Our
Captive Culture
and the Bio-Social
Forces that Will Free Us
Most Americans are proud of what they call their democratic,
and representative government. It
started growing long ago in England and Western Europe, from where it was
transported to America. It has continued
to spread, however slowly in the world. Unfortunately it does not function as we like to believe. Before seeing how and why such is the case,
it is necessary to establish the relation of science to government.
Few scientists have been much concerned with the operation
of government, (except when they are seeking support for their investigations)
but so far as being proponents is concerned, Kuhn correctly warned, "One
of the strongest rules of scientific life is prohibition of political appeals.”
Naturally most scientists in America, like most citizens have a preference
for our political form. Students of
politics analyze this subject at great length, but we seldom refer to it as
science. Politics involve advocacy and controversy,
reduced opportunities for operational agreement based on logic and data and
requiring principles of behavioral science.
The scientific aim is to analyze in a manner transcending preferences
and subjective arguments--as much as possible.
Unique among those recognized as representing science,
who did refer to the subject of government was Bertrand Russell, in one of
his essays, having the title "Scientific Government". About as unique was the fact that Russell failed
to pursue the subject with his usual perceptive analysis. He concluded: "I should define a government as in greater or lesser degree
scientific in proportion as it can produced intended results.” But Hitler and Stalin produced their intended
results to a high degree. Surely Russell
would not have been pleased to call them scientific.
The difficulty seems to be that Russell was really talking
about technology rather than science, a very common error but surprising in
one so well prepared. He might argue
that ultimately they failed, but only after many years and in the meantime
they produced extremely negative intended results in great number.
On the other hand, more democratic-type governments persisted, in part
because they were better adapted to the bio-social requirements or basic drives
of our species. Technology tells us how to do something better,
but not what to do. Dictators are
quite interested in and supportive of technology, but for scientists only
to the extent these do not challenge the dictator's social-governmental theory
and practice. It is the operational
theory with which science is always concerned.
As applied to government, technology leads to the methods
for accomplishing specific ends, but does not address the ends to be accomplished
and why. Science itself provides the
theory necessary for guidance, for explaining what has been occurring and
what are likely to be the consequences of alternative procedures.
This must be deduced from the operative principles, working with independence
and objectivity (at least to the maximum possible). The common belief that
it is either perfection or nothing ignores the spectrum of abilities, where
science has been the undenied leader in performance.
For conclusions about nature (including "human
nature") science has depended upon accurate observations and the testing
of guiding theories. Free inquiry
is necessary for this success. The
government and its technology, in order to be sustainable must be adapted
to the discoveries and principles of science.
Technology "won't work" by itself, especially technology,
which is too often just for sale.
The question arises:
"How is it possible to be scientific about “what to do” so far
as government is concerned?" The
values question is usually considered mostly
irrelevant to science, not being testable and confirmable. Russell’s problem
in this case was that he had insufficient appreciation of behavioral science,
which is understandable since this essay was written in l93l.
If results are at issue, then what is the nature of
the results? Who is intending them? Are they in harmony or at odds with relevant
biosocial processes? What any individual
would like to see prevail is really beside the point, so far as science is
concerned; but one might logically ask: "Is a scientific/technological government necessarily authoritarian?"
Of course no large nation can closely correspond with pure democracy. Elected representatives are necessary to reflect (hopefully) popular
requirements, in an abbreviated way.
Science addresses the causes or dynamics underlying
any form of government, but it cannot do this successfully in normative terms. Some illustrations of failure: (1) The political
scientist Ebenstein stated, "The strength of democracy is never greater
than the will of people to uphold it.” (2)
Lippmann built his political philosophy on "What should be done",
and (3) Sidney Hook claimed that all such decisions are basically moral.
The questions are then: "What biosocial forces generated our will
in these cases? Which political view is moral and why?
We earlier called attention to Masters' "naturalistic'
interpretation of political behavior in terms of ethological principles as
a step in the scientific direction--that consequences are the real basis of
meaning and guidance. Unfortunately
Masters fell back on self imposed moral obligations as underlying the naturalism,
all of which implies that the moral commitment can supersede or dominate guidance
by consequences. We will see that this neither fits the facts well, nor encourages
testing and operational agreement. It
opens the door to normative or moralistic interpretations. They cannot all be treated as equally sustainable
and there must be a means for selecting the more heuristic among them.
The evolution of democratic type government, and the various naturalistic
forces activating it has been a lengthy process, which I have reviewed elsewhere.
Democratic type government is built on some fundamental
assumptions that are both sound and unsound. The following attributes negate
its existence to the degree they are present:
The rate of popular and informed
participation in selecting representatives and government policies has been
a historic slide. In the l880s, over
80% of the eligible voters showed up at presidential elections. Today it is usually about half of that. Off-year elections are worse. In the latter
case, when 35 or 40% turn out to vote, this means that a candidate or policy
could be instituted with 20% of the eligibles. The Committee for the Study
of the American electorate reported the overall U.S. turnout of eligible voters
fell to 36% in l998, a 56 year low (voting by the l8-24 year olds was at 32%)
Various excuses
are offered for this result, none of them sustainable. The "excuser" might argue that people
aren't interested because they believe they have no influence on decisions--their
vote doesn't count, they have "given up" on politics as a futile
operation among conflicting powerful interests. A vote is all they have or can get (unless
they are part of the power structure) and "giving up" only insures
the power dominance. Some years ago,
surveys asked people if they were interested in the political issues of the
day. Most of them either said they
weren't or answered in indifferent language.
Pollsters seldom ask that question today because the response might
be unwelcome (however it has come to be seen as bad PR to answer "cynically")
In recent years, the cost of political campaigns, and
therefore the powers of money have grown enormously. If getting one's image and message before the public, whatever it
may be, is essential to office, then electees almost invariably feel a sense
of debt and a need to repay in one way or another. When challenged with this description of things, the common response
is to deny it, however if we look at the subsequent voting records (seldom
done) we can see that actions speak louder than words. Understandably this augments the voter's sense
of being powerless and therefore apathetic. There are, of course, exceptions. A few representatives are so well established with their voters
they have no need for big war chests. On
the other side are cases like Perot of Texas and Huffington of California
(who barely failed of election in spite of spending millions--mostly his own
funds.
There has been a recent call for term limits as a method
of helping to reduce the soaring costs of political campaigns, which ties
in with the increasing power of special interests, which fund these to a high
degree. The aim is sound but the outcome
is inferior and the rationale is illogical. There is a simple, democratic way to retire a legislator who has
been in the capitol too long or is falling under the influence of special
interests. Vote him/her out in the
next election.
Term limitation
is a simplistic, fixated procedure, which relieves voters of becoming informed
and acting on that basis. It requires
time and experience to grasp the operation of governmental machinery--how
to operate knowingly and constructively within it. Strict, short- term limits puts operation in
charge of "greenhorns” and the ill-informed. Some legislators are knowledgeable and independent, operating in
the public interest. Some are the
opposite. Term limits cuts them all
down, irrespective of their performance.
The only way to discriminate between them is by way of the voters at
the polls in the next election. Any
present practice is better understood by fitting it into the picture of history
in this case, recent history.
To the degree that the electorate is uninformed, democracy
is neutralized. We can start with
the 1974 election, which occurred at a critical time, right after Watergate
disclosures concerning the corruption and quasi-dictatorship in the White
House, also during an energy crisis, when the economy was weakening. If there was ever a time in recent American
history when voter interest and knowledge should have been high, this was
it. Just before the election, CBS
News took a nationwide poll, which revealed that only 14% of the voters knew
the names of their congressmen standing for election. The situation in the senate was little better. Just one fourth of the voters knew the names
of their senators.
When the network commentators announced the above result,
they explained it with perfectly straight faces as being the product of "apathy
caused by Watergate and the bad state of the economy.” If we were to be consistent with this reasoning
we would have to conclude it was based on the following amazing proposition:
The more serious the problems, the more indifferent and ignorant the population.
Now this may not be too far from reality, but if so, it is absolutely
at odds with the basic premises of democracy.
The evidence on this subject is clear, without knowledge there can
be no real democracy.
The commentators may have chosen their words carelessly,
for one got the impression they didn't quite mean apathy, but a kind of numbness
and feeling of despair at the whole business and public inability to have
much influence on it. This interpretation
received support from experiences of door-to-door vote canvassers prior to
the election who were repeatedly cursed and chased into the streets.
Even if this interpretation is correct, it does not save orthodox democracy,
for reasons already identified. The
antecedents for Watergate will be reviewed later.
Some "excusers" contended that the CBS survey
was not based on an accurate sample, however similar tests of public knowledge
in previous years reinforced these results. Only a short time earlier Gallup had found that 56% of the public
could not name either senator from their state; 70% did not know the length
of term and 77% could give no accurate idea of the Bill of Rights. It may be properly contended that knowing the
names of their representative is tangent to the real question of knowing about
announced policies. A survey by the
American Business Committee on National Priorities revealed that 80% of the
voters were ignorant of how their representative voted on key national issues.
A Nader study reported it this way:
"The Business Committee polled ten congressional
districts represented by important legislators. In all of them, a majority of voters expressed opposition to funding
the SST. But eight out of ten of the
representatives voted for the SST, and apparently could get away with it,
since 85% of the voters didn't know how they had voted, and 15% who thought
they knew were wrong as often as right.”
The uninformed voter may respond that it is unreasonable to expect
him to know how his representative voted on every issue. There is some truth in this contention, but most of them did not
know how they voted on any issue, even the prime ones, and it is not unreasonable
to expect that they will at least glance over an occasional summary from time
to time. An informed citizen will
know his representative well enough to be able to predict with fair accuracy
the vote on key issues. Congressmen
know that most of their constituents are not informed and public opinion changes.
They are also aware that the special interests--especially the industrial
and military--are always on hand, know what’s going on and almost never change
their positions.
Gallup in a speech admitted that the public was uninformed,
but contended that its judgment was better than that of the experts.
Even if we agree that wise judgments can be based on ignorance, Gallup's
conclusion is still gratuitous, but probably well received by an audience
eager to believe it. Let us look at a few key issues to test the
hypothesis, at least in part. Gallup
asked the public how it thought government should act to control inflation.
The responses and proportions were as follows:
Ignorance is well represented by the 35%, but the surprising statistic is that while 16% said price control or wage control, only 3% chose price and wage control. Countries which have had some success in controlling inflation did so only by controlling both prices and wages (plus other procedures). These results were on an issue which everyone admits is vital to the nation reflecting the very antithesis of wisdom and judgment. (This does not require us to rate the advice of economic experts too highly, since there is minimal agreement among them.)
About the same time, Louis
Harris in his book THE ANGUISH OF CHANGE provided very convincing proof that
the American people are actively opposed to the most fundamental proposition
contained in their constitution, namely the Bill of Rights. There is an enormous gap between verbalized
beliefs and practice on the subject of democracy. We can put these results in tabular form, then draw conclusions:
| Principle |
% For |
% Vs |
Practice |
% For |
% Vs |
|
Right to express any opinion, e.g. overthrow government |
91 |
5 |
Outlaw organizations advocating violent overthrow |
67 |
22 |
|
Right of accused to question witnesses against him |
86 |
7 |
Let FBI agents testify without cross-examination |
50 |
32 |
|
Right to reasonable, not excessive bail |
51 |
31 |
Criminals arrested a second time can be held without bail |
66 |
32 |
|
Right to hold meeting on any subject |
66 |
23 |
Expell any student attending campus protest meeting |
48 |
37 |
|
|
|
|
Review protest meeting in advance to be sure that they will
not advocate overthrow |
53 |
34 |
|
Right to print any point of view |
73 |
19 |
Ban newspapers advocating revolution |
53 |
35 |
|
|
|
|
Give authorities right to censor TV, radio, papers etc for
unpatriotic or revolutionary content |
57 |
32 |
The pattern revealed above is clear. Great majorities will agree with certain basic
principles when stated in general terms--in this case, rights guaranteed by
the constitution. When put into operational
form, the same people will oppose the practice of these same principles.
An inescapable conclusion is that the majority of people are fearful,
restrictive and conservative, especially when it comes to advocating fundamental
or revolutionary changes. While Harris
did not break this down according to income level, Gallup's data would suggest
that there would be a strong positive correlation with affluence.
This antipathy to the bill of rights was treated by
Harris as a minor shortcoming, which would be remedied almost by calling attention
to it. Not so. It is a genuine fear of change by a conservative
population; but if this is the case then why don't our leaders--executive,
legislative and judicial--ignore the Bill of Rights rather than trying to
abide by and enforce it, as they usually do? This may be the law, but a law can be changed
or even evaded, particularly when most people no longer support it.
The most probable answer is that American leaders are
aware that an articulate and organized minority can give them trouble; also,
if majorities were again exposed to unprotected exploitation, most people
would change their position rather soon, and re-develop an appreciation of
the benefits of protection. This would
expose the leaders to yet more trouble. Even
the threat of these consequences is not sufficient stimulus to deter some
politicians, but it is more effective than appeal to norms and ideals.
We can dramatize further the widespread fear and antipathy
to the foundations of American government. The People's Bicentennial Commission conducted a survey of 2, 300
public servants, interviewed at random in front of public buildings in the
nation's capitol. These people were
presented with a copy of the Declaration of Independence and asked to sign
it. 68% of them refused to do so,
and only 32% agreed to sign. This
result parallels an earlier survey asking a random sample of the population
to do the same thing. The most startling
discovery was that of those who refused to sign, 83% recognized it as the
Declaration. They knew what they were
refusing to endorse. When asked their
reasons for not signing the following were given as a sample of the comments
recorded:
Members of congress made the best record, since 46.8%
signed and 53.2% did not. Predictably,
at the Pentagon, only 20.6% signed and 79.4% refused. Other departments were scattered between these extremes.
The response to this survey is explainable by the realization
that our population is relatively affluent, conservative and afraid of change,
in contrast with the population that revolted from English rule.
There was no communist bogey in 1776 to which anyone could be assigned
if he looked with some degree of favor on revolutionary change (except for
perhaps "monarchist"). Today we claim to have a mechanism which
permits change to be made, legally, nonviolently and gradually.
It was interesting that this reason for failure to sign was not to
be found in the extensive list of recorded comments; further support for the
conclusion that it was not so much the method but the idea of fundamental
change itself to which the interviewees objected.
Some surveys of younger citizens have disclosed results unfavorable for the future of democratic
government. A nationally representative
sample of 240,000 college students conducted in 1995 by the UCLA Higher Education
Research Institute found that only 29% thought it was important to keep up
on political affairs compared with 58% in 1966. "Never before in the 30 years of the survey,
which has long been regarded as an important gauge of how college students
view their lives and society have more students shown such apathy toward politics"
reported the Washington Post. An earlier
poll by Times Mirror for People and the Press found that the majority was
not only poorly informed but unconcerned about the misbehavior of elected
officials.
We may therefore deduce with confidence that these young
people were proceeding in a satisfying way with their own personal schedules
and that they did not perceive any costs to themselves of their own ignorance
of and indifference toward voting, participation and misbehavior by their
representatives. Furthermore, we can
expect no substantial change in their outlook toward the behavior of political
leaders until they become aware that they in some way suffer for it.
Such episodes reflect negatively on the democratic process. Having
seen evidence of delusions about democratic government on the part of the
population, the question naturally arises as to whether political leaders
and scholars have been victims in any similar way. That can be determined by a series of cases
taken from the middle part of the 20th century... to be done shortly.
The essence of democracy as presently conceived is (1)
freedom of expression of all political positions and their consideration,
(2) political decisions made by majority vote, (3) implementation which maximizes
drive satisfaction for all to the greatest mutual degree possible.
The first two attributes are rather clear.
The third is difficult to operationalize.
At present in the U.S., there are many interests striving to maximize
their satisfaction, highly organized as lobbies, however the unorganized majority
is much less effective but also more diverse
Lasch contended that self-governing communities rather
than individuals are the basic units of democracy because they promote the
necessary debate. Therefore he viewed
their decline as a great threat. Lasch
provided no support for this belief. Individuals still must decide, with or without debate, and they
usually implement that by voting. Lasch
defines democracy as "a legal system that makes it possible for people
to live with their differences.” That
is one of the outcomes, but not the essential part. People are more interested in how their particular “difference”
can be heard and implemented as much as possible. Again, elections are the usual mechanism, but Lasch almost ignores
them.
It is instructive to recall the Dewey-Lippmann differences
on the subject. Lippmann concluded
that government has become so complex that it is best left to experts, trained
managers (who would act in a way satisfying to the public needs).
Only science could provide the truth in this matter, said Lippmann.
He concluded that the masses would therefore take no responsibility
to perform their work as well as possible.
Dewey disagreed that society would deteriorate under democratic conditions,
although he did not provide a rationale to show how "responsibility would
thrive in a world dominated by giant organizations and mass communication.”
There are at least two fallacies here represented.
(1) To allege failure of work performance is to confuse capitalism
with democracy and economics with politics.
(2) Lippmann misunderstood the nature of modern science, which does
not provide "the truth" on a subject, but as indicated earlier only
higher probabilities of accurate representation and explanation.
Moreover, as Dewey pointed out, scientists must also "debate"
their hypotheses and theories, in order to adequately test them.
The majority position is widely taken as the final test
of democratic decisions, however there must be qualifications, as the American
founding fathers realized. They had
reservations about majority rule, especially when decisions are made quickly,
under pressure and without deliberation. James Madison in his FEDERALIST PAPERS insisted
on the need to "refine and enlarge the public views by passing them through
the medium of a chosen body of citizens whose wisdom may best discern the
true interest of their country and whose patriotism and love of justice will
be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations.”
The response was a system of checks and balances.
What could not have been foreseen (adequately at least)
was the power of the media in a mass society, and the power of money over
the media. There has recently been
widespread frustration over the inability of many people, especially the unorganized--to
have any influence on government decisions, partly due to sheer size and partly
to the power of organized interests to dominate it. (Fortunately many of these interests are conflicting).
One response has been to appeal to electronic communications to widen
and speed up the process...pushed by Perot, the Tofflers and Gingrich.
Time magazine argued that Washington was already being
flooded by electronic messages from constants, calling this "Hyperdemocracy"--a
misleading term because these messages did not come from a "supermajority".
It was, once again the organized special interest groups pushing the
"last minute” decisions their way. Many
of the electronic advocates really perceived it and wanted to use it to forward
their causes. The neo conservatives
such as Gingrich favored it as a way to keep control where it has (almost)
always been, in the interests of the powerful, in spite of the usual, contrary
promises.
It should not be thought that the masses are wholly
favorable to realizing total democracy. The
appeal of political-economic "saviors" is often unappreciated.
Lapham has described this phenomenon in his book THE WISH FOR KINGS--exemplifying
his thesis by means of numerous personal experiences with prominent leaders
(in colorful terminology). In his
words, "The wish for kings is the fear of freedom" a pretext of
rescuing people from incalculable peril, fears unleashed in large part by
the mass, technological society out of control.
Lapham adds: "Once it is possible to believe that the world can
be redeemed by the sudden advent of a god from the machine, either in the
person of a newly minted celebrity or by one's own transformed self--then
it is possible to believe that if things don't work out quite the way the
audience had hoped, maybe the mistakes can be corrected by an equally abrupt
departure" or perhaps by another savior.
He expressed hope that democracy could survive the threats and appeals,
that freedom to question and change would persist.
In another place, Lapham declared that democracy included accountability
of the governors to the governed, but why would they be accountable?
One response is because of ethical, proper behavior--which has not
been very effective for insuring public interest.
The established instrument for enforcing accountability has been the
franchise--which power tries with some success to manipulate. We shall later consider a more fundamental
dynamic.
We have sampled evidence displaying the dangers of populism,
and our captivity to it. There are
great dangers from the worship of authority, which in America many think of
as the president. During the 20th
century there was a growing dominion of the presidency, supported and abetted
by the other branches of government, by the political scholars and even by
the people themselves. Professor H.D.
Hamilton has reviewed this development very succinctly.
The following introduction is indebted to Hamilton, and relates his
thesis to the theme of intellectual bondage, stressing the role of the political
scholars in the process (A paper entitled “Watergate and the Cult of the Presidency
in Political Science”, presented at the Caucus for New Politics in Chicago)
The tone was set at the end of the last century. H.J.
Ford in THE RISE AND GROWTH OF AMERICAN POLITICS argued that the danger of
parliamentary control of government was avoided by the development of an electoral
president, therefore, claimed Ford, "The greatness of the presidency
is the work of the people breaking through encrusted constitutional form.
In the presidential office, American democracy has revived the oldest
political institution of the race, the elective kingship.”
In 1908, Professor Woodrow Wilson wrote the book CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT,
in which he hailed the achievement of ascendancy on the part of the chief
executive. Said Wilson: "The president is at liberty both in law and conscience to
be as big a man as he can... the nation craves a single leader... His is the
only true national voice in affairs.” Wilson
did admit a danger to the abuse of executive power, but he thought it very
unlikely that a president would do this and suffer the costs of his illegal
methods.
The great depression reinforced the confidence of political
scholars in presidential power. Pendleton
Herring praised the idea in his book PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP.
Joseph Harris explained that congressional leadership was rendered
impotent by the committee system. Samuel Huntington provided additional reasons
why congress was unfit to lead or even to pass legislation. Arthur Schlesinger described Roosevel’s method,
developed during the depression as follows: "His system of command was to insure that important decisions
were passed on to the top. His favorite
technique was to keep grants of authority incomplete, jurisdictions uncertain,
charters overlapping. The result was
often confusion, but no other method could insure that the power to make decisions
would remain with the president.” Roosevelt was deliberately obfuscating toward
his associates. (As Tugwell said,
"Franklin allowed no one to discover the governing principle') But as
Schlesinger concludes, it paid off because "their insecurity gave him
new opportunities for manipulation, which he exploited with cruel skill.”
During the 1940s, war solidified presidential power,
as it always has. After World War
II, Louis Brownlow, in THE PRESIDENCY AND THE PRESIDENT, reviewed all the
vital functions of the chief executive and characterized him as "the
top manager who runs the government (in a few hours per week), engineers the
nation's economy, represents the opinions of the people, conducts foreign
affairs and leads us to victory in war.”
Edward Corwin in TOTAL WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION said that in total
war, the president has to be a dictator, but as Hamilton pointed out, the
adjective "total" got lost, and subsequent textbooks have proclaimed
that presidential dictatorship is inevitable in any war, and the president
does not even have to declare war.
Clinton Rossiter's popular textbook THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY
was long used to promote adulation for the office into college students in
political science. Rossiter condensed
his attitudes in an essay entitled, "The Focus of Leadership " where
he affirmed that "No American can contemplate the presidency without
a feeling of solemnity and humility.” The
president, according to Rossiter is not only the leader of the executive branch,
and the leader of the forces of war and peace, but he is:
A little later, Richard Neustadt moved the president
closer to God and stated that he was "the source of all major initiatives,
supplier of both general plans and detailed programs, articulator of the forward
course in every sphere of policy.” Later
Neustadt put it even more strongly: The presidency is the "sole centralizing
stake of power...the sole organ of foreign relations and military command,
the sole object of the ‘take care' clause and of the veto power, the sole
crown-like symbol of the union.”
Neustadt’s book PRESIDENTIAL POWER contains an exposition
of the ways a president can maximize his power. Leadership is power, and a leader, the president
must have the will to power if he is to be fit for the office; claims Neustadt.
Techniques of "bargaining" are recommended which minimize
the uncertainties of reward for supporting the president and maximize the
uncertainties and risks of opposition.
Neustadt apparently
believed that the president should strengthen his position and as much as
possible monopolize decision-making. Thus
the president "guards his own power stakes" and in order to identify
these stakes accurately he "must be his own power expert".
This is carte blanche to a very heady wine indeed, to suppose that
only the leader will be the judge of his own course, his program, his demands.
It is a form of idolatry. There
has never been a political leader who has not needed criticism and alternative
proposals from others, who has always been right. To suppose that, is to confuse earth with heaven
Watergate deflated the balloon of presidential sanctity,
at least temporarily. It became clear
that Woodrow Wilson had been wrong about the dangers, that Neustadt and others
had been wrong about a president being the only judge of his own course, of
shouting down all other voices etc. Schlesinger characterized the pathology of
the IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY as being "the misconceptions propagated by a
generation of scholars, sustained by the myth making of the press and the
acclaim of sycophants.” In a half
dozen places, Schlesinger conceded his own part in the process. But clearly the public was susceptible to,
or even demanded this treatment. As
Hamilton pointed out, all the elements of this syndrome--people, press, scholars,
elites reciprocally sustained each other.
This is no place for a detailed inquiry into the factors
which gave rise to the syndrome, for they are many and complex. Congress aided the process by giving the president
increasing powers under any emergency and by cooperating with the growth of
the executive bureaucracy. (Wildavsky
reminds us that "before 1939, the president officially had only three
assistants assigned to him; today the executive office has some 4,000 functionaries
and employees") Even today the press focuses on the president when he
is golfing or jogging, which reinforces the common illusion that his every
act is important.
The obeisance of political scholars reviewed here reflects
a departure from democratic principles plus an inability to maintain even
a quasi- scientific orientation. Their
own statements constitute critical evidence of failure to represent a relatively
high degree of objectivity and independence from a dedication to personality
and doctrine. The public performs
similarly and both manifest symptoms of our captive culture.
An explanation offered is that this situation represents
to a large degree a product of the times. The great depression and the Second World War were stressful experiences
which contributed to the fears and dangers and a "lack of control"
over these crises, therefore the strong appeal of a savior mentality.
F.D. Roosevelt successfully wore the mantle of Lapham's WISH FOR KINGS,
not only among the population but among the political savants as well--helped
by his taking some successful action against the depression (at a time when
money power was somewhat descendant)
Sixty years later, the presidential icon has fallen
much lower, not only in response to the Nixon downfall but to Clinton's shady
and equivocal behavior. It may be
added that Congress has suffered as much in public esteem during these later
years in comparison to the executive. There
has been no economic or international crisis to help the image or to provide
a Teflon overcoat. Reagan wore this
last apparel with great effect because of his movie skills and personal charisma.
The above cannot be taken as justification for the failure
of the scholars to be skeptical inquirers (not political hacks). There were, of course, analysts able to "tell
the truth and run" (e.g., George Seldes) however these found little appeal
amongst the public smitten by the great leader syndrome as much or more than
the scholars. These two social elements
reinforced each other. It is instructive to turn now to a presidential case,
able to exploit the public mythology and ignorance to build up a bogus authority
figure... until it collapsed.
The career of Richard Nixon is pertinent here as an
illustration of captivity. The essential points can be made without exceedingly
detailed analysis because they rest on the most evident facts and propositions
which are unchallenged, except by the hard liners, who cannot countenance
any unfavorable facts or logic on the subject.
Nixon himself was captive to a nearly bottomless need to achieve political
victories and eminence. He was fearful
of stopping at any point. Toledano
said, "Nixon has always run scared.” Kempton enlarged it: "The real Mr. Nixon just rushes past us
in ill-concealed flight" Nixon himself confessed: "When you have won one battle is the time
you should step up your effort to win another--until final victory is achieved.”
Of course he never defined final victory, but obviously it was at the
highest level, and he characterized his own need to always be on a "fast
track". Campaign politics was his life.
Any political defeat was traumatic to Nixon and only
rekindled his desire to vindicate it with success. Nixon was almost paranoid about the press, especially the liberal
newspapers, columnists and TV newsmen. (He
usually ignored the fact that over 3/4 of the newspapers supported his presidential
campaign). When he was elected, fear
of criticism caused him to surround himself with organization men who would
insulate him from unpleasant realities, and political gut fighters who would
battle for his cause, no matter what.
One of Nixon's aides, Richard Whalen observed, "Campaign
politics, regardless of party and candidate is inherently conspiratorial,
because the only purpose and binding force of the enterprise is victory. Almost
any means toward that all-important end can be justified with a modest amount
of rationalization. A conspiratorial
campaign politician who reduces all problems to power brokerage behind closed
doors is contemptuous of (any) ideology. Sadly for Nixon, he had only these two kinds
of men around him, the ignorant and the arrogant.”
The attitude of the White House gut fighters was illustrated
by Lloyd Shearer in PARADE: "We
find John Ehrlichman saying of Patrick Gray, “Let him twist slowly, slowly
in the wind" or John Dean's recommendation that the Nixon administration
study "how we can use the available federal machinery to screw our enemies.”
Charles Colson said "I would walk over my grandmother if necessary
to prove my loyalty to the cause of the president’s re-election.”
A Nixon aide said of Alexander Butterfield, who honestly
told congress about huge cost overruns on the C-5A, "We should let him
bleed for a while.” It is not surprising
that Nixon should believe he was above the law and could get away with tax
dodging, illegal break-ins, lies to cover up, illegal campaign contributions,
use of tax money for personal purposes, initiation of secret war in Cambodia
and a long list of offenses compiled by Senator Weiker. As late as 1977 Nixon had not changed his ideas,
for in the Frost interview, we find this exchange:
Frost: You're
saying... that there are certain situations... where the president can decide
that its in the best interests of the nation... and do something illegal?
Nixon: Well,
when the president does it that means it is not illegal
Frost: By definition?
Nixon: Exactly
An equally important phase of
the Nixon case is to be found in the captivity of the public to fears that
Nixon represented and exploited. His
techniques were successful and therefore repeatedly reinforced. In his first campaign for congress (1946) in
California against Jerry Voorhis, Nixon used the red scare tactics, which
were to prove so effective. He made
Voorhis synonymous with the Political Action Committee, and declared: "
I welcome the opposition of the P.A.C. with its communist principles and huge
slush fund.” A campaign flyer declared
that a vote for Nixon was a vote against socialization, communism and the
PAC. This was not true, nor was it true that the
PAC had endorsed Voorhis. The PAC
principles which Nixon found to be "communistic" were such things
as minimum wage, national health insurance, opposition to poll taxes, housing
discrimination, and détente with Russia.
The Nixon-edited version of the 3/22/73 tape had him
saying: "to get off the cover-up line.”
The actual tape recorded: "to get on with the cover up line.” Later the same day, Nixon said, "I don't
give a shit what happens. I want you
all to stonewall it; let them plead the 5th amendment, cover up or anything
else.”
Anti-communism was as potent a tactic as expected, but
when the election was over, Nixon asserted: "Communism was not an issue
at any time in the 1946 election" In his 1950 campaign against Helen
Douglas, Nixon followed the same script, but he had some distinguished help. Senator Joseph McCarthy spoke for Nixon.
Gerald L. K. Smith, the anti-Semite also spoke out in Nixon’s
favor (partly because Mrs. Douglas'
husband was Jewish and partly because Smith was an arch-conservative).
In the 1952 election, Nixon brought it out in the open.
He said, "Communist subversion and corruption will be the theme
of every speech.” McCarthy supported
Nixon and Nixon in turn called for the re-election of "my good friend
Joe McCarthy.” At this time McCarthy
was riding high with charges of communism everywhere and lists of "known"
communists who should be fired summarily, without knowing who charged them
or having an opportunity to answer the charges.
When Stassen finally denounced McCarthy in 1953, Nixon and others issued
a statement praising McCarthy.
Nixon made what Hamilton called "a revolutionary
bid for supremacy at home, employing an assortment of means: the mandate mystique,
the secrecy system, and executive privilege, also impoundment, political surveillance
in the name of national security...and use of the White House itself as a
base for espionage and sabotage directed at the political opposition.”
Had these illegal methods succeeded, the captivity of Americans would
have been markedly increased. It is of interest that what kept them from
succeeding was a careless, or reluctant revelation by one of Nixon's aides,
Alexander Butterfield about the existence of taped conversations. These tapes eventually brought Nixon down. It is probable that his other tactics would
not have been challenged by congress or the public and Nixon would have continued
in office. Schlesinger found Nixon
saying (1948) that the president-then Truman-should not be able to deny congress
vital information under the claim of executive privilege because it would
prevent such disclosures as Teapot Dome
Winston Churchill said that democracy is the worst form
of government, except for all the others.
The truth in this jest is worth further inquiry. Churchill was responding to the world's recent
experience with dictatorships, and their apparent rapid success. He also seems to perceive that no form of government,
including democracy is going to satisfy that random collection of individualists
and conflicting doctrines that make up any national population. Under such circumstances how can any government
be considered in any way as being scientific? (Churchill had at first expressed
admiration for the fascist doctrines because they were efficient.)
First of all, we are not talking here about science
in the sense of controlled experimentation or mathematical processes. In this connection we often fail to appreciate
that some sciences originated without any experimentation (astronomy) and
without any mathematics (geology, evolution). Some similarities of practicing democracy with
fundamental assumptions and procedures of all science deserve recognition:
1.
Free inquiry is basic to science, and no other form
of government is so open to this process as parliamentary and representative
democracy.
2. There is competition of ideas in science, with a better
chance of the superior prevailing, which is more characateristic of democracy
than any competitor.
3. The competition is more likely to be based on facts
and reasoning rather than power, force, suppression. (note: just "more likely")
4.
Humans, like other species, are encoded with some basic
physiological and psychological requirements or "laws of motion".
Democracy provides the better opportunity for these drives to be fulfilled
for more individuals
5. Therefore free and effective political cooperation is
more likely in the above cases. But
there are very great (and usually unrecognized) difficulties to be encountered,
as we have observed).
Practical democracy has performed
a beneficial function of enhancing opportunities for governing in the public
interest, for restraining somewhat the power and corruption of leaders.
Students like Toffler and Ingelhart predict more participation in the
superindustrial society of the future. The
sociologist Etzioni in his book on Communitarianism has provided an excellent
description of the impediments to democratic functioning on the part of special
interests, and the reforms needed to reduce lobby power.
These reforms included such items as public finance of elections (which
is less expensive in the long run), limitations on private contributions (with
no “bundling”); limitation on the costs of running for office (as in Britain)
etc.
Etzioni then summarizes the objections to these proposals--mostly
by representatives of the special interests themselves. For example: (1) "All that money buys is access, not actual congressional
votes.” Etzioni provides contradictory
examples to this claim. (2) "PAC
contributions are too small to matter.” But
the law permits as many PACs as needed for any candidate--they can be bundled.
(3) PACs are just rewards to legislators already holding a position;
no vote is affected. Etzioni's comments: "If this were true, corporations and labor
unions would be blowing away millions without discernible benefits.” Etzioni
reports on President Carter complaining about legislators being "bought".
When Rep. Breaux (La.) heard of this, he commented, "I'm not for
sale but I can be rented.” There is demonstrably some truth as well as
humor in this observation.
The rationalizers of wealth ordinarily present the following
arguments:
1.
That the constitution guarantees free speech, and restrictions
on campaign financing would interfere with and violate free speech
2.
That the extra money cannot be controlled, and makes
no difference in any case
The first argument contends that
spending money is equivalent to free speech (as ruled by the Supreme Court)
so the more money spent, the more freedom of speech, and the excess time given
to the bigger spender doesn't matter. To
take a parallel case, in any formal debate, if one participant was given twice
as much time (especially if it was because of the money spent) the onlookers
would assuredly make a justified and effective protest, which is no different
in large scale political issues. The observers can make their own guesses
as to the Supreme Court’s motivation for this decision.
As for the second contention, election statistics show
that the candidate spending more money is likely to win elections--by a varying
ratio, but it always averages out very substantially in favor of the bigger
spender. How can one prove the positive effect of the money? Simply implement
the reasonable Stern test described in Chapter 7. Any legislative proposal
to regulate campaign financing is opposed by the incumbents, for obvious reasons
(in which they are generally successful). A logical answer would be for voters to have
the record of what candidates spent, the amounts and the source. If they couldn't
particularize, a good simple rule for controlling expenditures would be to
vote against the candidate who spent the most,(Not l00% dependable but better
than nothing). Another answer would be for public financing of electoral campaigns,
with strict limits. We will address
money power and democratic elections more specifically in the Money Chapter
to follow. What will furnish a mechanism
for implementing some of the above reforms?
Etzioni calls for "social movements” as represented by the environmentalists
and feminists, and particularly by the Progressive Party of early in the 20th
century, in the model of the LaFollettes in Wisconsin.
By almost any definition, quasi-democratic regimes have
been and are increasing as compared with the growth of dictatorships, so far
as people are concerned. One must
dig deeply through the last quarter century to find many countries going from
democracy to dictatorship, but there are many that have done the opposite. Why? Because
this political form is more adaptable; it offers more opportunity, more self-realization
and a "better life" for its constituents.
This historical evolution has been recounted elsewhere.
Is that the end of the story for the indefinite future--democracy universally
triumphant? Not as usually conceived.
Burnham in his book THE MACHIAVELLIANS reviewed a line
of elitist thinkers from Machiavelli, through Pareto, Mosca, and Michels to himself. The subject of democracy was touched upon only
briefly by these theorists. They agreed
that government in the interests of people was possible, even necessary, but
only if it is first recognized that elites or managers are inevitable. These authorities, said Burnham will always
seek to operate in their own interests, and "No theory, no promises,
no morality, no amount of good will, no religion will restrain power.”
On the other hand they agreed that freedom or liberty
is also essential, and its operation is the essence of democracy as well as
science of all kinds. Pareto recognized
the requirement of science, whether natural or social: "Before a theory can be considered true
it is virtually indispensable that there be perfect freedom to impugn it. Any limitation even indirectly and however
remotely imposed on anyone choosing to contradict is enough to cast suspicion
on it. Hence freedom to express one's
thoughts, be it counter to the opinion of the majority, or of all, even when
it offends the sentiments of the few or the many always proves favorable to
the discovery of truth”, including governmental truth.
But does not the elitist concept of power lead to dictatorship
rather than freedom? In another book
Burnham foresaw that "With the consolidation of the managerial society,
its dictatorial phase will change to a democratic phase.”
That unlikely development will have to be explained and supported.
Michels, in his book on political parties, maintained that the number
of citizens who have a lively interest in public affairs is insignificant. “In the majority of human beings the sense
of an intimate relationship between the good of the individual and the good
of the collectivity is but little developed.”
However Michels admitted: "As
a form of social life we must choose democracy as the least of evils.
The ideal government would doubtless be that of an aristocracy of persons
at once morally good and technically efficient, but where shall we discover
such an aristocracy?" He thought
we might sometime find it as an outcome of deliberate selection, but offered
no explanation of how and why this selection might come about.
Michels briefly touched upon the idea of referendum
or election but concluded that it would not work well because of "the
incompetence of the masses and the lack of time.” On the contrary, elections
have become more widespread... not
less since Michels wrote, in spite of their inadequacies and defects. The American capitalistic elites have tried
to manipulate elections in their own interest through the power of money and
the media but with periodic success, at least so far. The persistent question becomes: What forces compel the power-seeking
leaders (elected or not) to operate in the public interest to an increasing
degree? We will return to that basic
problem again.
Walter Lippmann made a clear modern statement of the
dilemma of democracy as he saw it: "The mass of people see these settlements,
judge them and affect them only now and then. They are altogether too numerous, too complicated,
too obscure in their effects to become the subject of any continuing exercise
of public opinion.” The organized
theory of elitism was developed at the Hoover Institute, predicated on the
impossibility of mass government and the inevitability of elites--their characteristics
and evolution. These studies were
usually built around the struggle for power--who gets it, when and how.
On the other end of the political spectrum, social scientists
stressed the dangers of power and tried to make popular government work.
For example Charles Beard claimed that the elites and technicians don't
know any more about government problems than the masses.
"In an era of mass production by the masses, for the masses, when
the poor and bad born work in the whole industrial structure from bottom to
top, the people themselves bear heavy burdens of civilization and they are
as likely to discover through their skins if no other way, what is politically
feasible and desirable.” It was interesting that Beard seems to have
abandoned the ordinary avenues of knowledge and settled for a kind of osmosis.
Returning to Lippmann, he offered a view of THE PUBLIC
PHILOSOPHY, which put limits on private ownership and on the power of wealth
and property. These limits in his view were dictated by ideal public behavior--"what
ought to be", similar to the natural laws and human rights of the Enlightenment.
In another book, Lippmann expressed the belief that "When at last
the popular will prevails it is capable of overthrowing the vested rights
of property: The follow-up questions are: What shapes the popular will? What makes it prevail? Why are the powerful moved toward "what
should be"? Lippmann identifies
no social forces undergirding these wills, rights and shoulds.
Burnham acknowledged the necessity of an "unsuppressible
opposition" in his model, for both science and democracy.
He did not foresee exactly how this could be reconciled with managerialism
in practice. What do other elitists have to say on this
question? In THE COMPARATIVE STUDY
OF ELITES, Lasswell, Lerner and Rothwell assert, "There is no body politic
in which the active elite are wholly unaccountable to the large circles within
the community and even to the community as a whole.” Unfortunately “wholly" leaves room for "plenty".
The authors devote astonishingly little time to the question of what
factors enforce accountability of leaders.
Lasswell did add, "Where the means of peaceful influencing are
not at hand and deprivations are widespread, attempts at enforcing accountability
(of the elite) are likely to end in coercion, whether in the form of assassinations,
uprisings, sabotage or civil disobedience.”
But are there not ways in which accountability is gained
without such extremities? As well
known, voting is one, even if not always a guarantee. In any case what lies behind voting, to back
it up? Sociological science directs
attention to a long process of cultural conditioning as the main dynamic,
as first developed over the centuries in English history--reviewed elsewhere. Authorities of several kinds learned through
repeated experiences with the social costs of untrammeled self interest--protests,
riots, revolts--and the rewards possible from increased public interest operation.
Selecting one period, Lewis characterized "British
Planning in 1945-50", a time when leading Tories such as Churchill, Sankey
and Heyworth recommended nationalization of coal, railroads and gas.
They perceived that "the accompanying control was eminently pragmatic,
born of hard, immediate necessities.” Crudely
expressed, they saw that their industries were not profitable under the circumstances,
but so important that they must be kept, not only in operation, but at a level
adequate to maintain labor and business and to avoid paralyzing conflict.
Lasch (in THE REVOLT OF THE ELITES) contends that "the
elites who define the issues have lost touch with the people.” To that extent there is danger to a functional
society. The managers will become
adjusted to this problem "the hard way"--by conflict and malfunction--if
they cannot perceive and adjust in advance. Then what is the motivation for pursuing these
social movements? According to Etzioni,
it is "a louder moral voice". In explanation: "Only if Americans
truly participate in the formation of a new moral climate will the moral voice
of the community be re-directed. If one changes public policy without gaining
a moral consensus, we have at best a rather faulty democracy.”
Communitarian guidance is commendable as a policy, but the deficiencies
of moral appeals over the centuries have been illustrated elsewhere).
A defense of “communitarian” can readily be made in terms of the sociality
need, or drive.
The recommendations of Toffler, Inglehart and Etzioni
are more operative for small groups or parts of larger organizations where
there are face-to-face relationships and problems manageable by the individuals
involved. On the larger scale, as
technology grows at its usual rapid pace, the world is tied together more
closely. The problems become more
complex, large scale and integrated. Ordinary
people know less about them, and the control inevitably shifts toward trained
managers.
Perhaps the most sanguine outlook for democracy ever
written was the prediction by Bennis and Slater in their book THE TEMPORARY
SOCIETY. Their first chapter headlined
the good news: "Democracy is
Inevitable". The reason? "It is the only system that can successfully
cope with the changing demands of contemporary civilization.” What underlies the successful coping? It is the democratic family unit, making possible
close interaction and the freedom to test and adapt, which reflects itself
in the entire culture. One is led
to wonder what Bennis and Slater would say about the recent rapid deterioration
of the nuclear family in the U.S. and its impact on democracy. It becomes reasonably clear that the family
is not the primary source for whatever success democracy has in the world. On the other hand, their prediction of democracy's
growth has certainly been confirmed... but for the wrong reasons.
This chapter has examined the common myths and delusions
about democracy on the part of the populace as well as by the political leaders
and scholars. We have seen that democracy
as popular participation in government is contravened by opposition of the
majority to the heart of the constitution--the bill of rights--and by the
ignorance of the majority regarding the issues and the elements of their government.
The majority does not vote and as we approach the lower levels of government,
the percentage of voters is even smaller, and therefore the interest is less,
at the very place where problems are more manageable for the average citizen.
Everyone concerned is captivated by the appeal of power--the people, the leaders and scholars.