Our
Captive Culture
and the Bio-Social
Forces that Will Free Us
Nationalism may be defined most
simply as commitment to the perceived benefit of one’s own nation, without
respect to others. Nationalism has both
constructive and destructive forms. It
is applicable to those cases where one country seeks to free itself from the
domination or control by others and thereby attain autonomy. On the other hand, each nation may pursue
its own interests unimpeded or uninfluenced by the interests of other
nations. This may take the form of imperialism
where one country may try to conquer or control others by military or economic
means. We are concerned here with the
destructive phase of nationalism.
Nationalism is patriotism carried to extreme,
smothering logical analysis and sound evaluation. The military and economic phases are often hybridized in what
Eisenhower called the military industrial complex. There is usually an antithesis, against which all tactics are
justified. For Americans this fearful
specter has been communism as exemplified by the USSR. It was long our chief economic and military
threat and was used to decoy American public opinion into tolerating and
supporting "non-communist" dictatorships, witch hunts, the cold war
and a quasi-colonialism practiced by the U.S. government. It is found also
among multinational corporations, which use nationalism to their
advantage. The “red scare” was
justified until the USSR collapsed in the late 1980s. (Some pundits perceived a troubling vacuum among the
conservatives when their chief bete noir was removed.)
American behavior on the world scene has many facets,
some logical and constructive, some the opposite. Naturally we as a people prefer to focus on the former,
exemplified by colonial revolt against British nationalism and by our
introduction and promotion of the Point Four and Marshall Plan for world
reconstruction after World War II. This
great benefit to other nations at our own immediate expense, included not only
our friends and erstwhile allies, but our former enemies who had been trying to
destroy us (to be addressed later).
The appeal of nationalism and patriotism is quite
understandable. The organized human
group has evolved in size and complexity, attaining the modern form of the
nation state early in the 19th century.
At each stage, the humans involved recognized the advantages of the
organization, fulfilling many of the basic drives that characterize our
species. This creates the allegiance
which we see today. We may conclude
that the form of patriotism is beneficial for all, in its constructive
varieties and competition so long as it recognizes the same performance in
other nations and does not sink into the destructive form. The latter must be illustrated and reviewed
in our history by means of some selected instances, unwelcome though it may
be. These cases cannot be described in
detail nevertheless the essentials can be highlighted in order to portray
briefly the nature and extent of American captivation.
We can start with the early 20th century record of America's
super-nationalism to provide the necessary background. There will be the usual objections to
"re-hashing" our errors of the past.
In the first place, this "bad news" almost never appeared in
the media of the time (or even the standard history textbooks) and is therefore
largely unknown and unappreciated.
Secondly, it is critical evidence bearing on the power of nationalism in
our own behavior, and therefore on the dependability of the normative or moral
interpretation vis-à-vis the bio-social analysis. Finally it provides an appreciation of the degree to which we
have changed historically to a more productive course of action, and may
suggest how and why such a change occurred.
We may commence with some classic cases from Latin America.
We will direct some attention at first to our record
in Central America, starting with the days of "gunboat diplomacy",
when we got our way by military threat or the use of small forces. One of the men in charge of this threat,
General Smedley D. Butler characterized his own role in the operation as
follows: “I helped make Mexico safe for American oil interests. I helped make Cuba a decent place for the
National City Bank Boys to collect revenues in. I helped purify Nicaragua. I
brought light to the Dominican Republic for American sugar interests. I helped
make Honduras “right” for the American fruit companies. During these years, I had, as the boys in
the back room would say, a swell racket.
I was rewarded with honors, medals, promotions. Looking back on it, I feel I might have given
Al Capone a few hints. The best he
could do was to operate in three city districts. We marines operated on three continents.”
This is an uncommon statement to be coming from a
Marine general. Some may suspect
exaggeration, but Carlos Rangel in his book THE LATIN AMERICAS reported:
"From 1905 to 1965 there were no fewer than 20 marine landings in
Caribbean countries.” If we assume that the Caribbean nations had some
patriotic/nationalistic sentiments of their own then we would expect these
operations to have a pronounced negative effect on our proclaimed "good
neighbor" policy.
First we may consider the case of Nicaragua,
beginning in the years between the two World Wars and continuing almost to the
present time. During these years
American nationalism took the form of anti communism--usable to justify almost
anything that was done. President
Anastasio Somoza followed in the footsteps of his dictator father, getting help
from the U.S. Marines in furthering his career. Krauss observed that "The U.S.—-before departing--made one
final mistake prior to withdrawing the Marines. They appointed General Anastasio Somoza Garcia commander of the
National Guard.” Somoza had ingratiated
himself by his command of English and his PR capacity; but Somoza wanted power
for himself. He had his guardsmen
assassinate Sandino--the chief opposition, following a dinner for him held by
President Sacasa. Then, as Bermann
reported, in the coup of June 1936, Somoza again called on his guardsmen to
"surround the presidential palace and force Sacasa to resign.” Lake adds that Somoza then used the Guard to
solidify his own position and arrange his own uncontested election that same
year.
In the U. S., the guard was praised by Assistant
Secretary of State Sumner Welles, "The continued maintenance of the guard
substantially as at present is important to the future peace and welfare of
Nicaragua.” Lake records that it was
called "a bulwark against communism”.
When the question of a possible Nicaraguan canal was proposed as an
addition to or replacement of the Panama Canal, Somoza went to Washington where
he was "lavishly entertained.” The
U.S. Ambassador to Nicaragua (Whelan) opined that "Somoza is not a
dictator in the true sense of that word.”
Lake wondered what is then required to be a true dictator. In any event, Benito Mussolini, the fascist
dictator of Italy, thought of Somoza as a comrade and rewarded him with a Fiat
tank.
The reaction to American intervention in Nicaragua was
substantially responsible for the success of a Nicaraguan nationalist, August
Sandino, who gathered a large following, post mortem, after his
assassination. The Sandinistas gained
control of the government in 1979.
Their program took two forms.
They introduced a reform in education, health, plus some land reform and
encouragement of industry. This was
what Krauss called the "pragmatic” aspect. They also displayed an ideological face, which was turned toward
communist Cuba. The latter slowly began
to dominate, and as it did, the U.S. opposition rose correspondingly,
accompanied by (uninformed) surprise at the communist success.
In an effort to end or reduce the conflict and aim
toward a democratic Central America, President Arias of Costa Rica proposed a
Peace Plan. Ronald Reagan said that as
far as Nicaragua was concerned, the plan was "fatally flawed" because
it was not backed with military force, but it is probable that any military
force incorporated in the proposal would not be used in the way Reagan had in
mind, i.e., more contra activity.
At his death, some New York papers declared that
Somoza's "personal popularity was beyond doubt.” The question is, with whom?
As late as 1952 and 1954, Bermann reported that the "U.S.
inaugurated several new assistance programs for the guard, which coincided with
the anti communist hysteria preyed upon by Joseph McCarthy. In recent years the Sandinistas lost their
appeal by growth of their dogmatic phase and were replaced by Ms. Chamorrow.
Krauss expressed the belief that Nicaragua would probably have had a peaceful
history if it weren't for the "foreigners" who wanted to control the
country for business or anticommunism.
The case of Panama was a conflict of
nationalisms. Panama was created by
Theodore Roosevelt who "removed" it from Colombia in 1903 in order to
build the Panama Canal. Its
independence was made in Washington where its flag was sewn and its currency
printed (with a picture of George Washington). U.S. soldiers took charge of the
national defense. The earliest
political leader was Arnulfo Arias, from the native population, who pursued a
nationalist program of reducing American power in the country. As Krauss reported, "All told, Aria was
overthrown or prevented from taking office a total of five times" --by the
U. S.
During the 1960s, riots and violent protests broke
out over the U. S. control of the canal--following similar protests regarding
the Suez Canal in Egypt. This convinced
some American leaders that a new treaty was necessary, turning the canal over
to the Panamanians (in 2000)--in order to assure calm, efficient continuation.
Governor Nelson Rockefeller led the decision to
install a military government to assure this operation. Colonel Omar Torrijos of the National Guard
(who had removed the elected Arias) took control. A younger Guard officer ingratiated himself with Torrijos--Manual
Noriega--becoming his chief conduit of information. When Torrijos died in a plane crash, Noriega took over and at
least nominally transferred his talents to William Casey, CIA director. However Noriega privately "branched
out" into running drugs, guns, laundering money. As Krauss commented, "Nobody truly trusted him, but as
strong man of Panama he had much to offer every power player in the Caribbean,
from communists to capitalists, from criminals to law enforcement agents.” Noriega installed his own choice as
president in 1983-- Nicolas Barletta, in a rigged election. There were protests, but says Krauss,
"Washington didn’t want to notice, largely because CIA director Casey
thought Noriega was a crucial asset in the region.” This was especially the case with his gun running
proclivity. It could be used to support
the Contra campaign in Nicaragua. Thus
Lt.Col. Oliver North met with Noriega... on a luxury yacht docked off the grimy
Panama port of Balboa in June 1985.
This meeting seemed to give approval to Noriega for whatever he wanted
to do. The CIA was paying him 100,000 a
year for his services.
From this point it was a story of decreasing confidence
and increasing suspicion of Noriega, which finally deteriorated enough to
justify mounting an invasion to capture him and bring him to justice. It had been very difficult to do anything
about Noriega because his military remained loyal, being paid adequately—a
formidable combination—in favor of any dictator.
The prior case of Cuba is worthy of some
attention. After World War I, American
capital began moving into Cuba on a large scale. It gained control of utilities, mining, and transportation. By
1929 American investments totaled more than 15 billion. The growth of American economic domination
was described by Lowry Nelson: "There can be no doubt that the contest in
the courts was a one-sided affair in which the companies had the overwhelming advantage. They could employ the best lawyers who knew
the loopholes in Cuban laws. They
could, if necessary corrupt officials high and low with bribes.” The
organization of industry passed largely from the hands of the individual
entrepreneurs to those of large corporations, many of which were foreign. "Guggenheim characterized the degree of
American control as follows: The rail system and utilities were mostly
American, sugar 70% American, oil 2/3 American, iron 90%, American Banks, and
Cuban government bonds mostly in American hands.”
As for political control, Gerardo Machado imposed a
dictatorship in 1928. At the same time,
President Coolidge could say, "Today Cuba is sovereign. Her people independent, free, prosperous,
peaceful, enjoying the advantages of self-government.” American leaders,
especially Secretary Sumner Welles wanted Machado replaced by Col. Fulgencio
Batista. After a (second) coup in
March, 1953, Batista suspended the constitution, and was soon recognized by the
U. S. government. He became more
oppressive and his secret police made more use of torture, castration and
murder. Sometimes bodies were left on
the street as object lessons to any critics.
It is estimated that some 20,000 Cubans were executed, however the
business interests were well treated and showered him with gifts. We sent repeated shipments of arms to
Batista, but for what reason? Cuba was
in no external danger. It was in the
name of anticommunism. Ironically, our
counterproductive policies left this military hardware for Castro. The methods later employed against Castro
would have certainly brought about marked changes in Cuban policies if used in
the days before the communist revolution, but they were not seriously tried.
Looking back on events from the vantage point of
April 3, 1961, a State Department white paper declared: "The character of
the Batista regime in Cuba made a violent popular reaction almost inevitable.”
It explained why an ill equipped band led by communists could come down from
the mountains of eastern Cuba and rather easily overcome a much larger, better
supplied government army. It may be
contended that they jumped out of the frying pan and into the fire, but as one
observer noted, the frying pan had an American label and we had helped light
the fire. Our actions simply did not
correspond with our proclaimed principles. Now we angrily complain about Castro
in Cuba when we in effect “helped” him to take over. The behavior is, however,
quite explainable on a bio-social basis.
We very evidently assumed that our operating policies would satisfy our
own individual and collective drives.
Dropping further south, in Chile, 1970, the socialist
Salvadore Allende, a physician was elected president. This incurred the enmity of American corporations and the Nixon
administration. The ambassador to
Chile, Edward Korry said he received orders from Washington to use any means,
short of military, to prevent Allende from taking office. He reported a conference with President
Nixon who spoke of "that son of a bitch" Allende, and how he was
going to "smash Allende". The
CIA and ITT worked together to create conditions favorable for a military coup.
Allende's program was one of nationalizing foreign
corporations and redistributing the land.
This created much resistance within the country, as well as from the
outside. Allende was a poor fiscal
manager, and his problems began to mount.
The population became polarized into staunch advocates and staunch
enemies. In the election of April 3,
1973, Allende raised his vote plurality to 43% (from 36% in the previous
election). As a result he gained seven
seats in the Chamber and two in the Senate.
A common saying among the poor people was that Allende's was a poor
government, but "at least it’s ours”.
Resistance mounted and a truckers' strike led to a
national emergency. A military junta
conducted a coup on September 11 and not surprisingly, Allende turned up
dead. The American administration acted
speedily to recognize the new government on September 24. The American congress later looked into our
actions in Chile. Some, like Senator
Percy, justified them ("Things were going to pot under Allende") and
Senator Dirksen ("We shouldn’t know what the CIA is doing.”) The Director of the CIA (Helms) was indicted
for lying to congress about Chile. He
offered no contest and was fined 2,000 dollars.
The junta wasted no time in acting to replace all
university administrators and close all schools of sociology, journalism and
education at all universities. The
torturing and killing of more than 15,000 people during 1974 was agreed upon by
sources such as the International Commission of Jurists, Amnesty International,
Inter American Commission on Human Rights, the Organization of American States
and the Federation of Scientists. Even
anti communist writer Buckley admitted the practice but offered explanations
and excuses. The leader of the junta,
Gen. Pinochet imported a Nazi expert on torture, Walter Julius Rauff,
presumably to oversee operations--no notice taken by the American press. As
late as February 2, 1974, Pinochet declared that a state of siege would remain
and political activity would be banned for five years. The threat of communism was given as the
reason.
The Nixon administration was
silent during this time, however an Assistant Secretary of State said that the
protection of human rights was a matter of legitimate international interest,
but the U. S. could not intervene in the internal affairs of other
countries. The New Republic
acknowledged: "This is not the language used when it officially announced
(September 9) that the administration had funneled eight million dollars
through the CIA to "destabilize" Allende's regime. The British and
Canadian presses reported that Pentagon arms shipments to Chile jumped from 60
million to nearly 700 million the following year.
On October 7, 1988, a plebiscite was held and
Pinochet was defeated. Some Chilean
writers describe a transition FROM DICTATORSHIP TO DEMOCRACY, without
explaining why Pinochet surrendered his power.
"Lack of massive electoral support" was mentioned. Portales says Pinochet’s liberalization,
leading to an election was “a response to protests and foreign influence”,
including U.S. requests by Secretary Shultz and President Reagan, Senators
Lugar and Kennedy, representing the Committee for Free Elections and other
human rights groups (identified by Tyson).
Latin American dictators have traditionally been
little concerned about a lack of support--electoral or foreign--so long as they
controlled the military. Varas
expressed the belief that the country "should strengthen the civilian
authority over the military”, however what writers believe should be done is
routinely ignored by a committed dictator.
The real forces at work are not identified by these observers, and may
not be identifiable. Pinochet acted to insure that his own future influence on
the country would be great. He
"packed" the Supreme Court, the military commanders, the city mayors,
the central bank with his own appointees and made himself senator for
life. Perhaps he thought this was
enough to insure his control. He also
acted to retain influence over television and the National Security Council.
Timerman in his book (CHILE) described how Pinochet
was always maneuvering-- and got support from his American friends, such as
Senator Helms and Jean Kirkpatrick. As
noted, President Reagan tried to influence Pinochet to submit to election, but
Kirkpatrick--his own chosen representative to the United Nations--spoke in
support of Pinochet and keeping him in operation. The American position seemed to be confused, but slowly shifting
away from dictatorship and toward a more workable policy consistent with
democratic principles. It would be safe
to say that Pinochet supporters would wave the joint threats of communism and
the nationalization of business in his behalf.
In 1998 Gen Pinochet came to England for
surgery. The Spanish government wanted
him extradited and tried for crime against citizens. Pinochet supporters argued that as a former head of state he
could not be held for trial. The House
of Lords first voted to hold him, then re-voted because one member was
"prejudiced" for belonging to Amnesty International. (So organizations revealing crimes and
seeking justice are prejudiced. Future
dictators: "Have no fear, your
opponents are prejudiced")
William Kristol--on the Diane Rehm show (12/4/98)
said “Holding Pinochet will discourage other dictators from resigning their
office.” They are more likely to resign if you don’t prosecute them? Why?
It is more difficult to prosecute a head of state than one who is not.
That was Pinochet’s first defense. The rational response is: What will
discourage other dictators from appearing in the first place? Certainly not providing them an easy exit. The fallacy in the above arguments: Suppose
Hitler had taken refuge from Germany and claimed exemption from prosecution for
crimes against humanity. Would the same
people have defended him in this "right" as head of state? Would they have neutralized the idea of the
Nuremberg trials? Is how they get to be
head of state irrelevant?
One may contend that punishment is ineffective in the
future prevention of dictators. There
is no way of testing this, except over time.
There is no dictator, no matter how ruthless, who has not treated some
of his people very well for various reasons.
They have been (however unconsciously) paid off to support him, and it
should be noted that Pinochet had put into effect some laws and appointments
which insured their future influence, including forbidding his apprehension and
punishment as a head of state.
Defenders argued that we should "forget the past". Of course
they did not forget the holocaust.
Iran provides a classic example of our bondage to nationalism
and its costs. It had traditionally
been seen by American leaders as an oil-rich country, bounding the Soviet
Union, and headed by a "stable" or conservative ruler, Shah Reza
Pahlevi, who maintained close ties with the United States. We shut our eyes to the fact of American
interference in the affairs of Iran.
The CIA had restored the Shah to power in 1953, after he had been
expelled by the Iranians, so he continued to rule as an absolute monarch.
The Shah ignored the constitution of 1906, which
called for the growth of popular government and the end of authoritarian
rule. He created a secret police, the
SAVAK, after consultation with the CIA.
We ignored the SAVAK’s subjecting thousands of Iranians to imprisonment,
torture and death, even though this was reported by respected agencies such as
the International Commission of Jurists and Amnesty International. Corruption and nepotism characterized the
Shah's regime and he managed to divert a sum estimated at several billion
dollars from the public treasury.
It was facts such as these that produced strikes,
demonstrations and revolt in Iran early in 1979. This resulted in his departure from the country. Another outcome was the accession to power
of a religious fanatic, the Ayatollah Khomeini and the domination of Iran by
his Shiite Moslem sect (replacing the communists). A final result was the wave of protest against the U.S. role in
Iran and the illegal seizure of 53 hostages in retaliation--ostensibly as a
means of getting the Shah returned to Iran.
CIA director Helms objected that the Americans had
heard too much about the Shah's repressions and too little about how loyal he
was to U. S. interests, as reported by
Time Magazine. Of course even if these perceptions were true, they were
not those of the majority of Iranians (the crux of the matter) and nothing
could make it so for them. As a CIA
man, it was to be expected that Helms' view of world events would be dominated
by conspiracy and power politics. The
repressions, the drive frustrations of the people are the realities which
determine the outcome, not the arguments of apologists and organization
men.
Charles Hanley, a writer for the Associated Press
reviewed the hostage crisis and suggested that the U.S. might issue a
"white paper" expressing "concern" over our involvement in
Iran's government”. He proposed that
the UN report on the situation could be released. He noted that while American anger and frustration at Iran's
illegal acts was understandable, fair-minded Americans would acknowledge that
Iranians had some legitimate anger over our illegal actions during the last 25
years. No sale.
In an unusual step Science magazine addressed the
Iran question. Was it a scientific
analysis? It did accurately describe
our failure to utilize the little expertise available to us, not consulting
those who knew the most about Iran (one of whom actually predicted the revolt
and the installation of Khomeini).
However Science’s suggestion that our main shortage was one of technical
information on the subject was inadequate, as was its contention that we had no
basis for evaluating the Shah. As
already noted, the elementary facts about his regime were reported in world
newspapers and were incompatible with a bio-social diagnosis. Science also erred in blaming the Iranians
for not perceiving what the real American aims were for Iran. The only basis its people had for judging
that were the actual operations that our representatives conducted in their
country.
Time magazine observed that "the Shah's dilemma
was mostly of his own making. The
unrest in Iran has its roots in his failure to permit the growth of responsible
opposition to his one man rule.” In the
following issue, TIME presented an interview with Henry Kissinger in which the
former secretary averred, "It looks as if our friends are going down
without effective American support.” Here again we have the classic failure to
perceive that the critical matter is the nature of our
"friends". If they are
leaders who are out of touch with the basic needs of their people, our
"support" will not only be unavailing but even
counterproductive. In this case,
nothing could have made it "effective.”
Kissinger and other traditional diplomats and geopoliticians are more
influenced by the formalities than by the human realities.
We seldom appreciate how persistent are the values,
attitudes and practices within a culture, and how long it takes to change
them. The "Islamic Republic"
of Iran, which was supposed to reform the abuses of the Shah, actually continued
most of them, under another name and directed by and at other people. Khomeini, the messenger of God, continued
the SAVAK (renamed the SAVANA) and under the same director (Hossein Fandoust). Political prisoners were estimated variously
from 1,500 to 17,000. There were
executions by the hundreds. Khomeini closed 40 newspapers and magazines. He
also encouraged religious persecution of minorities, as reported by a Jack
Anderson Column.
These events demonstrate that an undeveloped country
where there has been no experience and tradition with human rights will have
similar manifestations, no matter who is in power. Religious fanatics can be as oppressive as kings and political
dictators. It is to be expected that
Iran will pursue its religious nationalism, however not so fanatically as under
the Messenger of God.
Turning attention to the case of Viet Nam, our
nationalism led us into a war that almost everyone now agrees was a
mistake. Every president from
Eisenhower to Ford proclaimed that we were in that country to repel communism
and prevent its further spread. The
fact is that Viet Nam was always an autocracy of some kind (although with some
democratic structure at the village level, which we destroyed during the
war). For many years, American
leadership defended the Diem regime as an ally. Diem attained office by an election which the London Times
described as police supervised and therefore meaningless Diem, like all the leaders during America's
(and France's) tenure was Catholic. The
Buddhists who constituted 70% of the population protested against the
discrimination practiced by the Catholics.
American entry into the war was accompanied by a
barrage of untruths. Lyndon Johnson
campaigned on a commitment not to send American boys to war in Asia--just
before he sent them in the spring of 1963.
The Pentagon denied that the Marines were going to Viet Nam, a few weeks
before they actually arrived. The
Pentagon announced that the Marines were only there to protect airfields, just
before they went into combat. Only a
few months earlier the Pentagon had claimed that airfield defense was a
Vietnamese responsibility. The Tonkin Gulf affair was vital to the
justification of our intervention. The bogus character of that episode was
described by Goulden in his book TRUTH IS THE FIRST CASUALTY.
A strong
motive which got little attention from our military and political leaders was
the issue of land. The peasants longed for some ownership but the absentee
landlords owned most of the arable acres and took about 60% of the crop. When the Harriman group studied Viet Nam it
concluded there was no convincing reason for them to fight for Saigon. As Schlesinger said, "Why should the
peasant die for a government, which, when it removed territory from the VC,
helped the local landowners to collect back rent?" The Congressional
Record also provided pertinent information on the subject.
The landlords were in control under the French. When the French left, the Viet Cong kicked
out the landlords and redistributed the land.
When Diem's troops moved back into the villages the London Times
reported that the landlords rode in with them and demanded back payments (at the
time the U. S. was supporting Diem). Reporter
Clayton Fritchey wrote: "Everyone is for land reform except the only three
groups that matter; the Ky military junta, the landowning class that supports
him and the U. S., which supports them both.”
We did too little and too late.
During our tenure in this conflict, South Viet Nam
continued to be an autocracy with the usual managed elections (and American
supporters looking the other way). Critical papers were shut down. In 1971 it was reported that there were at
least 20,000 political prisoners in South Viet Nam jails. The U. S. helped to finance the prison
system with 30 million dollars in 1970.
The U.S. Navy issued a contract for 400,000 dollars worth of "tiger
cages" where civilians opposing the war were kept in filth and cramped
conditions.
In 1970 a special House committee went on a
fact-finding trip to investigate military involvement in Viet Nam. Accompanying the legislators was a Viet Nam
veteran, Thomas Harkin. It was Harkin
who discovered the tiger cages being used--on ConCon Island. The legislators tried to ignore the
discovery, and Harkin lost his job as a result of uncovering the wrong
facts. He described the events for a
national magazine, and commented on how "men supposedly dedicated to the
public interest can ignore or even conspire to conceal the most blatant
injustice.” Harkin was later elected to
congress from Iowa.
Another fact persistently ignored was that we were
killing civilians in South Viet Nam about four times as fast as we were killing
enemy soldiers--revealed by the Jason Study and included in Littauer’s book The
Air War In Indo China. It took time to
dissolve the nationalistic myth on the homefront before the people as well as
the leaders became aware of the futility.
The Gallup sequential polls provided an accurate index of the slow shift
that took place. A critical question
is: Why did the North prevail in spite of the fact that it was inferior to the
South in both population and equipment?
Undoubtedly people were more motivated and thought of themselves as
defending the homeland from an alien “invader”.
And now since nationalistic defenders contend that
this is all in the past, we may consider briefly the instance of East Timor, a
country that was militarily consumed by the dictator of Indonesia (Suharto) in
1975. This proved to be the first step
in 20 years of genocide, with local observers reporting that about 200,000
natives and resisters were killed (NATION l2/25/95). The U.S had been selling
arms to Indonesia. As Timorese resident
Allan Nairn put it, Washington was Suharto’s main patron. Asked by reporters about the sale of arms,
spokesmen said these were only for defense, not used in civil strife. A person who had lived in Timor during these
years reported that American planes “bombed and machine-gunned camps and wells
of refugee population” (Nation, 7/l7/95)
As to the U.S. failure to pressure and penalize
Suharto on human rights rather than rewarding him with arms, our spokesmen
argued that there were other strategic factors to be considered besides human
rights. The Indonesian chief of
military intelligence observed, “Local human rights groups are all right so
long as they do not deviate from the official line.” This all has a familiar
ring and parallels our behavior in Cuba, Central America and China were
nationalistic interests (and profit) superseded ethical, moral and political
principles.
When President Clinton visited Jukarta for the APEC
meeting on world trade, the emphasis was on the "Suharto economic
miracle" and the fact that their plan was to embrace free trade in 25
years, (which was seldom mentioned).
The Indonesian system was described by a local economist as "more
like the Russian system " but with private rather than public
tyranny. Greider said the Suharto government
remained a prototypical fascist regime, a governing system that fused
political, military and economic power.
Any time this system was criticized, Suharto continued to call upon the
red scare, despite the fact that it had about disappeared.
Greider concludes. “The U.S., having justified its
embrace of right wing dictators like Suharto as a bulwark against communism now
continued the alliance on commercial grounds”, observed Greider (l997). The
United States had been selling arms to Indonesia. As a Timorese resident Allan Nairn put it, "Washington was
Suharto's main patron.” In 1996, two
Timor resistance fighters were awarded the Nobel peace prize. This resulted in focusing attention on
support given to the Suharto regime and its justification. Spokesmen for
President Clinton praised the Nobel recipients and said that the administration
had always tried to promote human rights in Indonesia. Asked by reporters about the sale of arms,
the spokesmen said that these were only for defense, and not used in civil
strife. A person who had lived in Timor
during these years reported that American planes "bombed and
machine-gunned camps and wells of refugee population.” (NATION, 7/17/95).
As to U.S. failure to penalize
and pressure Suharto on human rights (rather than rewarding him with arms) the
spokesmen argued that there were other strategic factors to be considered
besides human rights. All of this has a
familiar ring--of American support for a dictator who murders his people in
large numbers, while he is receiving our arms, under the heading of defense and
strategy, even though these are being used against the population. This parallels behavior reviewed earlier. When the dictator prevails, the U.S. may
then be viewed as a defender of tyranny, at the same time we claim to be the
chief progenitor and promoter of democracy.
A rational, and
probably the only workable course would be to internationalize such critical
areas as Jerusalem and the West Bank, with U.N. observers and governance to
insure access to all and the exclusion of violence. However, when this proposal
was made at a meeting it was ignored by both parties. Given these circumstances, periodic conflicts of varying
intensity will continue until both sides have suffered sufficiently from the
aversive consequences of present policies, continuing until they are ready to
explore and implement more cooperative and heuristic tactics and strategies,
including UN participation in oversight.
The contestants must finally acknowledge that they cannot “win” a
complete and perpetual victory. Even if the conflict should later evolve into a
nuclear phase, there is no prospect that the outcome could be considered a
victory by either (as the U.S. and Russia finally concluded from the nuclear
cold war)..
We may now consider
briefly the case of Iraq and its dictator Saddam Hussein—a mid eastern Hitler.
Henderson’s book INSTANT EMPIRE chronicles Saddm’s effort to sell himself as
the rebuilder, and no doubt “king” of a Babylonian empire. Henderson also describes the repeated
murders of critics, including relatives, at home and abroad--also l4 of the
more common torture methods employed by his agents. For a time, the U.S. was
supporting and supplying Saddam, but his efforts to develop nuclear and
biochemical weapons, coupled with his attack on Kuwait led to the Gulf War and
Desert Fox attempts to reduce his military centers and punish him for his
interference with the UN inspection teams. Only the Kuwait attack was
stopped. Saddam could depend on the
help of Russia and China and France to successfully protect his absolute
weapons projects. Henderson gives data
showing that they were his greatest sources of military equipment, so they
could be depended upon to help a profitable partner. The U.S. at one point treated Iraq as an ally and made military
shipments to it, when we perceived this to be in our nationalistic and military
interest, which turned out, predictably not to be the case.
Little can be done
about a dictator like Saddam, who has control of the military, the secret
police, the media and the economy, who presents himself as the savior of the
nation. The usual means do not work,
such as sanctions, isolation, UN protests, and even local uprisings. The U.S. urged Iraqis to revolt against their
dictator, which resulted in many deaths of the revolters and disgust at the U.S.
for making (and being able to make) no significant contributions to the
project.
Saddam will surely
proceed with his project of making absolute weapons. What will he accomplish as a result? Two things: He will have joined the “big nations” in the military
arms business. He will be able to use a
few of the bombs against his chief enemy, Israel who blew up his nuclear plant.
If he should develop a few atomic bombs (and also his Condor missile) he could
identifiably deliver them, but at too high a cost. The probability is that he
would use these for bragging rights, threats or blackmail. The biochemical warfare would be usable as
against the Kurds. It does not require any deep thinking on Saddam’s part to
come to the above conclusions, merely confronting reality.
The motivations promoting nationalism are not
obscure. Individuals perceive their
social group as protector and provider for their constellation of basic
needs... their drives as canalized by the surrounding culture. Kohn and Calhoun in separate books entitled
NATIONALISM described the birth of nationalism from small social organizations
and the advantages gained in the process.
In this way the nation is to be sustained at all costs and promoted as
much as possible. This was true at
earlier stages of human social evolution.
Even religion and science were often summoned in
support of international conflicts. For
example, Hitler asserted that God was on his side. He proclaimed: "The
(Nazi) has the sacred duty of making people stop just talking superficially of
God's will and actually fulfilling God's will.” As for science, no more striking example could be found that the
case of anthropologist Margaret Mead, who issued the following call: "During the last war, a great lot of
nonsense was talked about the folly of two sides who both prayed to the same
God and who both felt that God was with them.
We weren't both praying to the same God. The Germans saw God as on their side just because they were
Germans... They followed a tribal God, whose preferences were determined by
race. It wasn't necessary for him to
scrutinize the rights and wrongs of battle; the only issue was who you
were. If you were German, God, being a
German God, was on your side. (With
Americans) the only way to get God on one's side is to be on the right
side--that has been the whole teaching of Puritanism; it lies back of the
conditional love we give our children.”
Mead offers no evidence that the German people as a
whole had such a tribal God. Germans
had been considered a Christian people for several centuries; now she proposed
to re-define them, for the moment at least.
This argument nullifies the precepts of "Christian" and makes
them operationally meaningless. Not
only Germans but their allies the Italians believed God was on their side in
the war, as did the British, the French and the Americans they were
fighting. Mead said nothing about the
Italians. Did she think they were only
praying to an Italian God, or perhaps a strictly Catholic God? Mead had clearly scrapped the scientific or
anthropologic attitude. The jingoism of
a wartime book was not deleted from the latest edition.
Now we must ask and answer the question: "What kind of motives will restrain
myopic nationalism?" There have
been two kinds of answers--the moral and the naturalistic. Representative of the first is Morgenthau's
long-running book POLITICS AMONG NATIONS.
The authors call for "moral law that governs the universe.” The
term moral is never defined or clarified.
In any event it interferes with successful analysis. To say: "Certain kinds of competitive
practices in business and politics (such as lying) are opposed only by morality"
assumes there are no scientific concepts for guiding foreign policy and
international decisions. Actually it is
only necessary to be guided by the probable results of procedures--as
identified by bio-social theory. The
authors object to appeals to "human rights" because these are so
variable among nations. They correctly
point out the dangerous conflicting claims of nationalistic "rights",
but the same objection applies to claims for what is "moral". (Of course appeals to some
"authority" can be made by both)
A second Morgenthau fallacy is that "moral
restraint" is possible (or at least more probable) for kings of nations,
but not for the public policies in more democratic countries. "When we say a king is subject to
certain moral restraints, we are referring to something real" say the
authors, “But when we say Great Britain, for example, has moral obligations
toward the U.S., we are making use of a fiction.” This kind of thinking is purely individualistic. The argument continues: "Where responsibility for government is
widely distributed among a great number of individuals with different
conceptions as to what is morally required in international affairs--or none at
all--effective restraint becomes impossible.”
This thesis fails to perceive that democratic
decisions are not without restraint or guidance. There are outcomes experienced by those who make them, which
therefore contribute to "responsibility" in the long run--although it
may require somewhat more time for larger numbers of people to "get the
idea". The record of democratic nations in foreign policy is at least as
effective, if not more so, than that of kings.
In any event, we are not going to return to the days of monarchy. A section of this book is (mislabeled)
"The Vice of Majority Decisions". Some of its defects are described,
but the writers fail to perceive that "minority decisions” of dictators
and monarchs have been productive of even more troubles.
The Marshall Plan has often been cited as an example
of morality overcoming nationalistic selfishness. This was challenged by R.J. Barnett’s diagnosis. He asserts that our restoration of European
nations devastated by World War II centered around nationalistic and profitable
advantages to us rather than moral empathy and largesse. It would restore a large market for American
trade and it would resist the threat of Russian domination, both of which are
directly in our interest. Barnett even
lists the businesses that stood to gain from the operation. Nonetheless it must
be admitted that there was a good deal of enlightenment in this self interest,
that is to say, some economic "hyperopia". Certainly Germans are much better off than if the Russians had
been in control of their post-war history (and so are we). General Clay almost unilaterally directed
the restoration of western institutions of government and industry. The story is similar in occupied Japan where
General MacArthur operated in essential isolation from Washington. He single-handedly installed democracy and
"free enterprise" in a war torn nation with an autocratic tradition,
as Manchester has described. He did
this in quite a cooperative manner. The
intriguing question is what caused military generals to proceed in such a
non-military and democratic way?
Manchester touches upon this briefly in the case of MacArthur.
Undoubtedly early conditioning and life experiences prevailed over military
authoritarianism when it came down to what kind of a nation to
"create". Again, the
MacArthur "revolution" produced a more productive and peaceful society
than would a Russian revolution of post war invaders. All too often what we like to call "enlightened self
interest" results in less enlightenment and more self interest of a short
sighted nature. Why it does or doesn't,
must go back to the values with which we were positively reinforced.
A.M. Schlesinger challenged the moral approach in
Harpers Magazine, asserting "The Necessary Amorality of Foreign
Affairs.” He asked: “To what extent
should morality influence foreign policy?" His answer: "Very
little". Foreign policy is here seen as a means of influencing events. The cases of Noam Chomsky and John Foster
Dulles were cited. Both men started
with the assumption of morality as basic, then ended up at opposite poles. Science requires a theory more in accord
with the behavioral facts, not with what we say we ought to do.
Bedrock for Schlesinger is revealed by his contention
that he can think of no case that could not be solved in terms of national
interests, which raises the question of what he means by "solved" and
"interest". It is hard to
believe that Schlesinger was not aware that our leaders (and people) initially
believed they were embarked on the national interest during the Viet Nam War.
It was similar with our gunboat diplomacy in Central America--maintaining military dictators. The realities of these enterprises were
finally recognized as NOT being in our self interest, in spite of the fact that
wiser observers had so-warned at the very outset. Predictably ignored was George Ball's early prognosis that the Viet
Nam conflict would lead to disaster. Logically speaking, it should not have
been a taxing problem to deduce that we were charging against the very
motivation which drove the U.S. to reject foreign intervention and seek
cultural autonomy.
As usual, our policy and procedure has been changing only
when it has stung its practitioners enough in quantity and quality. Americans have been so long rewarded by
nationalistic practices that progress has been slow, as described above. Is there a difference in the nationalism
represented by our past cases and our contemporary illustrations? The U.S. gives consideration to the needs
and sovereignty of other nations somewhat more than in the past, although by no
means uniformly. One only needs to
compare its behavior in the League of Nations with its present role in the UN,
remembering that we both created the League and scuttled it. Today some 3rd
world countries are drunk with their own nationalism, or ethnicism. Some
leaders exploit this to stay in power.
Needless to say there are few, if any nations prepared to practice
disarmament and grant to an international government the role of resolving
conflicts, making international laws and policing cooperation with them. Those
difficulties we must now address.
The only alternative to excessive nationalism is
increased internationalism, which cannot amount to a black and white choice
between them, but a way in which both can be satisfied. One cannot help but be surprised to find
books on the subject of nationalism which never mention its dangers in the
modern world. Returning to book by Kohn, it described the evolution of
nationalism and the many benefits gained from this process...all of which is
unexceptionable, but unfortunately Kohn says nothing about its perils. No one who lived through the highly
nationalistic Germans, Italians and Japanese of the World War II period can
doubt the pitfalls associated with it.
The dangers of nationalism must at least be balanced
by the benefits of internationalism, and for the latter to take a leading role,
it must offer similar prospect of satisfaction and a sufficient failure of
extreme nationalism to motivate a transference. To the degree that people of one nation say and think
"America first and only.” or “Russia right or wrong” and are prepared to
fight any other competing national group, the costs will ultimately outweigh
the advantages. Unfortunately there are
always politicians ready to capitalize on the national ego. This is the nationalism described by the
anthropologist Malinowski, who warned:
“The great enemy of today is the sovereign state, even as we find it in
some democratic commonwealths. The real
failure of the League of Nations was due to the fact that its very builders
refused to pay the price which it obviously imposed. They were not prepared to abrogate one ounce of their political
sovereignty, forgetting that this is the very material of which the League had
to be constructed.” It wasn't so much a
matter of forgetting as of rationalizing--what Pareto called nonlogical and
Bleuler referred to as dereistic thinking.
The dominant danger to scientific analysis and
successful change is doctrinaire thought.
On the extreme right are the ultra nationalists who dismiss all
accomplishments of the United Nations and regard world government as a
dangerous impossibility. On the other
side are the idealists who gloss over the difficulties of international
operation and treat it as only a matter of commitment of mind and will, rather
than attempting to chart the forces which will move us past such barriers. The defects of both doctrines must be
surpassed before a real and effective dynamics can be identified. The latter will permit us to explain more
consistently the progress and failure of both the past and present.
Analysis in normative terms is commonly assumed in
thinking about and identifying solutions to the problem of controlling
international conflict of all kinds. This especially true in terms of a more
effective world organization. Woodrow
Wilson declared that there is only one power behind the liberation of mankind
from war, "It is the power of the united moral force of the world and in
the Covenant of the League of Nations that the moral forces are mobilized.”
Olaf Palme, former Prime Minister of Sweden and Chairman of the Independent
Commission on Disarmament and Security agreed with Wilson in saying,
"Needed changes will only come about as the expression of the political
will of the peoples in many parts of the world.” The real question becomes: What will cause an increase in their
willpower?
There are various reasons for the increased attention
to internationalism. Two are of
particular importance. We have noted
the universal fear of nuclear war, which might be prevented or reduced,
finally, by a stronger world government, a danger that has recently diminished
substantially. Second, the attention
has been increased by the growth of technology whose products bind the nations
closer together and make them more interdependent, requiring more decisions
which cannot be made successfully by individual nations. Just occasional cooperation will prove to be
increasingly inadequate.
The UN was the first truly international organ of
government persisting with some successes, ineffective as it often is, and
whether one approves or disapproves of its operation to a high degree. The League of Nations, preceding it was more
ineffective because important nations (including the U.S.A.—the originator) did
not belong, which by itself would have guaranteed failure. There is a parallel that is more than an
analogy, with the Articles of Confederation in early American history. Following the Declaration of Independence,
each state drew up its own constitution, which included a restricted franchise
(less than half the male citizens could vote and none of the female). The Continental Congress was called into
existence but support for it was voluntary, and it had no authority. Therefore the Articles of Confederation were
created, which established the least union necessary to perform some vital
functions, such as a postal service, a militia, diplomatic representation and a
system of standards. However the
Confederation had no authority over the states, could not enforce laws,
administer justice or raise any taxes for its assigned administrative
operations. After the war was over, the
states refused to provide funds for the Congress. They could not even trade with England or Spain, which they much
needed to do. Conflicts between and
within the sovereign states broke out, some of these armed, which Congress
could not control, and therefore were threats to the union.which threatened the
union.
As Norman Cousins described it, "Before the U.S.
could be born, 13 sovereign states had to undergo a collapse of mammoth
proportions.” The historical account in
more detail was provided by John Fiske.
In his book Fiske says that with our mounting state quarrels over trade
and boundaries, "We seemed to be treading the path of anarchy.” He takes the case of Shays Rebellion: "Congress called on the states for
continental forces, but did not dare declare openly what they were to be used
for...National humiliation could go no further than such a confusion on the
part of the central government that it dared to use force in defense of those
very Articles of Confederation to which it owed its existence. Fiske concludes,
”Something had to be done”
Similar problems and responses to them, can be seen
in both the League of Nations and the United Nations: subsidiary states stronger than the central government; these
states fighting among themselves with their own, often conflicting
constitutions; inability to pass or enforce laws; lack of dependable monetary
support. Massachusetts claimed it was
"incompatible with its dignity as a state to allow national troops to set
foot on its soil" to deal with Shays.
It will now be appropriate to review the factors for and against
extending the process of American constitutional history to the world. Nationalism is by far the most important
barrier to the development of any world organization. The advantages would be synonymous with the disadvantages of
internationalism. However it is a stage
in social evolution, which at this point in time commands the most human
loyalty. Some groups in the third world
are only now attaining true national status, developing the allegiances
associated with it. This is a natural
process, and the benefits are apparent.
In terms of bio-social laws it must be recognized that people have
perceived their nation as a source of drive satisfaction. Their ego or self has identified with
it. These are powerful forces, which no
appeal to internationalism can match under present circumstances. Before any shift away from national loyalty
can occur, internationalism must offer similar prospects of satisfaction. This
alternative is unknown, feared and associated with "foreigners"
having different and often conflicting beliefs. Intellectual appreciation, unfortunate as it may seem, is seldom
sufficient to motivate the sharing. It
will require more potent incentives.
Strong
opposition is displayed by writers like Grenier, Pines, Buchanan, Tugwell, and
Berns. Representing the National
Review, Berns contended that the USSR is an eternal roadblock to any democratic
internationalism, referring to "this focus of evil in the modern
world.” Tugwell charged "a
reluctance on the part of the UN to recognize and address the reality of Soviet
expansionist policy, coupled with disarmament proposals that may undermine
deterrence, could diminish rather than strengthen the preservation of
peace.” There was a dramatic change,
with the advent of Gorbachev, introducing glasnost and perestroika and greatly
reducing the nuclear dangers, but other objections were easily found. Most authorities agree that glasnost and
perestroika are here to stay, that Russia neither will nor can return to the
cold war and total obfuscation of the west.
The Global Education Center pointed out that
"The UN has played a major role in settling over 70 important
peace-threatening disputes in the last 40 years... places like Cyprus, Sinai,
the Korean buffer zone and some middle east disputes. The UN could do nothing
in the Viet Nam, the India-Pakistan or the Arab-Israeli wars. As one observer noted, the UN has no power
to interfere when two countries are determined to fight. Among traditionalists the failures of the UN
are more likely to get attention than are the successes.
Kurt Waldheim came to an essential conclusion: "The truly meaningful question
regarding the UN is not whether it functions perfectly or even poorly. It is whether humankind, taken as a whole,
is better off with it or without it. As
to that, it seems to me there can be no doubt.” It does encounter blockage regularly. Even when the UN completed the Law of the Sea Treaty after years
of negotiation, with approval by 117 nations--ensuring that all nations will
share in the future mining of oceanic minerals--not just the rich few--the U.S.
would not sign (being one of the rich few).
In mid December of 1982, The General Assembly presented 25 major
resolutions designed to curb the nuclear arms race. The U.S. rejected 21 of them because of its pre-eminence in
nuclear research.
One of the strongest objections to world government
is that it would interfere with our own national freedom and democratic
operations. A Republican leader,
General and President, Dwight Eisenhower perceived the fallacy of such
unmodified fears: "In “urging progress
toward a world community, I cite the American concept of destiny of a progressive
society... One of a mixture of many peoples and faiths we have developed unity
in freedom, a unity designed to protect the rights of each individual while
enhancing the freedom and well being of all... Thus we see as our goal not a
superstate above nations, but a world community embracing them all, rooted in
law and justice and enhancing the potentialities and common purposes of all
peoples.” Of course the requirement is
for the world government to have law enforcement powers (without it becoming a
war) and for that law to insure freedom and justice. This is only possible
through disarmament.
Some advocates of world government reveal
expectations far above reality. For example in their comprehensive plan for
revising the UN charter, Clark and Sohn (writing in 1960) predicted that
"by 1969-71, (their plan) will have been ratified by all or nearly all the
nations, including the major powers and will have come into force.” Such exaggerated optimism can only undermine
an otherwise sound and constructive proposal.
People are just not “ready”, and we are trying to identify the reasons
as well as what makes for the readiness.
Providing another illustration, Mayall acknowledges
the handicap in nationalism of its propensity to foment wars, "where state
practice sadly lags behind the development of international law " He also
recognizes that governments which torture or exploit their people for the
advantage of a narrow clique must be accountable for their actions”, but
accountable to who/what and why? There
have been many wars and failures/absences of international law. "Sadness" and request for
"accountability" have had little effect. What then will cause a change in these respects? Internationalists usually believe that world
government will make the difference.
Mayall doubts it: "If
government is to belong to the people it cannot belong to mankind, which is a
mere abstraction.” But
"mankind" is no more of an abstraction than is "the
people". It is only a matter of
how many and what kind.
We must expect ethnic and national conflicts to
continue until they overburden the leading nations. This will also disrupt the necessary international trade. To prepare for this increased conflict, the
third world countries have been buying arms at a record pace (mostly from the
U. S.). There is little hope for
serious progress until this practice ceases.
(Prospects turned dimmer when the Bosnian peace treaty was approved.) The U.S. immediately ceased its arms embargo
on the region, according to the Center for Defense Information. Disarmament is the key to the entire process
of controlling conflicts. At the moment
we are going in the opposite direction.
There is another force at work, which is seldom
recognized. Students of WORLDWATCH have
anticipated that "For the first time since the emergence of the nation
state, all countries face the challenge of trying to unite around a common
theme. The global agenda is likely to
become as much ecological as ideological, dominated by the relationships
between ourselves and nature.” The UN
would have to assume a more prominent role if environmental threats are to be
addressed on a more comprehensive basis, says Brown, (in his book SAVING THE
PLANET). As an illustration, the UN
environmental program facilitated the vital ozone agreement. Pollution of atmosphere, soil and sea is
growing and also can only be effectively addressed on a global basis. Conflicts and inaction cannot be allowed to
interfere with these in the years ahead, without costs that will mount
intolerably.
We have reviewed
some unpleasant facts, ones that are seldom presented and regularly ignored.
Servitude to nationalism plays a large role in this. Our own security is not
improved by bolstering dictatorships and calling them allies. When they
collapse, as almost always happens, it leaves us less secure and friendly with
other nations for having supported them. This is the way Cuba and China were
originally "lost". It is not difficult to find warnings of the
dangers of interfering in other governments. Even a conservative magazine like
Forbes may sometimes perceive these quite clearly: "If after so many dead,
so many years and so many billions, those governments we supported can collapse
overnight, it can only be because they have little or no support from their own
people”. Armies who believe in and know for what and for whom they fight, don't
collapse, turn and run overnight when they still have vastly greater martial
material. We learned that we should not, cannot and in the future will not
undertake to force upon other lands and other people our own
government-at-the-time's version of what's best for them."
However before we bestow too much credit for
the above perception on the Forbes editors (that regimes collapse and fail
because of little support from their own people) we must take note of a
countervailing case just three years later, the Shah of Iran, which Forbes
could not recognize as an obvious lack of public support. It resorted to the
argument that the Shah was introducing technology and social change too fast,
and this is what did him in. As they put it, "This is why the Shah is in
trouble." As we have already seen, this fallacy reflects an ignorance of
what was going on.
Galbraith summarized what he called "A Decade of Disasters in
Foreign Policy" for two magazines. He made four points or
"lessons" to be learned:
1.
Our power
in the third world is limited, both economically and militarily. Economic
aid only succeeds only insofar as it fits the needs of the recipients. Military
intervention has been largely counterproductive.
2.
Communism and capitalism have
little relevance for people in the 3rd world; they are too busy eking out
an existence to be concerned with doctrines.
3.
Intervention
by political and military bureaucracies has led to frustration. Working by
way of the hearts and minds of people's takes more time and ingenuity but
it is at least constructive and has more permanent results.
4.
Overseas
bureaucracies are self-generating. They invent new reasons for continuing their
function, as the old ones are discredited. In Viet Nam the old ones kept
"dissolving" but new ones kept appearing until collapse occurred.
We may conclude briefly with a vignette of the present, bearing on the
relation of nationalism to interference with truth telling. This correlates with the dangers of
fictionalizing and the possibility of controlling it, and the extent to which
this might be achieved, not only on the part of political leaders but the people
themselves.
The power of
nationalism was portrayed in an unusual but widespread form by a top publisher
of books (Michael Korda). He began by
complaining about publishers being
condemned for not presenting accurate and unbiased accounts of history
and public affairs. He rose to their defense by citing highly regarded and
biggest selling publications that were full of errors and biases.
He began at the top
of the list, with the Judeao-Christian Bible (s) pointing out that they were a
melange of ancient, unverified stories, including contradictions,
impossibilities and myths. Here faith
was presented as history, and fiction as nonfiction. He characterized combining the Old Testament with the New in the
same book as “deceitful packaging”. The
question is raised for modern publishers as to whether it is possible to escape
introducing fiction (as fact) and also whether it is important to do so.
Korda then turned
to greatly varying accounts of World War II found in different nations, each
preoccupied with its own contribution, accepting contradictory contentions as
facts. Could they escape doing
this? In his phraseology, “If
nationalism is present, truth/objectivity goes out the window.” He doesn’t
raise the related question: “What comes in the window?” It is special interests, particularly
political fiction and misrepresentation in order to gain power. Korda zeroed in on Ronald Reagan as an
individual case, with whom he worked and was well acquainted. He claimed Reagan was “the greatest and most
accomplished after dinner speaker in American history.”
He didn’t charge Reagan with being
untruthful in his fictitious stories. “He had just come to believe them” with
some striking examples such as claiming to have been at the liberation of
Buchenwald, when he was never closer than Culver City California. (Korda
presented other such cases in his book OTHER PEOPLE). What was Korda’s response to the lack of accuracy and objectivity
in reporting? He maintained that we
should prepare to live with it, and the only option for people was to become
exposed to all the varied views on any subject and extract the most dependable
interpretation “on their own”.
That is a noble
ideal, but not possible (or even attractive) for each common person to have the
time or the interest or the perspicacity to do it. Ordinarily the individual selects the preferred authority in
print (if based on reading) rather than media sound bites and newspaper squibs,
but this is scarcely harmonious with with the basic nature of science, or democracy.
These are built on the idea that we can increase the accuracy and reliability
of our conclusions to a worthwhile degree. Whatever is offered by “authorities”
can be tested, by ourselves or by peers who have some special training. We
simply assume that doing our best is superior to have no part in it.
Finally the
question: Is confusing fact and fiction dangerous, with costly consequences?
That depends on the case in hand, however we can be confident that it may be
entertaining but it is far from desirable to be guided in this way. We have considered the nationalistic
interference with concluding the cold war by Reagan’s demonizing the USSR with
epithets of evil, plus other defalcations in knowledge and guiding principle.
In this chapter we
have raised two questions about the future: (1) what will restrain
nationalistic power and (2) what will cause us to stop supporting dictators.
The first will be restrained when it is perceived to be counterproductive.
World organization will be forced into existence to regulate and coordinate
resources, trade, money and arms in the world. Some progress has been made in
that direction. As for dictators, we have apparently "learned our
lesson" rather well on that score, at least insofar as we can do much
about it. Occasionally (as in Haiti) we may accomplish something with an
intelligent intervention (and wise departure)where the population is not large,
not heavily armed and eager for combat.
In the future it is
unlikely that the integration of nations will develop suddenly and
worldwide. Regional coordination will
slowly evolve. For example, the NATO is changing gradually from a military
organization to one promoting peace among European states. Similar developments may be expected in
other regions of the world. These will
serve as acceptable evolutionary steps.
Another force promoting mutuality often predicted is some super-crisis
threatening the globe, e.g. some atomic explosions, food/water crises, a meteor
collsion (or the invasion from space dramatized by Orson Welles?)
It could be
instructive to consider a prognosis for nationalism--its related economy and
government, as fictionalized by the New York University Professor, Warren
Wagar, and contained in his book A SHORT HISTORY OF THE FUTURE. It consists of
three "booklets" each describing a different outcome but presented as
a historical sequence--by the person telling the story (Jensen) from his
position about 2200 A. D.
Formed during this
period is to be a global trade consortium (GTC), 12 megacorporations shaping
the policies of nations. Nation states will not disappear, but continue as a
formality, being subject to the power of the megacorps. Jensen reports:
"Politicians seldom acted without consulting the GTC, and the GTC seldom
failed to anticipate their every move." Subsequently a world leader
declared that the division of the world into rich and poor nations was a
necessity under capitalism. "For us, it shall be a crime... No
commonwealth of nations can endure permanently half rich and half poor..."
It is difficult to tell how much of this prognosis represents objective and how
much subjective interpretation.
Biosocial analysis
suggests that reduction of nationalism must precede international disarmament,
because the first is the origin of the second. As long as a nation and its
people do not trust some other nation (s) or trust the governing system, they
will remain prepared for conflict. Then this question: "What reduces
nationalism-arms dependency? Several different factors have been suggested here,
such as:
1.
The threat
of nuclear proliferation is still a possibility and it can only be controlled
by close cooperation between nations (i.e. less nationalism)
2.
Ecological
costs, as already noted, but insufficiently appreciated thus far
3.
Balkanization
of ethnicities generates increased conflict and economic disruption requiring
"policing" by a collective
4.
Economic
costs of constant rearmament and police actions
5.
Mega-corporations
(a la Wagar) make nationalisms increasingly powerless and meaningless
6.
Technology
integrating the economies to where national decisions are grossly insufficient
7.
International
guerrilla conflict which transcends national boundaries
8.
A few
atomic explosions necessitate collective action with an overpowering negative
stimulus. All these factors will operate with similar effect.
CHAPTER
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