NUCLEAR EXTRICATION:
Our
Captive Culture
and the Bio-Social
Forces that Will Free Us
Start End Table of Contents Bib Discuss
At the beginning of this book we encountered the cases
of leading scientists such as Bush and Teller who believed that nuclear explosives
were no different from conventional and that all out warfare could continue
as in the past. Herman Kahn belittled
the effects of nuclear war by emphasizing the heroism and resourcefulness
which people show in catastrophes. He recommended a number of (overly optimistic)
assumptions about how we might survive it.. identified later.
A survey personally conducted (published 1972) found that scientists
were about evenly divided on whether nuclear war would destroy our way of
life, but a substantial majority agreed that defense could not keep up with
offense. Some observers went as far as William Buckley who argued that it
was better for us to go up in a blaze of radioactive fury than to risk letting
communism run free in the world.
However as time went on, about 40 years, people and
leaders began to agree on the idea that universal and mutual destruction was
the inevitable result of nuclear conflict. Schelling tried to explain the
absence of nuclear explosions for the last 5 decades since Hiroshima. It is
because the horror “can grow in strength and become locked into military doctrine
without being fully appreciated or even acknowledged.” This can explain the
absence of its use in Viet Nam or Korea, or even by the “evil” Russians in
Afghanistan. It can even explain any
explosions for non-military excavations, or the non-development of the neutron
bomb.
Certain defects are evident. The Russians turned away from nuclear-use because
for some years it would have lost them more than it might gain, vis a vis
the U.S. superiority. Its non-use
in Viet Nam or Afghanistan is better explained by the fact that these bombs
are not productive when there is no concentration of enemies or industrial
areas. Indeed, the Pentagon has judged
their use to be contraindicated in such cases, especially so when would be
costly to their international acceptability and status. As for the test ban treaty, these explosions
have been going on, with no real damage, escaping the unique harm. Finally,
no one knows how dependably this “aversion” would hold up in a nation which
felt sufficiently desperate. Others
would do well to be prepared for the worst and take whatever measures they
can, particularly collective action via the United Nations. President Eisenhower
perceived the change in outlook and predicted that we will one day get to
the point that both sides know that in any outbreak of hostilities, regardless
of the element of surprise, destruction will be both reciprocal and complete. (He also argued that any strictly military
uses of the weapon “were just the same as bullets”. The problem here would
be insure that it is strictly military)
The function of this chapter is to describe and to explain
our illusions about nuclear conflict, to identify the bio-social forces that
caused us to start extricating ourselves from the dilemma of self destruction
which confronted us from the mid l940s to the mid 80s. It began with the explosions
over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, displaying the supreme power that was released.
From there it was a race between the two major contestants to invent
more techniques for using this potent energy in new ways for more extensive
destruction. We and the Russians, as well as other major
nations were on our way, speeding down the deterrence racetrack. Expectedly
the desire not to be second became increasingly urgent. Very soon the superpowers had the ability to eliminate each other
as organized nations, many times over, but the overkill scenario did not change
the ongoing practices. Thus was born
the concept of M.A.D.
Under this banner, the nuclear race would continue even
while racing was being condemned by almost everyone. For example President Reagan could declare
himself against arms races at the very moment he was carrying out the biggest
buildup of weapons in our peacetime history.
He declared: “We must find ways to reverse the vicious cycle of threat
and response which drives arms races.” Obviously
his threat, or response, whichever one chooses to call it, was an integral
part of the arms race itself. Each
nation saw all additions as a threat, no matter what name the other used.
On the Knife Edge
How close we came to a nuclear
holocaust has been largely ignored and undescribed. This is the kind of history that is frightening and reflects unpleasantly
on our elementary ability to avoid catastrophe, or even to recognize it when
it looms. However this threat illustrates
how strong punishing stimuli or their imminence, are required to change behavior
patterns with which we have been culturally reinforced.
One of the few accounts of this strategic crisis was provided by Richard
Rhodes in his book DARK SUN.
The setting was the autumn of
1962 when Khruschev had secretly installed nuclear missiles in Cuba (which
he regarded as part of the deterrence policy of the cold war, balancing U.
S. missiles surrounding Russia.) President
Kennedy announced a naval quarantine of Cuba saying that the U. S. would respond
to any launch from Cuba with a retaliatory strike against Russia. At this time, the pentagon strategists were
General Curtis LeMay and General Thomas Power.
LeMay was USAF Chief of Staff in the Pentagon. Power was commander of the strategic bombing force, SAC. Both of them believed that the occasion should
be used for a pre-emptive strike on the USSR. As Rhodes described it, "General Burchinal, LeMay's deputy
said ‘Power was at least as eager to get World War III started as LeMay’”. Furthermore, Power was told by the previous
commander of SAC (General White) that he had the authority to order a retaliatory
attack if time or circumstances would not permit a decision by the President.
In October preparations for nuclear war were proceeding rapidly.
Defcon numbers were lowering, from 5 to 3 then at one point to Defcon
2. 54 more SAC bombers joined the
12-plane, round the clock airborne alert.
Polaris submarines put out to sea.
SAC prepared 136 Atlas and Titan ICBMs for firing. General Burchinal later reported, "We
got everything we had in the strategic forces counted down and ready and aimed.”
The Minutemen missiles were being rushed into readiness.
"One officer who controlled the Minutemen during the missile crisis
told nuclear safety expert Scott Sagan “We didn’t literally hot wire the launch
command system, but we did have a second key... I could have launched it on
my own if I had wanted to.” (Our missiles
didn't have PAL safety locks in 1962) Various threatening snafus were reported
by Rhodes, SAC bombers flying past their usual limits approaching Russia,
launch of an Atlas ICBM across the Pacific Ocean to Kwajalein island area
at 4 a.m. On October 26, the height of the Cuban missile
crisis, a launch klaxon went off in the middle of the night at Volk Field
in Wisconsin, by mistake; at the same time a U-2 flew over Siberia, "More
dangerous by far than all these incidents was LeMay's overconfident and belligerent
advice to President Kennedy,” whom he believed to be a coward.” Historian Ernest May later interviewed LeMay
who expressed the belief that the Soviet Union could have been obliterated
without more than normal expectable SAC losses on our side.” After Khruschev agreed to remove the missiles,
Kennedy invited the Chiefs to the White House to thank them for their support,
but LeMay came out saying, “We lost! We
ought to just go in there today and knock them off.”
Fortunately President Kennedy's caution prevailed over
the extreme militarists...some of them in top positions in the hierarchy.
Leaders on both sides were beginning to recognize the insanity of total
war. One of the earliest to appreciate this was President Truman in his
last State of the Union address: " The war of the future would be one
in which man could extinguish millions of lives at one blow, demolish the
great cities of the world, wipe out the cultural achievements of the past,
and destroy the very structure of a civilization that has been slowly and
painfully built up through hundreds of generations.
Such a war is not a possible policy for rational men.”
It is defensible to argue that a rough balance in the
nuclear threat restrained the superpowers and successfully frightened them
from some armed conflicts, which would have occurred in a pre-nuclear age,
but the greater the proliferation, the more probable it becomes that they
would be used in any of a dozen or more situations which could produce all-out
conflict. Even now, after substantial agreement has been
reached, each superpower has more than enough bombs and missiles to destroy
the nationhood of the other several times over. The absurd logic of overkill was recognized
by William Colby, former head of the CIA, and who therefore could not be suspected
of standing for a weakened America. Colby
spoke thusly: "You say the purpose
of nuclear weapons is deterrence, then fine...why do you need more than a
very minimal number? President Carter
is reputed to have gone to the Pentagon early in his term and asked for an
explanation of why we needed more than 200 nuclear weapons.
Its a very good question. I don't think he got a good answer. It nearly blew the roof off the Pentagon.”
(The 200 would have to be nearly 100% reliable and protectable in order to
guarantee deterrence, but only doubling or tripling this number would have
been equally objectionable to the Department of Defense.) It always argued the need for more in order to attain security and
safety. As a result we were piling
overkill on overkill in the arms contest.
However when Gallup asked Americans which of the following choices
more greatly increases the danger of war:
"Continued arms buildup" or "The U.S. falling behind
the Russians" More chose the second than the first, by 47:39.
The public is usually receptive to the administration
and Pentagon's plea for new weapons and the American military effort to dominate
the world. The Viet Nam war was supposed
to have chastened expectations about such international power, but when Gallup
reported polling the American people on this subject he asked if we should
"maintain military strength throughout the world in order to control
communism?" 53% said "Yes" and 37% said “No”. Unfortunately
Gallup did not ask this question after the breakthrough, but there is evidence
to support the new commitment to international "regulation".
The public has always backed presidential commitments to the same thing,
leading to arms contests. The Pentagon was planning for 17,000 new nuclear
weapons until Gorbachev shifted our attention.
The usual defense was presented by Secretary of Defense Weinberger:
No matter how much the U. S. might want arms control, he claimed it could
not be attained unless the Soviets also wanted it and were prepared to make
the sacrifices. Neither side monopolized
the opposition to necessary sacrifice and compromise, before the break-through,
which transcended the usual negotiating efforts. Reagan's first INF proposal amounted to a request for Russia to
destroy many of its intermediate range missiles in exchange for our promise
not to deploy a similar number, which were not as yet even available. (If
positions had been reversed, there is not much doubt about our response)
President Reagan in his address to the United Nations
on September 26, 1983 referred to a letter written by General Eisenhower to
a publisher. Its remarkable foresight
was reproduced by Reagan, and here: "The
era of armaments has ended and the human race must conform its actions to
this truth or die... We have already come to the point where safety cannot
be assumed by arms alone, their usefulness becomes concentrated more and more
in their characteristic as deterrents than in instruments with which to obtain
victory.” Reagan could acknowledge that total war is becoming obsolete, and
that the "era of armaments" has ended but this intellectual recognition
did not deter him from a frenetic commitment to renewed weapons buildup, all
of which demonstrates that intellectual recognition alone is not enough.
National leaders could still be recommending Eisenhower's statement
at the moment their cities were going up in radioactive dust.
We will later call attention to the Reagan administration’s early belief
in the possibility of winning a nuclear war, which is totally at odds with
the Eisenhower position, quoted with approval, but apparently without awareness
of the contradiction. THE WIZARDS OF ARMAGEDDON by Kaplan and similar books
reviewed the irrationality of the MAD policy pursued for 40 years, emphasizing
the schizophrenia into which it led us.
A striking illustration of the devious way in which
arms race procedure can be offered as purely "defensive" is Star
Wars, or SDI. This military brainstorm
advanced by President Reagan, was presented--often graphically--as an all-protective
umbrella over the American population (with missiles shown bouncing harmlessly
off). The fallacies in this very popular
and widespread picture soon became apparent to informed observers.
A basic assumption made at the outset is incorrect.
SDI was not claimed to be perfect even by its most ardent supporters...hopefully
about 70% effective. Considering the
destructive power of nuclear bombs, near-perfection is an absolute requirement
for avoiding intolerable destruction. However
let us assume for the moment such a perfect "defense" is possible. Dr. Robert Bowman (in charge of space defense
under Carter) pointed to the fallacy of calling SDI a defensive project.
In reality it is an offensive threat.
As one of the contesting nations (the U. S. in this case) neared its
realization, the other nation (USSR) would know that very shortly all its
missiles would be ineffective and militarily worthless, whereas all the U.S
missiles would still be operational. No
more perfect case of "use them or lose them" is possible.
If not used, the possessor of SDI is left with ultimate military power
and the non-possessor at its mercy. As
for Reagan's reported offer to give SDI to the Russians, one critic judged
that he would have to blow up the Pentagon to make it give away such a perfect
weapon. The reception of industry to SDI is worth noting. Business Week, speaking about prospective contracts
said, "Star Wars is a shot in the arm for corporative R and D. It will dwarf the lunar program. It presages a new industrial revolution”—Profits
unlimited. Since the breakthrough, this project was re-named (NMD) and reduced
to protection against a few missiles from the smaller, rogue nations.
Another
reason for discounting SDI or NMD is that they cannot defend us from other
methods of introducing atomic explosions.
The bombs can be smuggled in (piecemeal), assembled and set off by
remote control or by a kamikaze. They could be brought into New York harbor
and planted by submarine. They could be dropped from a plane. They could be lobbed in from a ship l0 or 20
miles offshore at a low altitude and in too short a time for response. As
little as an explosion or two of this kind would result in revolutionary change
toward nuclear control.
Minimizers of Nuclear War
We easily forget that some (outspoken) observers minimized
the dangers and effects of having a nuclear war. They must be remembered. For those like William Buckley much depended
on what they saw as the alternative. Buckley
decided that nuclear war wasn't so bad, at least when compared with the threat
of communism: "If it is right
that a single man is prepared to die for a just cause, it is arguably right
that an entire civilization be prepared to die for a just cause.”
He went on to contend that our nation should be prepared to die in
order to destroy the USSR and its threat—-living under communism. In reality
that was never an option, which is the way it worked out.
Engaging in total war which kills both civilizations is a far cry from
Patrick Henry's call (to Buckley) for brave men to sacrifice their lives so
freedom might be saved. The resulting
chaos would be anything but conducive to the survival of freedom after atomic
war. The rabid anti-communism of Mr. Buckley was
matched by the equally rabid enemies on the opposite side.
Shortly after World War II, geopoliticians
began gathering at the Rand think tank, plotting strategy for the atomic age.
Among them was Herman Kahn (author of Thermonuclear War). He was “thinking
big” in terms of possible costs, even if his recommended scenario was put
into operation. He assured the others that we could suffer
a loss of l00 metropolitan centers and still survive better and function more
normally than Russia did before the conflict, which he must have thought would
be reassuring to the citizenry. Kahn listed some optimistic assumptions that
he thought would facilitate our victory, such as:
These requirements
would be highly unlikely to prevail after a nuclear exchange of the l00-metro
magnitude or anything approaching it. A similar projection will be noted a
bit later by George Bush’s four step method for winning a nuclear war.
Kahn took about 650 pages to describe how to be prepared for a nuclear
war without offering any organized plan for preventing it.
The power of the military mindset to shackle the highest
intelligence can be illustrated by the case of Edward Teller. No one could be better situated to appreciate
the dangers of nuclear war. Teller
more than any other scientist was responsible for the creation of the hydrogen
bomb. What did he tell the American
people about the consequences of its use? First he minimized its effect and argued that so far as war is concerned,
"The worst in the past is just as bad as the worse we may expect in the
future.” Teller got support from Vannevar
Bush of M.I.T., reported earlier. As for the nuclear ammunition itself, Teller
said that H bombs "were nothing more than packaging high explosives.”
Teller minimized nuclear war in another way. If it was fought, he said, "It will consist
of short and sharp local engagements, not involving masses that are being
slaughtered.” How soon might the nation
recover from a nuclear war, should it occur? In one place, Teller answered:
"Survivors of a nuclear attack could replace this great industrial
complex in five years.” In another
place, he offered the even more cheerful forecast that "In two years
after the attack we would be well on the road to recovery... " A final display of (over) confidence
concerned the effect of nuclear war on our democratic government, our political
freedom and our identity as a great nation.
Teller asserted: "If nuclear
attack comes, the nation can survive.” Also:
"Our democratic ideals and institutions will survive with us.”
There could hardly be a more striking case of preconceptions and desires
creating a dream world.
President Reagan's ambivalence regarding pre-emptive
strikes and survivability from nuclear was shown in an interview with Robert
Scheer, a reporter for the Los Angeles Times.
Scheer asked Reagan if we could not rule out making a preemptive strike.
Reagan said No-- going back to Generals Le May and Power who pressured
Kennedy to srike. Then Scheer asked, “Do you think there is such
a thing as surviving a nuclear war?"
Reagan expressed confidence that some of us would survive and start
our culture again. "Some"
could be 60% or 6% and the start would be far more primitive than Reagan imagined.
Clearly he was not ready to recognize that nuclear war was unwinnable.
On the other hand, George Bush represented the illusion
in a much more straightforward manner, in one of Scheer's interviews.
Scheer asked, "Don't you reach a point with these strategic weapons
where we can wipe each other out so many times and no one wants to use them
or is willing to use them that it really doesn't matter whether you are 10%
or two percent lower or higher than the Russians?" Bush responded as
follows: "Yes, if you believe
there is no such thing as a winner in a nuclear exchange, that argument makes
a little sense. I do not believe that.” Scheer:
"How do you win a nuclear exchange?"
Bush: "You have survivability of command and control, survivability
of industrial potential, protection of a percentage of your citizens, and
you have a capability that inflicts more damage on the opposition than it
can inflict on you. That’s the way
you have a winner.” This incredible
jingoism demands further attention to its specifics:
1.
Just keep our military leaders safe under Cheyenne Mountain
(a la Dr. Strangelove)
2. Just maintain our factories—even though both sides assume
that industrial centers would be prime targets
3. Just protect “a percentage of your citizens”. Bush must specify his percentages. It makes
a profound difference.
4. Just “inflict more damage on your opponent.” So it’s
all a matter of relativity. The nation in 60% chaos loses and the one with
only 50% celebrates victory.
It is a cause of astonishment
that a leader who believed a nuclear war can be won in 4 steps would soon
be elected president with no invoking of questions or protests about such
an unsupported and even suicidal belief.
Very probably Bush would prefer that everyone forget about this careless
claim. Evidently they did. We must
recall that the people themselves were reluctant to surrender the idea of
winnability because our whole tradition had been one of victory in wars and
arms races.
America as a winner is deeply engrained in the population
and their leaders. These leaders and
their "wizards", Russian or American, were struggling to define
the outcome of a nuclear war so that it might conform to the traditional,
but obsolete idea of being triumphant. Our leaders had repeatedly proposed schemes and “guidance systems”
for beating out the Russians, as reported in the New York Times (and also
a D.O.D. announcement by Weinberger.
The people themselves were ambivalent and contradictory,
which appears in the following local, case study. A.J. Mojtabai was drawn to Amarillo, Texas, home of the Pantex Plant
where all nuclear missiles were finally assembled. She had seen the results of a local survey
which revealed that 85% favored the continued presence and operation of the
nuclear plant. (Quoted reactions: "Its all right with me". "We need it for sure". "It would be better if I had a job there.”).
94% said Pantex increased the chances of bombs falling on Amarillo,
but almost unanimously they agreed that Amarillo was a good place to raise
children.
The local religious leaders were deeply split on this
subject. Bishop Matthiesen asked workers
at the plant to seek more constructive employment. Many Protestant leaders either ignored the
question or suggested that members do so.
One of them (Moore) found Biblical support for the factory's mission
in God's command to annihilate the Amalekites (communists?) claiming that
only the sinful would be destroyed by the (nuclear) fire which was coming. Another preacher (Jones) condemned human knowledge
because "the more a man knows the more dangerous he becomes.”
Still another said the Bible demands submission to the government.
Annihilation of the enemy was called an act of love, like "Blessed
are the peacemakers.”
Mojtabai identified some fundamental contradictions
among the people:
This case supports the conclusion
that people rationalize freely on nuclear arms production, the possible use,
the effects and the dangers.
Questions arise from the foregoing descriptions. Why did we cling so tenaciously to an arms
race for so long? (“we” being the
majority of people in the leading nations).
What caused us/is causing us to slow the arms race? In response to the first question, principles
of bio-social science suggest that certain patterns of behavior have been
impressed on us by our culture for centuries. We seldom appreciate the power of cultural conditioning. Beneath culturization lies the process of positive
reinforcement of basic drives. Almost
since the beginning of history we have found that arming ourselves with the
best weapons available and using them when necessary has offered a good probability
of satisfying basic needs, or of protecting these from more severe deprivation.
Social scientists have noted that changing this conditioning is often
a lengthy and sometimes painful process.
The normative or moral theories about the cause of war
and the response to threats usually center around human fallibilities for
hate, greed and violence. They persist
because we have failed to conquer these destructive emotions by our willpower
and by dedication to higher, more human qualities of reason, moral-ethical
capacities and love. This may be illustrated
by reference to some books written at the time of the crisis, advising readers
on how to control it. A popular treatment
was FATE 0F THE EARTH by Schell. It was an eloquent description of the dangers
plus an appeal for people to face this peril and commit themselves to meeting
it. This was a simple matter as Schell
saw it: "Just as we chose to make nuclear weapons we can choose to unmake
them.” There was no recognition of any causes for the choice.
The physician Caldicott (in her book MISSILE ENVY) had another easy
answer which appealed to love for all others, including enemies:
"All it takes is willpower and determination for people to rise
to their full moral and spiritual heights.”
Dr. Caldicott’s sense of what it was time for and what people ought
to do by willpower and morality had little relation to subsequent events.
Robert McNamara, former Secretary of Defense wrote about
the dangers of BLUNDERING INTO DISASTER.
While his book was informative, he upheld moral exhortation and willpower
as the answer to the control of nuclear as well as other genocidal weapons,
declaring, "Only an absence of political will hinders a verifiable agreement
preventing the deployment of more threatening ballistic missiles.” Evidently we found the will, but why, and how
did that happen? McNamara referred
to Catholic and other religious leaders who called the armament program "morally
wrong", then he asked, "How long will it take to recognize this
fact? Being wrong is not a fact but
a judgment.
Perhaps the most telling example of normative shortcomings
on the nuclear cold war is to be found in the book WEAPONS AND HOPE by the
physicist Dyson. He began by declaring
the futility of behavioral science on the subject: "Human nature is unpredictable".
The scientists cannot surrender on predictive testing, however difficult
it may be. As for explanation and guidance, Dyson turned
to moral beliefs, for example: "I
say we have no hope of escaping from the trap we are in unless we follow ends
which are ethically acceptable.” Then, "Moral convictions must come first" But "We
are all affected by this paralysis of the will, this atrophy of the moral
sense.” Then he admits his own failure
to be moral and free-choosing: "I sat in my office until the end of the
war, carefully calculating how to murder most economically another 100,000
people.” Finally Dyson perceptively
observed that "The public is still in love with war.” Yes it is, and
the question becomes: What really caused it to stop loving or tolerating war
since appeals to moral behavior on killing have long been repetitious and
undependable.
Still another case of idealizing is JUST AND UNJUST
WARS by Walzer. His morality appears
to be grounded in individual rights as "an absolute value.” Unfortunately rights are notoriously ignored,
especially when the stakes are high and blood has been shed. Walzer leaves
some loopholes for the rationalizers, for example he argued that "Nuclear
deterrence is immoral... but it may fall under the standard of necessity",
and "War can be moral if the killing is confined to legitimate targets.”
How do we tell when it is all right to be immoral? Nations engaged in war invariably think their
side is just, and no ratiocinations have made much difference. One reviewer said Walzer's argument "will
make a difference only to those capable of moral restraint.” Another charged him with evasion.
A final example of normative thinking on the control
of nuclear arms and war is THE SUPERPOWERS AND ARMS CONTROL by Clemens. He rejected "moral-politik" but it
creeps into his analysis in the form of "modernist principles". One of them states that power should entail
responsibility; another is that the worth of nations should be defined in
moral terms. Use of the term "should"
opens the door to idealizing, and away from the more critical attention to
empirical consequences (of failing to act "responsibly”).
The alteration of Russian policy and practice on the
nuclear-cold war arms race took almost everyone by surprise, including our
secret defense, the CIA. Some anticipation
was foreseen by Reddaway, writing in The New York Review of Books. He predicted
that the USSR might be "about to change course", that "economic
progress is more important to their long term interests than grimly hanging
on to every form of police control.” Gorbachev was predicted to "launch a program of reforms.
He seemed to realize that economic reforms will never be effective
without social and political reforms" which included cold war control.
Gorbachev's sudden introduction of glasnost and perestroika
led to many authors attempting to reconstruct events, e.g. Doder, Owen, Goldman,
Medvedev, Lewin and others. Most of
them directed more attention to Gorbachev's personal history and his movement
in the hierarchy than to why Russian policy changed and why he happened to
be the one leading it. Several of
the books call attention to the fact that Gorbachev introduced a new and important
factor, he received attention and welcome from the general public for the
first time. (Except as noted by John Steinbeck, from his first hand observations
of Russia immediately after World War II. Steinbeck was surprised that Stalin
had “a god-like hold on his people.” Why should a dictator who had ruthlessly
executed and exiled so many people be revered? We may reasonably deduce that
any leader who “saves the nation” from invaders is going to get acclaim—at
least temporarily). How do we explain this change from lack of concern for
the public by previous leaders to recognizing their needs and recruiting their
support? Medvedev offered the following
answer, briefly:"The social psychology and value system of the U.S. had
changed far less in the 20th century than have those of the Soviet Union.”
He is pointing out that this evolution of public concern and its effects takes
time. (It required a century or two
in Western Europe).
Lewin in his book THE GORBACHEV PHENOMENON provided
significant data and interpretation related to Soviet reforms. He referred
to what the geographer Harris called a "record breaking growth of urbanization,
associated with the rapid growth of education, communication, specialized
training and the professional classes.” The implication of this development is described by Lewin as follows:
"The city more than any other environment provokes critical faculties
and intellectual freedom--of course a textbook principle, but despite the
theoretical common-placeness of it all, when the authoritarian social system
begins to rediscover such terms, we are witnessing an important event. People
are not satisfied any more with some set or other of specific notions, they
demand a new quality of the whole life environment.”
The necessity for significant social change had been
growing for decades beneath the facade of monolithic power. The structural changes in the economy and society
proceeded independently from politics, and Lewin gets to the crux of the matter,
saying, "The key lesson here is that a complicated urban society at some
point stops responding to the urges of backward political institutions.”
Having provided such a foundation for scientific analysis, it is surprising
to find Lewin concluding that "for a comprehensive reform program to
be enacted...political will is necessary”.
A behavioral scientist would have to ask, and answer the question:
What activated the will, and why at this time?
Gorbachev was part of a new generation, more highly
trained and educated, becoming conditioned to identify with the basic drives
of the people and to recognize the requirements of a technological culture. This was also true of his successor, Yeltsin,
although Gorbachev only wanted to reform communism, not eliminate it. The latter person felt he had to react autocratically
in order to keep the painful economic change in operation. Some attention to the Russian evolution has
been helpful in relation to nuclear weapons and the probability of war. It is this process which produced leaders who
for the first time were able to speak at length about the dangers and take
appropriate action. In support of
this conclusion we might consider some Gorbachev statements. Glasnost and
perestroika were introduced (in his words) "To provide the Soviet people
with the possibility of working under conditions of lasting peace and freedom...above
all to terminate the material preparations for nuclear war.”
He could perceive the benefits of a change in the economic and military
behavior of his country. Again, Gorbachev could state publicly: "We have reached a stage in the scientific
and technological revolution when new discoveries can only spur the arms race
and create a situation in which it will be far more difficult to even start
talks.”
As for the impact
of this social evolution on militarism, Lewin observed that the suffering
economy was one of the forces behind Gorbachev's success, but Lewin himself
did not sufficiently acknowledge the cost of the arms race as a factor.
Not only did the military burden impede economic improvement of the
Russian people, it reduced their status and appeal among nations.
After the rush to make and deploy SS-20 missiles, the Washington Post
observed the Russians changed their position as a result of the damage caused
by the deployment. The response from NATO nations was apparently
not anticipated by the Kremlin and cost Moscow dearly. "In London, Bonn and Paris, governments
that had displayed a certain sympathy for the Soviet policies, turned more
conservative. Across Europe, peace
movements fizzed like punctured balloons reported the Washington Post. Previous
dictators would not have rated that very highly. Gorbachev did and that was a new response.
It is interesting that Khruschev, in his book expressed
the opinion that if Russia could not get bi-lateral agreement with the U.
S. on arms reduction he would do it unilaterally. He said, if the U. S. wants to keep "inflating
its military budget, they'll be sure to lower the living standard of their
people, and unwittingly strengthen the position of communist and progressive
forces.” Khruschev perceived the contest
and the outcome, but he had it reversed.
The U.S. News and World Report claimed that the Russians
were "afraid that it (SDI) would drive them into a trillion dollar arms
race they could not win.” Evidently
the U.S.News thought we would win such a race without too great a cost.
The London Times capped a description of the faulty Soviet system with
the following prediction: "The dilemma facing the system now is
that it is not economically capable of maintaining its military machine for
the next 20 years at parity with the U.S.”
In his book
THE FALL OF THE SOVIET EMPIRE, Dobbs offers two explanations, and as a reviewer
pointed out, he "oscillates between them": (1) death by economic
exhaustion and (2) by seeking to reinvigorate the communist system, Gorbachev
succeeded in destroying it.” (The real cause of destruction was Yeltsin’s
effort to change the system overnight. This produced anarchy and government
by criminals). Dobbs’ explanations are sound but phenotypic. There is no need
for any “oscillating”. The reviewer, Ulam, concludes, "The crash of the
Soviet system is a good illustration of how personalities shape history as
much or more than those social and economic forces so often invoked by historians.”
The great man theory of historical change has always been very appealing,
but human society is in a bad way if it must wait for and depend upon a great
man to save it from every serious challenge that comes along (as Kissinger
pointed out). Any analyst with a scientific orientation will and must look
for the bio-social processes which underlie and explain events, in this case
the "greatness" of such leaders.
It is because they perceived these biosocial forces and worked in harmony
with them. (In reality, society usually just gets one by anointing him.)
Even if the importance of Gorbachev's personality is
admitted, the scientist must inquire what produced it and why it was effective
in the changes that occurred. A leader
can help deflect the nation from catastrophe, which Gorbachev did. He realized the great danger and opened a door
previously closed and unrecognized. For
that, the reviewer concludes, "deserves his peoples' and our gratitude
and an honorable place in history.” We
can perceive that Gorbachev came out of a new and different background from
previous Russian leaders. He was more
highly educated and technologically trained; also more attuned to the needs
and sentiments of his people. The introduction of glasnost and perestroika was aimed at "reinvigorating
the system" but probably contributed to undermining it, for the reason
that new freedom always seems to call for more, and when a system is seriously
weakening, any change may "get out of hand" and foment criminality
(as in Russia). We have seen that Lewin and others identified the weakening.
(We must remember that it was Yeltsin who took over and was committed
to displacing communism.)
The USSR moved further and faster in its breakthrough
out of the nuclear cold war than did the U.S., however few Americans would
credit its advance to ethical principles or outstanding leadership of logic...as
they do to themselves. There will
be only a little contest to the conclusion that they were driven to change
as the unanticipated result of technology. Their technology was a major cause
for increasing demands by the people for a better life and more voice in government.
There is not much doubt that one of the main reasons was military/economic
costs. The reasons for American change from militaristic
pursuits to negotiation for arms reduction is more involved and oftener debated.
It can best be encapsulated by a consideration of the role of Actor-Governor-President
Ronald Reagan, who was in charge at the time.
The Reagan administration is of
strategic importance. It marked the
time of breakthrough from the old international world to the new, led by a
man who epitomized the old. It thus
reflected profound contradictions about arms, war, economics and the Russians--contradictions
that were largely shared by the public. Some examples of the Reagan early views:
This record cannot be reconciled with the rational-ethical
approach to and solution of problems. The contradictions can only be explained and
understood in terms of bio-social laws. The
second contradiction was dramatized by an interview in Newsweek, in which
Reagan was asked how he could be optimistic about disarmament negotiations
with Russia, at that particular time. He
answered that it was because one of the communist leaders (unidentified) had
told him so—“just between the two of us”. If Carter or any Democratic president had made
such a claim, he would have been roasted alive for believing a figurehead
of the evil empire. In an attempt
to explain this anomaly, a biographer was questioned, the best known being
Lou Cannon. It was because the Russian
had told it to Reagan--it was personal. Cannon
characterized the president as not being governed primarily by reason and
evidence. He was more emotional, primarily
dominated by his feelings about people
For the first seven years of Reagan's tenure, he was
an ardent escalator, and then he finally received great popular credit as
an arms controller and reductionist. We
will consider how these contradictory roles can be reconciled. Reagan himself believed there was no contradiction:
Talking tough and arming maximally compels the opponent to negotiate when
he would not otherwise do so. As S.P.
Huntington observed, the Reagan administration made arms control an integral
part of its defense policy, but arms before control. An arms race was a prerequisite for change.
The fallacy in this position can be readily seen if
we reverse roles. When the opponent
escalates arms, we, the United States, have never been motivated thereby to
rush to the negotiating table; in fact, the opposite. This old tactic--forging ahead in the arms race--has at no time
in the past led to reduction and control.
Should it have that appearance we would have to offer other reasons.
In 1982 Reagan had reached the (verbal) conclusion that "A nuclear
war cannot be won and must never be fought.”
This at least applied to his public utterances.
Of course he vigorously continued preparation to wage it and was surrounding
himself with men who did likewise.
Weinberger,
Reagan’s Secretary of Defense generated what was called an Arms Guidance Program
designed to “decapitate” Russia. At
the same time Weinberger could say, "There is no place in our strategy
for winning a nuclear war.” One of
his critics, T.Draper, pointed to "the disparity between what you are
doing and what you are saying.” Another onlooker, P.D.Erickson observed that
Reagan linked nuclear freeze with the antichrist and that he used "the
language of Armageddon to create an atmosphere of crisis”.” In 1984, Dallek,
author of the book RONALD REAGAN, concluded that "Reagan sees almost
no room for reasonable compromise with the Soviets.” Of course he did compromise,
as already noted.
The two key questions here are: (1) why was Reagan so
resigned to conflict and preparing for it, and (2) why did he then reverse
his position with dramatic suddenness? In
response to (1): In his earlier years, Reagan had swung from liberal-new deal
to rigid anticommunism because of his personalized experience with the radical
left involving the actors' organization in the 1930s. This stereotype carried over into his relations with Russian leaders
during his first term as president. Another
part of the explanation relates to Reagan's religious views.
Erickson’s book and a second, more recent biography
of Reagan by Cannon, try to explain his dramatic appeal. The first author
details his “rhetorical style and narrative persona” and how it captured the
hearts of the electorate. Korda describes how, by way of his acting career,
he “adapted a number of more or less imaginary personalities” through which
he moved back and forth between the rhetorical world of his speeches and political
realities.”
Cannon reports on how Reagan’s belief in Armageddon
played a prominent role in his plans for the future.
Macfarlane, Reagan’s national security adviser said that from the time
he adopted the Armageddon thesis, he saw it as the comming nuclear catastrophe.
He concluded that Armageddon was inevitable, sooner or later. Other observers
denied that he believed this (but such “moving back and forth between rhetoric
and reality” is not reassuring). Cannon
cautions: “The Armageddon story did not reconcile Reagan to nuclear war” but
since Armageddon was coming, Reagan thought it prudent to protect people from
its consequences.
Frank Carlucci,
a later security adviser, said Reagan told him that “Nuclear weapons were
inherently evil.” When Carlucci pled
the case for deterrence, Reagan responded by telling him about Armageddon.
Speaking again, Erickson concluded that through Armageddon, “Reagan could
borrow for any issue the emotion and aura of this ancient motive, casting
himself as both prophet and president.” Reagan became a hero of Biblical proportions.
On the one hand he warned that our actions could lead to destruction,
but at the same time he promised us glory and success if we hold true to his
political vision.
Reagan agreed with his friend Jerry Falwell that the
apocalypse would start with Russia invading Israel. Falwell predicted that his children would never live out their full
lives, but fear not, he and they (and Reagan and other true believers) would
be raptured into heaven just before the nuclear blasts. When Reagan was governor of California, he
had met with some ministerial friends. At
a prayer session, one of them (Otis) claimed to have God speaking through
his voice, with this message: "I
have watched you and I have been pleased and if you will walk in my ways,
it is my will that you become the resident of 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue.” (See
the papers listed reporting these developments)
Later it was stated by Reagan's legal secretary: "He talks about it (the prophecy in Sacramento)
all the time.” As president, Reagan
told reporters from The Washington Post, "Its part of God's plan for me.”
With respect to the turnabout, Time commented on this
startling change: "Ronald Reagan
came into office pledging to be radically different in dealing with the Soviet
Union. He disparaged detente. He criticized arms control. He assailed the three-decade old doctrine of
nuclear deterrence. For a while, no
one could accuse him of failing to deliver on that promise. Reagan showed little interest in getting to
know Russian leaders. He proposed
a dubious and potentially destabilizing scheme for space based defense. In a speech that will long be remembered, he
stooped to rhetorical depths not seen since the onset of the cold war, decrying
the USSR as the focus of evil in the modern world--the evil empire.” So, Time asked, “Why was he smiling at the
ruler of the evil empire?” Why was
he going to the focus of evil, praising the works of its leader and working
hard for arms cuts? It was manifestly
inconsistent.
Now the question: What caused Reagan to reverse himself
on nuclear arms? As with all motivations,
we can only hypothesize on the basis of logic, psychology and the available
information (however this is a requirement of behavioral science). First,
Reagan was a well-known poll watcher and surveys had shown that people were
worried about the hair-trigger threat of missiles being launched without control.
Also, Reagan had been contacting a new breed of Russian leaders. But there was another more important factor
to be considered. The bio-social theory
suggests that the power of the ego or self, led Reagan to take a course which
would make him "go down in history" by breaking the impasse over
nuclear arms.
To be sure, all leaders want to do that, but usually
on the basis of a consistently pursued policy, not as a result of reversing
themselves. If Reagan finally conceded
in his own mind that nuclear war would be unwinnable and a universal catastrophe,
then whoever started or participated in it would not go down as a great leader.
Obviously a belief in (nuclear) Armageddon leaves a leader no place
to go. It is a dead end, in more ways than one. Eisenhower declared (l953):
“Could anyone wish his name to be coupled by history with such human degradation
and destruction?” Reagan must have remembered Nixon, who also wanted to take
some striking step in diplomacy, which would make his name in the record. For Nixon this had been the recognition of
Red China. The parallel continues,
because Nixon had repeatedly expressed the strongest condemnation of China.
In the 1950s, Nixon had stated that he could conceive of no situation
where China might be recognized by the United States.
As late as 1960, he declared: "I can think of nothing more detrimental
to freedom and peace than the recognition of communist China” (according to
Costello). A more unlikely candidate for healing this
breach could hardly be imagined. Likewise
Ronald Reagan had previously played the role of hawk and anti-Communist.
In some situations, the ego drive has the power to make us do unusual
things. There is yet another similarity.
At the time Nixon recognized Red China surveys had shown that public
opinion had just turned a corner. The
proportion of people favoring recognition had passed 50%. The opinion trends toward nuclear arms reduction
had also been rising toward a majority about the time of Reagan’s transformation.
In conclusion, President Reagan, a man of the old world
was forced to take steps toward the new, much as he may have disliked the
prospect. He had set his policies
and staffed his administration in the direction of war preparation, complete
distrust and alienation of the Russians, unilateral action and doing whatever
was thought to be necessary for "winning". Transition to the new world was made reluctantly; it was not begun
and pursued under the aegis of ethics and logic. Reagan's primary manifestation of moral thinking
on this subject was in reference to the "evil" Russians, which did
not help
In principle, we would expect leaders to be chosen who
represent a direct, immediate rational approach to problems, i.e. who reflect
a high regard for and practice of intellectual activity. In March, 1980, President Reagan (then governor)
expressed the opinion that "The state of California has no business subsidizing
intellectual curiosity”, as reported by TIME. Curiosity about how to most
effectively relieve national and international dangers would seem to be rewarding.
President Reagan was well known for inserting his foot into his mouth,
but it didn’t make much difference. The
people had accepted him as the charismatic father figure and leader through
the wilderness of troubles. This explains
his famous "Teflon coat.”
There is no shortage of criticism of technology. It often races ahead of the most intelligent
control and presents dangers of regimenting society, in the visions of Orwell,
Huxley and the scholarly treatment of Ellul.
Nevertheless it is not going to stop, and furthermore it has compelled
us to reform old and obsolete practices.
It has dissolved the basis for war in its most destructive form. This was recognized at an early date and very
clearly by General Douglas MacArthur. In
a remarkable speech, he described the military tranformation occurring occurred,
and the dynamics behind it. A portion follows, courtesy of the New York Times: "The tremendous and present evolution
of nuclear and other potentials for destruction has suddenly taken the problem
away from its primary consideration as a moral and spiritual question and
brought it abreast of scientific realism.
It is no longer an ethical question to be pondered solely by learned
philosophers and ecclesiastics, but a hard core one for the decision of the
masses whose survival is at stake.” MacArthur
could perceive what was coming and why. Some may be surprised to learn that this speech
was delivered to the Los Angeles Council of the American Legion.
Even earlier, essentially the same foresight was expressed
by the Nobel physicist Robert Millikan, who declared: "War is now in
the process of being abolished, chiefly by the relentless advance of science,
its most powerful enemy.” Millikan
went on to point out that war "has existed in spite of religion, in spite
of philosophy and in spite of social ethics and in spite of humanitarianism
and the golden rule since the days of the cave men because in accordance with
the evolutionary philosophy of modern science and simply because it has had
survival value. It will disappear
when and only when the conditions which have given it survival value have
disappeared.” This was written some
years before the atomic bomb, and included in a book on Science and Social
Change by Thornton. It has certainly
held for the nuclear military phase, it remains to be seen whether and when
the same prediction holds for conventional arms.
Our captivity to the most violent conflict for many
decades, has been described. We are in the process of being emancipated
from it. In this connection, a book
by Somerville, (THE PEACE REVOLUTION) offers an anomalous and little noticed
analysis of how we are being forced to change our established social practices
regarding all out war--gradually and because of cultural forces. Somerville says that when science and technology
produced the atomic bomb, they also produced a social revolution.
Previously one nation had been able to make all out war against another
and benefit from it, but no longer is it possible to massively kill other
people without being massively killed oneself (assuming that the others are
also nuclear-armed).
Somerville had nothing to say about massively killing
others who were not nuclear-armed, as at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The standard explanation has been that this
was the only way to end the war quickly and save perhaps a million American
lives--a controversy reactivated by an article in The New Yorker. Of course that is all speculative now, as we
know from experience. Every nation
invariably justifies whatever it does, a fact that seriously undermines any
such argument, but does not fully contradict it.
Somerville concludes that by developing nuclear explosives,
scientists have "driven home" a truth that had previously been ignored:
"I must be my brother's keeper, if I want to keep myself.” Mutually
assured destruction makes us moral! This
is why the U. S. and Russia are now more or less cooperative friends instead
of threatening mutual annihilation. In
this way a sound “morality” is illustrated and enforced.
This interpretation has consequences which Somerville, and many others
do not pursue to logical conclusions, as already seen by MacArthur and Millikan.
The trouble with Somerville's rather ingenious interpretation is that
the concept of morality, i.e. what we ought to do, as judged by some ideal
norm of rightness, is not needed and is indeed superfluous.
The same conclusion as to the newly acquired behavior
can be deduced from amoral concepts of biosocial science, viz., all people
have an innate drive for “survival”, avoidance of pain, hunger, suffering. When a situation is created where one group
or nation cannot inflict these on another without also inflicting them on
the attacker, then that option has been effectively foreclosed--IF rational
individuals and leaders are involved. Of
course there can be exceptions to that last requirement, but they should be
minimal, and the costs will be so extreme as to almost guarantee non-repetition.
Put in somewhat simpler terms we are guided by the probable consequences
of our procedures, as we perceive them. The
alternative is either positive (rewarding) or negative (punishing) and we
must either anticipate or learn to make the distinction.
Use of the term "guided" may be misleading,
for it implies that we have selected such a guide with foresight and logical
anticipation of the advantages of having done so, or the costs of having failed.
If that were the case, we would have acted preventively at a far earlier
date and far less economic burden. We have noted the experiments of Azrin and
associates, showing that significant change of response requires a severe
stimulus to be effective. At least
it can be said that we recognized the threat "at the last moment"
before it actually occurred.
The danger of nuclear explosions has not disappeared,
but the probability of all out atomic war has been reduced. Proliferation slowly continues despite declarations
by the nuclear powers of their will to discourage or stop it. Sooner or later some rogue nation (or some
rogue but well financed organization like Bin Laden's) will use a bomb for
blackmail or set one off against another nation. This does not require sophisticated missiles (which would usually
be traceable to the source). We have previously described ways in which a
bomb or its components could be introduced and exploded in a coastal metropolis.
This would probably lead to retaliation by the attacked
nation, if nuclear-armed and the attacker was known. Use of this kind would be localized, and it
would certainly arouse the major nations to do whatever was necessary in order
to insure no repetition, even if this included rigid enforced inspection and
nuclear disarmament inaugurated by a more powerful and effective United Nations-type
organization. Some observers might
argue that the nuclear threat is greater now than during the Cold War (which
could be true for the kind just described). The Russian expert Cohen stated that ill attended, fugitive nuclear
weapons in former Soviet territories (plus proliferation) made the danger
higher today than in the past. Presumably
he meant for total atomic war, but that outcome is doubtful.
The model for this kind of limited outbreak is India
and Pakistan, competing with each other in bomb and missile production. Their bomb/missile tests were met with jubilation
on both sides, as an expression of nationalistic pride. Fear began to replace
joy, and leaders denied that they would follow the lead of our cold war in
such a contest but a Washington Post analysis (by Blair) reported that they
are into that pattern and an Indian political leader had urged the government
to make hydrogen bombs. Should these
nations lose control and get into an exchange of their arsenals at some future
date, there is no good reason to think that it would escalate into worldwide,
all out conflict. This would be the
last gasp of nationalism trying to attain its ends by means of ultimate weapons,
at least of the nuclear kind. It is the extreme, punishing stimulus that
enforces a change in values and practice on the part of those who experience
or learn from it.
In this
chapter and in the preceding one, we have encountered references to nationalism
in conflicts of various kinds. In
this situation it has rendered the prospects of peace more difficult. It
has therefore been appropriate to direct attention to this aspect of captivity
on the part of people everywhere, concentrating our scrutiny on the American
condition, not because it is more severe than others but it is ours and therefore
presumably more accessible to our influence.
CHAPTER 4
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Reagan,
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Khruschev,
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Editors London Times, 4/2/85, Selected by “Today’s
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Dallek,
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See
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Editors Time Magazine, “Plus ca Change” 6/6/88, p.
l2
Costello,
W. THE FACTS ABOUT NIXON, Viking,
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Editors Time Magazine, March, l980, and QUOTATIONS
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Editors New York Times, “Text of MacArthur’s Speech”
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Millikan,
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Somerville,
J. THE PEACE REVOLUTION, Greenwood
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Blair,
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Washington Post NWE, Oct. 7-l3, l996, p. 21