusive in its history and in
the details of financial and political operations inside the tobacco
companies. He focuses in particular on
the operations of the two largest agencies, RJR (Nabisco) and Phillip Morris
(General Foods). Of special interest is how these companies competed, using
their enormous profits from cigarette-making (a death industry) to take over a
significant part of U.S. food production (a life industry), although ignorant
of the business. Kluger describes the
operation thusly: "Instead of
building equity in corporate America and efficient, globally comprehensive
plant, the greed machine was piling up huge debts from bidding wars that the
buyouts set in motion.” At this time,
public attitudes toward tobacco were beginning to sour, so Phillip Morris
president Maxwell appointed a public relations expert (G. L. Smith) to engineer
public approval. His tactics were
ingenious and successful. He followed
the rule: If it behaves like a sterling corporate citizen, people would
overlook the unfortunate tendency of the core product to shorten life
expectancy. So Phillip Morris subsidized art, music, museums, sports, libraries
and Negro organizations.
There
followed a conflicting emotional response between grateful recipients of the
money and those who recognized a buyout.
Rationalizers argued that if tobacco was bad for their health, so was
hunger, and the latter seemed the more pressing evil.” Perhaps it did, but then we are asked to
believe that cigarettes rated higher than food. Kluger's explanation for the success of tobacco makers and the
failure of regulation is certainly to the point: "With such a mammoth and influential constituency, it is no
surprise that the would-be tobacco regulators are scarce in the political
arena. Governments have themselves
become addicted to the cigarette because of the taxes it harvests", which
returns us to the power of money.
The tobacco business in the U.S. at the moment, is
about 45 billion dollars a year. It is
associated with almost a half million deaths per year. This money lets them promote the sales of an
often-lethal commodity to people who are in effect paying to promote their own
ill health and death (but are enjoying it).
A critic is always obliged to offer a rational alternative, whether or
not it would have much prospect of implementation. A democratic procedure would be to expose school children at
least once a year to a "tobacco day" in which the consequences of its
use would be presented by those with advanced lung cancer, emphysema, heart
trouble etc. Descriptive examples of tobacco industry tactics would be
displayed and it would be announced that medical bills of smokers would not be
funded by public money. They would be free to risk committing suicide if they
wished--enjoying all the soothing attributes and nicotine along the way. (This is unlikely to occur, even if it is
logical, democratic and non-paternalistic).
In conclusion it is essential to analyze PR
motivation scientifically, not in moral terms of evilness. Like every business in a capitalist society
it must be dominated by making a profit, rather than by social welfare. If the welfare policy produces money, that
is fortunate for all, but secondary. If
profit comes from serving a special interest at public expense, that is
unfortunate (for others) but part of the economic rules. If public costs become sufficiently high, as
a result, and sufficiently recognizable by the population, then the operation
is reduced or stopped. That is unfortunate
(for PR) but also a part of the political rules.
Obviously there is an incompatibility between these
two kinds of rules, even though we commonly, or can easily lump them together
under the rubric of freedom. Both are
legal. Just as obviously it is in the
interest of the economic players to avoid or divert or reduce the democratic
part whenever profit requires or is at risk.
So long as misrepresentation works, PR will misrepresent and suppress
the truth. Truth in advertising may
sound fine, and may even work, but it is almost unenforceable when marching
under the flag of freedom. Of course if
people discover in experience they are being lied to, either actively or
passively, they may well change their habits and their attitudes toward the
PR. Therefore the latter aim becomes to
prevent this perception, which they can do with great skill.
When the economic power behind PR become sufficiently
wide and deep, it can more effectively hide the truth and to that extent keep
people in captivity. Fortunately the
power is not endless, although there is always an attempt to probe the
limit. In doing so there is also the
danger of creating a crisis or breakdown.
Then, like the great depression they simply back out slowly, and
democratize to a greater degree.
In 1998 the big tobacco companies and many states
reached an agreement in which the companies would pay off all tobacco suits
that had originated within the associated states, for several hundred billion
dollars. Then the senate committee
considered raising the fine, adding penalties if teen smoking did not decrease,
giving the FDA authority on tobacco and further limiting advertisements. A Fortune article (3/27/98) entitled
"Don't Snuff Out Big Tobacco" argued that if we overburdened them,
they would go out of (a legal) business.
This in turn would halt the payments by which congress hoped to
remunerate the litigators.
So it appears that congress and big tobacco are
planning to pay off previous victims by the sale of more tobacco and therefore
the creation of future victims. Of
course the tobacco companies would not go out of business without raising their
prices enough to continue operating--a standard procedure, which Fortune did
not even acknowledge! Higher prices
would greatly reduce consumption in this case, which is the whole idea. The article sees this as an excessive burden
on big tobacco, reflecting only an overblown desire for
"revenge". Even if we
happened to agree with this motivation, it is irrelevant to the main issue,
which is: How to pay off the past victims without creating more, and what can
be done to prevent, or at least save them in the future?
Prohibition does not work, moreover it goes against
the common belief in people's right to govern their own lives. The procedure offered previously, is likely
to be opposed because it allows individuals to risk killing themselves, however
this involves the same basic right of personal autonomy. It only requires making sure that the user
is adequately informed of the odds, and is aware that he/she has surrendered
prospects of publicly funded medical care for the tobacco-caused ills (and
probably reduced sympathy for choosing a lethal outcome).
Another case where PR organizations sprang forward
and had a large hand in defeating any significant change was health care
reform, especially that offered by the Clinton administration. First came criticism of the 31% profits made
by the pharmaceutical industry (highest among the Fortune 500). The industry responded by hiring a PR firm
(Beckel Cowan & Co.) thus creating "Rx Profits" which claimed to
generate 50,000 congressional contacts in opposition. The threat was perceived by insurance companies, for example the
HIAA, which led its 300,000 members into battle
Another insurance group "Coalition for Health
Insurance Choices" (CHIC) joined the fight against the Clinton proposal of
health care alliances. It admitted
receiving funds from the insurance group HIAA, but Consumers' Reports noted
that the HIAA really "created it from scratch". The Coalition--essentially a front group,
spent 6.5 million dollars on an ad campaign to keep insurance business at the
center of health care, to deflect any government restraints on rising insurance
premiums, drug prices or doctor fees. Surveys by the Commonwealth Fund and the
Kaiser Foundation had shown that these aims were supported by 70% of those
polled.) CHIC was responsible for the famous and effectively misleading
"Harry and Louise" ads on television. A writer for the New York Times called them "a powerful advertising
campaign financed by the insurance industry, that played on people's fears and
helped derail the process.” Rush
Limbaugh and similar talk show hosts joined the attack with effective
propaganda techniques, unrecognized by most of the listeners and viewers. Campaign and Elections magazine concluded that
"Never before have private interests spent so much money, so much
publicity to defeat an initiative launched by a president.”
The insurance, pharmaceutical and political attackers
of Clinton's, or any other such proposal, will contend that it is to be expected
and is part of the American freedoms.
Conveniently ignored is the requirement that it be open, accurate and
non-doctrinaire. It was none of these. The PR companies prided themselves on their
silent and unrecognized operation. When
results correlate with the amount of money, people are correspondingly
captivated--on both sides of the equation.
Some critical evidence in this case was reported by
Fallows (in the Atlantic Monthly) citing the Wall Street Journal, which asked a
panel of people what factors they most wanted in a health care reform
bill. After obtaining this list of
desiderata, it was pointed out that the Clinton plan was in closest
correspondence with it. The panel, upon
hearing this information, reversed its conclusion because "everyone knows
the Clinton plan could never work.”
Looking back on the melee over health care reform,
Fallows described what he called "A Triumph of Misrepresentation". He
set up what people had accepted as the major defects of the administration
proposal (i. e. "The plan was
hatched in secret; "The plan was politically naive"; "The first
lady's whiz kids wasted precious months" and "The plan had delusions
of grandeur"). Fallows then
proceeded to show that each of these assumptions was at odds with the facts.
An outstanding case of misrepresentation was the
attack by McCaughey in the New Republic.
She contended that the Clinton plan would lock people into
government-run health coverage and would "prevent you from going outside
the system to buy basic health care you think is better.” George Will pursued this idea by imagining
that doctors could face a 15-year jail term "for people driven to bribery
for care they felt they needed but the government does not deem necessary.” A reading of the bill would show these
charges to be false. Sec. 1003 says the
"act does not prohibit an individual from purchasing any health care
services.” Other errors were identified
by a White House response, but the New Republic ignored them all and ran
another critical item by McCaughey. It
must be stressed that the foregoing is not to suggest that the Clinton plan was
without defects or even the best possible.
It did not really come to grips with the incompatibilities between its
aims and its costs, as politicians usually fail to do.
The national health care plan actually put into
operation was a product of economic special interests. At the present time, the U.S. provides less
health care at a higher cost than any of the major nations of Western Europe
(which includes the single payer system of Canada). The latter was heavily
propagandized during our health care debate.
Almost one fourth of our approximately trillion dollar health care
annual expenditure goes to insurance, administration, paper work, instead of
the restoration of American public health. (The bill proposed by Senator
Wellstone, comparable to those of Western Europe has languished in committee.)
The state of Oregon, under Dr. John Kitzhaber,
governor, drew up a priority list of ailments and intended to spend state
funds, going down the list until the money allotted by the legislature ran
out. National protests were heard to
this plan and it was stalled, however no superior alternative was publicized,
certainly none proposing to provide completely universal treatment. (Hawaii was reputed to come close, but
Hawaii is not a typical state). The
ideal was silently evaded in one way or another.
The point here is that any significant change was
opposed by all those with a special interest in the System--added on to the
standard opposition of the other political party. Indeed, Speaker of the House Gingrich had concluded as early as
1991 (before the Clinton administration) that health care reform had to be
stopped cold--as reported from an interview by Johnson and Broder in their book
THE SYSTEM). So the wrecking crew was
at work, politically but not legislatively. (The bill proposed by Senator
Wellstone comparable to those of Western Europe, languished in committee)
Since the Republicans controlled congress, and senate,
they could have passed their kind of health care improvement--with minimal
Democratic support--if they were seriously interested. A token bill was finally passed, courtesy of
Senators Kennedy and Kassebaum, which made it easier for people to keep health
insurance when they changed jobs, but did nothing for the 40 million people who
could not afford health insurance. A
study done for the American College of Physicians found that lack of insurance
was associated with a 25% higher risk of death.
Many of the critics of health care reform offered the
opinion that after the Clinton defeat, there would be little further
interest. That prognosis remains to be
tested. Fallows pointed out that as the
health care conflict went on, "Republicans dropped their support, one by
one, for any health bill at all.” The
Kennedy-Kassebaum proposal cannot be considered a health care reform bill, but
it was passed off in many quarters as serious congressional action to this end.
Another striking case of the power of commercial
interest to interfere with public health was the silicone breast implant,
produced by Dow Corning. Byrne has
described the case, as experienced by a Dow Executive (Swanson) and his wife
who had an implant at an early stage of the invention (1974). Swanson was in charge of producing an
ethical guidance program for the company--which was widely admired and
copied. Silicone was assumed by all to
be medically inert (safe to use).
As years passed, a long series of ailments beset
Mrs. Swanson, becoming more numerous
and serious. Her physicians offered
other reasons for these, but finally similar cases became public and were
recognized--after much resistance--to be the product of silicone, especially
when the implants leaked it into other parts of the body. Swanson was in the difficult position of
being torn between his company obligation and his wife’s deteriorating
condition. The question was: How did
the company relate this development to his ethical program? Dow Corning denied any medical effects and
any responsibility for them (if they indeed occurred). Lawsuits began to arise across the nation,
at first settled out of court. Then
major court cases followed (e.g., by Stern and Hopkins) which resulted in large
rewards. Mrs. Swanson contacted some of
these plaintiffs and decided that the implants were the cause of her condition
and must be removed, however not locally because it would make difficulties for
Mr. Swanson and herself. As the suits
piled up, the company "stonewalled" against the opposition, claiming
no danger and no responsibility.
However as Byrne reported, "Even Dow Corning in 1993 had
acknowledged for the first time that silicone may not be inert after all",
reminiscent of the tobacco case.
Dow cited studies by Michigan, Harvard and Mayo’s
allegedly showing that the implants were safe.
This raises the question as to actual experimental evidence on the
subject. Dow had been little interested
in such an investigation itself. One
study of the effects on dogs was cited by company writers, but they confined
their reference only to the first six months of the experiment, when few ill
effects were encountered. After two
years of the experiment, one of the four dogs had died and others suffered multiple
ailments due to silicone implants.
Dow Corning leaders rationalized, denying the damage
of silicone, by fighting any control offered by the FDA--even trying to get the
Director fired; by refusing any responsibility for the effects, even by
expressing no sympathy for them in the case of Mrs. Swanson. To be sure, they were defending their own
and the corporate status, their own influence, their own affluent life styles.
These all depend on keeping the sales and profits going. The so- called medical scientists were not
immune. The plastic surgeons generally
defended silicone to the end. Mayos was
able to recognize that the Harvard and Michigan studies were deficient and
inadequate to test the longer time periods required for effects to develop. They had clung to the accepted dogma of silicone
safety.
What part did PR operations play in the silicone
controversy? When the going got rough,
Dow Corning called in Burson Marsteller, a top PR firm. It prepared a long series of prosecutor-probable
questions and recommended defendant answers, to get them ready for the
attack. Byrne points out that even its
ingenuity faltered at one point. When
the plaintiff reviewed Dow's failure (in the Stern case) and the judge’s decision
of corporate guilt, the entry was "Need response". Interestingly Dow Executives paid little
attention to this high priced advice.
Arnold Zenker a Boston lawyer who was in charge of media relations for
the company, described how he and Burson Marsteller sat in one room, while the
CEOs would meet elsewhere, virtually ignoring them. Said Zenker, "It was the god-damnedest thing I have ever
seen.” In this unusual case, the CEOs
ignored PR guidance, apparently committed to their own preconceptions. Dow Corning later declared bankruptcy.
We may now consider a few cases wherein the PR
industry was engaged for more "political" reasons. A fascinating instance was when American
Catholic bishops engaged Hill and Knowlton for an anti-abortion campaign. The case was made more controversial because
of its religious involvement; in addition it was reported to have been worth
3-5 million dollars. Opposition to this
project quickly took two main forms:
(1) It violated the traditional separation of church and state, (2) It
violated the policy of tax exemption for religion, based on its presumption of
no political action. The chief defense
was presented by a PRSA founder, Jerry Dalton who argued that the bishops had
first amendment rights to engage PR, like everyone else.
A
complementary argument was that in a free enterprise culture all services are
in the market. As the National Catholic
Reporter phrased it "What does Hill and Knowlton sell?" Answering its own question: "Anything
the customer is prepared to pay for.”
(See Wilcox et al, p. 138) Evidently the bishops had decided that their
religion and the papal pronouncements were not enough to resolve this issue in
the public mind, and more secular power was needed if the political battle over
abortion was to be won. The supposed
paragons of ethics are resorting to an agency which is famous for a "no
holds barred" tactics and strategy.
We can be confident that the bishops would put strict limits on first
amendment rights if Hitler had made the same claim in behalf of his operations. In any case they came up empty.
Turning to more strictly political employment of PR,
Pratkanis and Aronson report the first systematic use of PR by the presidency
was by General Eisenhower who hired two agencies (Young and Rubicam and BBDO)
to direct his campaign. Richard Nixon
followed with a PR engineered presentation which was both adept and successful
but in large degree bogus, as McGinness described in his book. McGinness concluded that TV is a powerful
means of seducing voters to vote for images of candidates rather than the
candidates themselves, or as one Nixon staffer put it: "This is the beginning of a whole new
concept... This is the way they'll be elected forever more.” When it came to Reagan and Bush, they hired
the PR expert Roger Ailes... seemingly with success, although Reagan was an amateur
PR expert.
A final case concerns Bonner and Associates, as
described by Greider. It is in the
business of selling mock democracy, manufacturing "grassroots"
support for whatever legislative aim a corporation or interest group may have
(and be able to afford). Says Greider,
"1f you want facts to support the industry's lobbying claims; it pumps out
facts. You want expert opinions from
scholars? It has those in abundance
from think tanks which corporate contributors underwrite. You want opinion polls? It hires polling firms to produce them. You want people, live voters who support the
industry's position? Jack Bonner
delivers them.”
Bonner specialized in lining up what he calls
"white hat people", regarded as independent and uncommitted (but
"educated", mobilized and agitated in advance by his
operatives). He says that emotion is
what makes a cause succeed. A case in
point is the Clean Air Bill of 1990.
His services in opposition were sold to the automobile makers who made
the usual claim that they couldn't meet the fuel standards required, and by
others who feared they would be forced to drive only small cars. These groups were mobilized--by an elaborate
phone system, to bring pressures to bear on their legislators (chosen because
they were more or less uncommitted on the subject)
The Clean Air Act of 1990 abandoned the standards of
the first clean air act (1970) which stated that the primary purpose would be
to protect life and health. The 1990
act directed attention at what Greider referred to as "the
plumbing". The new legislation set
out less ambitious terms for how the government will regulate toxic air
pollution. Of course this result cannot
be attributed just to Bonner's program, nevertheless it made a significant
contribution (which Bonner would undoubtedly be first to acclaim). More importantly it illustrates how these PR
agencies work, of which Bonner is one of many in the field. Bonner stated (to Greider) that he received
between a half million and a million dollars for his contribution.
Bonner defended his practice, and told the Washington
Post reporter: "In democracy the more groups taking their message to the
people outside the Beltway, and the more people taking their message to
congress, the better off the system is.”
The logical response was made by Stauber and Rampton: "What puts the lie to Bonner's claim is
that his clients are not “people', but corporations and business trade
associations buying the “appearance' of public support and citizen
advocacy.” This is not genuine
"grassroots" but rather an artificial operation recently labeled
"astroturf".
We have seen that what is called "public
relations" represents every kind of social behavior, from self interest
(and engineering others to that end) on the one hand, to understanding,
communication and mutual aid on the other.
The former we have referred to as PR.
When Haberman and Dolphin Inc. claims:"American style politics appears
to have adopted PR more enthusiastically than almost any other area of contemporary
life" it must be the former to which they are referring. It is well organized and is conducted to
bolster success and profit.
The second interpretation is welcomed. Everyone favors more effective public
relations--all individuals and groups.
There is very little organization to it, and ordinarily little
profit-seeking in such exemplary agencies as Consumers' Union, Common Cause and
the League of Women Voters. The same is
true of the Red Cross, Salvation Army and the various service organizations. It
is also true of those individuals
representing the second interpretation such as Gandhi or King or Ralph
Nader. It is closer to adult education
and applied social psychology.
Organized
PR has formalized and published guiding ethical principles, which should be of
some help. We have seen that practices
are often very different. Unfortunately
there is no law promoting the practice of the ethical theory in this
occupation, as in other professions.
The PR message must be paid for, and almost always by the agency which
profits even more from the operation, and at someone else's expense. Messages of understanding and communication
and help are seldom monetarily profitable to the purveyor. The men named above were not subsidized and
they made no significant amount of money from their messages. Of course presenting their messages required
gatherings and publications and broadcasts, which involved expense and someone
or some group had to pay it, but there is no profit involved so far as the
purveyor was concerned.
Assuredly (almost) all people are entitled to get
their messages out, and the "free enterprisers" are no exception, so
long as they are accurate and not characterized by misrepresentation and
untruths, which benefit the purveyor at the expense of others. This means that some person or agency must
be present and able to distinguish between the two. For that purpose there are independent, private groups such as
mentioned above. There must also be
agencies of the (hated) government to perform this function on the largest
scale. It and the others must be
constantly monitored with public reports, insuring independence and relative
freedom from special interests and pressures... perfection being impossible.
We cannot attribute the "successes" of the
PR operators wholly to their own efforts...fortunately their power is
limited. Nevertheless they have been
persistent and dereistic, with marked effects.
In any case their special interest activity is eventually
counterproductive, although the effect may be much delayed. The PR function will continue very
prominently, however there is some prospect that increasing numbers of people
will become alert and sensitized to it.
Such developments may force greater observance of their ethical code in
the future. Fortune magazine long ago
observed: "No profession poses more ethical problems even for its ablest
people than the practice of public relations.”
The question is--If the change results from pressures and protests and
fines, can it be regarded as primarily ethical?
CHAPTER 8
Bernays,
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Bernays,
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48
Tedone,
D. PRACTICAL PUBLICITY, Harvard Com.
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from The Public Relations Journal:
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b.
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c.
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d.
Ingram, W. “Building a Viable PR”, 5/75, p. 15
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