IN BONDAGE TO MASS KILLING
Our
Captive Culture
and the Bio-Social
Forces that Will Free Us
For several centuries nations of the world have been dominated by preparation for and resort to organized conflict on a massive scale to protect or advance their interests--resistant to any alternative. They are in that sense captives to military operations and mass killing. Like other nations, the U.S. has always lived with a perceived military threat, developing a potent agency to meet--and sometimes make it. Has this always been characteristic of the human species?
Although the earliest humans undoubtedly fought among
themselves, it was not until the neolithic revolution that organized groups
formed and could indulge in what we think of as war. From that time forward, violent conflict has been part of our
history. The scale of fighting has
increased until world wars occurred in the 20th century. Accompanying this process, the
destructiveness of weapons has scaled upwards until atomic bombs and missiles
climaxed the story
The explanation for this universal phenomenon is
relatively simple, and the basics are all we are concerned about at this point,
to account for its prevalence and long life.
There can scarcely be any doubt that organized, violent conflict between
nations and lesser groups has persisted because it has always been perceived as
a possible method of satisfying basic human drives or at least as a means of
protecting them from greater frustration--which comes to the same result. This elementary conclusion has been shared
by anthropologists, sociologists, psychologists and even physicists, as we
shall see.
An enormous volume of prose has been expended on the
subject of war...hundreds of books and thousands of papers on the subject, by
philosophers, clerics, and various kinds of scientists, with at best the
slightest effect. Appeals to logic,
ethics, morals, commonsense and facts—even when these are sound--have not
changed this behavior pattern very much.
The question of why (not) leads to unpleasant conclusions necessarily
reflecting on the human species, in an inglorious fashion. A recent book that
confirms our captivation to mass-killing is BLOOD RITES by Ehrenreich. Its main concepts may be summarized as
follows:
¨ The going theories on this subject are numerous and
conflicting. They do not correspond well with history.
¨ Social scientists avoid dealing with the macroscopic
phase and address the limited, specialized features.
¨ War is primarily an emotional phenomenon, as
illustrated in her many cases of “bloodiness”.
¨ War is a social “meme” which has been deeply
embedded in the culture.
¨ Moral principles and appeals have made little
difference in society’s response to wars, by leaders or people.
¨ The war problem is so complex that it is not
susceptible to elemental analysis. She
quotes Tolstoy’s argument that the deeper we search for causes the less we can
be confident of our conclusions.
The first 5 generalizations are sound.
Ehrenreich’s inadequate concept of natural laws or processes of science
interferes with perceiving a relatively simple theory, used here to explain our
elementary, operational failures and counterproductivity relative to mass
killing (regularly unaddressed). What
does Ehrenreich propose as an escape from the sanguinary syndrome? “The passions we bring to war can be brought
just as well to the struggle against war.
There is a place for courage and solidarity and self sacrifice other
than in the service of this bloody institution...and we need all the courage we
can muster.” Unfortunately a call for
courage is of the same nature (and defect) as the traditional calls for
morality. The genotypic question
remains: What does it take to actually enforce the change in operational
terms? Tolstoy in effect declared that
dependable knowledge about war is impossible. This is not a
constructive/scientific response.
There
has been insufficient attention to the application of bio-social theory and
natural law on the subject. However no
matter how voluminous the accumulation of information, and the depth of
intensive studies, we can never pick our way through the critical problems, to
see where we have been and will be going without discriminating the guiding
forces to which we must ultimately conform and adapt. The aim of this chapter
is to confront the social forces behind this phenomenon that can explain more
consistently why we are bound to violent conflict on a massive scale, whereby
we can anticipate the circumstances under which it is more likely to
subside.
We come then to the other common misconception--that
successful analysis requires sophisticated and complex scientific theory, as
well as massive empirical support. At
present we do not conform to the most elementary concepts on this subject,
which itself must be explained. This chapter addresses the violent conflict associated
with conventional warfare. The subject
of nuclear conflict and its various dangers constitutes a special case and will
be analyzed in the chapter to follow.
It provides some indications of how and why some progress has already
been made in controlling the (nuclear) threat.
We can begin with some analyses made by various social sciences in the
past and their shortcomings.
Some ethologists, such as Lorenz, maintain that
humans, like the lower animals are programmed with an inexorable instinct of
aggression. The best we can do, he says is to re-direct or sublimate it into
more constructive forms of behavior, for example sports-- which is only
cultural learning. It is helpful for
present purposes to distinguish between aggression and violent conflict. The latter would be regarded as a
manifestation of the former, however the only one with which we are here
concerned.
Eibesfeldt, Lorenz's pupil,
is not clear as to what degree aggression is immutable. In one place he asserts, "The
aggressive drive can atrophy if not discharged.” In another place, he concludes that the aggressive drive is
inevitable. True instincts do not
disappear if unexpressed. Eibesfeldt
would do well to try that with hunger, thirst or sex, in order to have a better
appreciation. Eibesfeldt cites Davis to
the effect that there are many observations that prove that aggression is
genetic, but he provides none of these.
Ardrey claims to offer evidence
which supports Lorenz "quite clearly" but none of it is
repeated. Every human case that
Eibesfeldt employs is susceptible to an
explanation which rests primarily on learned reactions. (Humans are, of course encoded with
behavioral forces, but we learn (or are conditioned) to satisfy them in various
ways, some constructive, some destructive.)
Eibesfeldt admits (p. 328) it is possible that
aggression "can be greatly influenced" but not "completely
learned". We might consider some
cases that prove otherwise. Mead
studied two tribes racially the same, which live 30 miles apart in New Guinea.
One illustrates extreme aggressiveness (Mundugumor) and the other was extremely
pacifistic, (Arapesh). There can be no
reasonable appeal to genetic differences here.
The ! Kung tribe of Africa shifted from a nomadic hunter-gatherer way of
life to a sedentary farm existence. The
children's behavior then became quite aggressive. This was more apparent in the adults also. Here we have a shift within the lifetime of
a single group. The Tasaday of Mindanao in the Philippines, a totally isolated
Stone Age tribe, were reported by Nance to have never had disputes, have little
disagreement "and cannot even think of anything that is not good".
The Hunzukuts of the Himalayan Mountains were formerly feared widely as savage
warriors. Now they live so peacefully
there is no police, no crime and few disputes. Here we have a change in the
same people within recorded history, according to Shor. Another community that
is wholly cooperative and conflict-free is Ladakh, studied for years by
Norberg-Hodge.
Lorenz and Eibesfeldt respond to this after a
fashion. They refer to the Eskimos and
the Zuni Indians, often cited as completely non-aggressive people. They say the allegedly non-aggressive
Eskimos do indulge in "singing duels" to beat each other out and the
allegedly non-aggressive Zuni do have "aggressive initiation rites"
even though they will not compete with each other in any ordinary way. Lorenz carries this line of thought one step
further and argues that people are being aggressive when they make music, art,
or even indulge in humor. Even if we
agree to call this aggression, it has been blown up to the point of virtual
irrelevancy, certainly as any serious threat to individuals, culture or
species--which is the concern here.
The ethological fallacy is assuming humans are
identical or nearly identical with the lower animals they study. This claim is based on genes governing the
behavior of all creatures. Fish, for
example, have a strong genetically based instinct of aggression. What happens to these genes in
evolution? Human ancestors of 300
million years ago almost certainly did have a rigid, genetically based instinct
of aggression like the fishes of today.
Doubtless this instinct had survival value for them (as Lorenz and
Darwin maintain). What happened to
these genes as evolution approached the human level, we don't know in detail,
but almost certainly the same kind of change occurred to the genes for gills
and a big tail, which our ancestors had, but we no longer possess.
Wilson goes so far as to argue (IN SOCIOBIOLOGY) that
"murder" is more common among the vertebrate animals than among
humans, even when the loss of life from our organized wars is averaged in.
Although this killing must be conceded, none of these vertebrates purposely
engage in the organized, systematic extermination of each other on a giant
scale like our World War II or in some strictly ethnicidal massacres. He makes no reference to the revolution
wrought by nuclear war, but he does recognize that "the learning rules of
violence are largely obsolete".
Wilson does not cosider the psychological and social forces compelling a
change. The phenomenon of modern war
and its fate is our concern here.
Wilson is inclined to exaggerate the role of genes and underestimate the
effect of culture and learning. He
contends (1) that we are programmed to react to external threats with hostility
and sufficient violence to insure safety, and (2) that such threats are usually
associated with strangers and we are genetically disposed to react to strangers
with aggression.
These two propositions are challenged by elementary
facts and logic. People may react to
threats in several ways. They may run
away. They may fight. They may passively submit. Which they do depends on their perception of
the situation--their past experience, their learning, their cultural
conditioning. There is no rigid, automatic response of fighting dictated by the
genes. Wilson responds that the modern
sophisticated view is to realize that learning and reasoning are themselves
governed by genes. That is true, but
conceding it leaves us with nothing very informative or offering much
guidance. Running ability is determined
by heredity, but the more important questions are where, when and why we run,
and these are not illuminated simply by an appeal to genes. Likewise what we learn and why are questions
that require careful analysis of factors other than genes. We have gone to war with English, Germans,
Spanish and even ourselves, not because of strangeness, but because "the
other side" was regarded as posing too great a threat to our own basic
needs, as we perceived it (and them).
Reward and penalty have often been associated with what is called
nationalism, our own group versus the “aliens”- a potent motive. (See Chap. 5)
Wilson is correct in stating that "human
behavior rests on a genetic foundation", adding that it is organized by
some genes which are shared with close relatives and others that are unique to
Homo sapiens. Actually both the internal
and external are factors, varying in influence according to different cases,
but both playing a vital role in creating our wills and choices. We are encoded with the ability to perceive
some consequences of behavior and be guided by these, but with difficulty, as
Lorenz recognized--a little too well: "Unfortunately I consider the
collective stupidity of mankind, which is somehow incapable of learning from
truly negative experiences and turn them into good--very great indeed”. In
actuality, when pressed hard enough by the costs of established but inadequate
responses, we can slowly adapt, and have done so, as will be seen.
There is a danger in over-emphasizing the impact of
cultures, particularly to be found among some sociologists and anthropologists,
for example White or Sumner. Andreski
hypothesized that war was essential to the development of government among
humans, so too with industry, democracy and the arts. Skinner criticized the
belief that it is just a matter of "ridding ourselves" of the
aggressive instinct by participating in sports etc. He contended that we are aggressive only because of and to the
extent that we have been so conditioned. Two responses to this are in order: (1) The prior reference is to individual
behavior not to organized conflict, and (2) We do inherit a mechanism studied
by Cannon which when triggered results in violent action, on the individual
level. There is yet another
anthropological interpretation, tying genes to evolution, by Bigelow, who
concludes that ancient war killed off the more stupid individuals, resulting in
a fast mental evolution. Without
arguing about its ancient function where it may or may not have had a
beneficial effect on the human species, we must agree that modern total war
kills off the intelligent as readily as the stupid. Bombs make no distinction between the I.Q.s of those standing
nearby.
The military operations are always cloaked with
rationalized and moralized principles, whether sound or unsound. When it comes
time to stop or to avoid such conflicts, the same appeal is seen as the best
hope and chief reason for any success, which is or might be achieved. Unfortunately for this interpretation, the
injunctions against killing go back almost to the dawn of history, and
certainly to the beginning of religious history, repeated at regular
intervals. The religions themselves
have sometimes been the stimulus for costly conflicts, as reviewed in some
detail by Haught in his book HOLY HORRORS.
Some examples will illustrate the normative
interpretation of the war problem and the logical response to it. Waltz declared: “Reinhold Niehbur has
written as many words of wisdom on problems of international politics as have
any of the academic specialists.” There
are repeated references to Niebuhrian analysis--the evilness in man, the appeal
to love, God and morality. A typical
statement reveals Niehbur's orientation:
"Only a forgiving love is adequate to heal the animosities between
nations.” The US-USSR nuclear animosity of the cold war almost disappeared,
without any great manifestation of forgiving love. (We shall shortly examine the real dynamics of this change.)
Not long ago, Brzezinski, addressing the dilemma of
foreign relations OUT OF CONTROL, declared "The need for an enhanced moral
consciousness.” As for its source, he
said: "Moral guidance must come from within.” Representing religion, Dr. J.C. Johnson said, expectedly, that
behind the economic and psychological forces, "are the moral standards
which men adapt.” The author then
opined that "religion offers to men the only final solution to problems.”
The values and practices we adopt are largely a product of cultural
conditioning, modified by individual differences. Scientific analysis does not anticipate "final"
solutions, only somewhat higher probabilities. Religion has obviously been much
delayed in its “final solution”.
Even social scientists may be drawn into
moralism. For example Margaret Mead and
Clyde Kluckhohn proclaimed that the greatest need in controlling warfare is
"agreement on a set of principles of world morality.” Presumably such a rational and ethical
decision would exert primary and almost irresistible pressure, but nothing is
said about the critical questions of how such an agreement would be reached or
why, nor the way in which biosocial forces can explain any "world
morality" much more consistently.
Kant addressed the subject of war in his essay
PERPETUAL PEACE--a strange combination of normative and scientific
thought. He agreed that morality cannot
provide the necessary motivation for lasting peace. He then called on the laws of nature, which he thought are made
for moral ends--"Nature's own purpose-the empire of right.” A better
knowledge of nature would show that there is nothing ordained to be “good and
right” about it. Kant was alleged to
conclude: "Morals is a practical science, the sum of laws, exacting
unconditional obedience, in accordance with which we ought to act.” Only a
minor change would delete the superfluous part involving moral ought and
purpose. Simply substitute a statement
recognizing the costs or damaging consequences (to human drives) of failing to
adapt our behavior in harmony with bio-social processes, and the rewarding
consequences of so doing. Kant could not
see that the moral-ought-purpose syndrome is adscititious and readily
replaceable with a superior understanding, however slowly.
If there is one good test of the relation between
mass killing and ethical-moral principles, it would be the treatment of women
and children during armed conflict.
There have been protocols, formal or informal against attacking this
non-military population. (Soldiers
fight soldiers, not the innocents). How
ineffective that has been for general populations is on record in present day
cases such as Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Afghanistan, Bosnia.
The United Nations reported an extensive study of
"The Impact of World Conflict on Children”. This included not only the
ones that are killed but their regimentation into the killing field as
participants, which makes them accept this way of life, thus helping to
perpetuate and extend it. Violent
conflict has always made victims of noncombatants, but a new development has
occurred. The proportion of civilian
victims has multiplied (The UN report says 9 times) "Children have become
not only targets, but combatants and perpetuators of violence and atrocity.”
We say little about bombing by the major powers in
World War II (for example the destruction of Dresden and Hamburg reported by
Irving). These resulted in as many or more deaths than Japanese atomic
bombings. The latter were justified as
necessary for stopping arms factories or defeating Japan quickly. All of which leads to the question of
responsibility. We have seen that
science directs attention away from judgments and toward the social costs of
procedures, in this case costs to the nations of eliminating a sizeable
fraction of the next generation, also of producing one that is conditioned
toward violence and destruction. Responsibility in science equates to the
ability to distinguish a response that is drive-fulfilling for those concerned
from its opposite; this is for all those who may relate to us influentially in
time or distance, either short or long term.
As another illustration of the interference of
normative thought with scientific analysis we may consider the classic work by
Quincy Wright, THE STUDY OF WAR. After
all his imposing details assembled on this subject, he concludes: "We must
choose the direction in which we want to go.
This cannot be discovered by science of analysis. It is an act of faith.” Behavioral science
uses a tested theory to explain why we chose, or what we probably will choose
among alternatives and what the consequences were (or are likely to be). There is of course, as alleged by Wright,
always a "point behind which science cannot go" on any problem at any
particular time, but no other intellectual enterprise can be more successful,
whatever the task. Wright’s appeal to
"an act of faith" could lead anywhere, and offers no (testable) kind
of guidance. He refers to behavioral
science only for the purpose of emphasizing its obstacles and dependence on
outside, incommensurable factors.
Finally it is a little surprising to find Bertrand
Russell analyzing the war problem in a non-scientific way. He could dispense with the concept of human
will in explaining our behavior on this subject, but he retreated to an unsound
conclusion: "It is rather through impulse than through will that the
individual lives and the life of the community can derive the strength of
direction.” He advocated that we
"preach the kind of change required”.
The effects of acting on impulse alone have demonstrated a lack of
effective guidance and a pronounced tendency to get us into trouble. We would expect Russell to recognize that
rationality plays a role--even if it is not one of undeflected leadership. As we have already observed, it is
incompatible with the nature of science to indulge in "preaching.”
We must look to more realistic forces for explanation
of national behavior on the subject of violent conflict and its control...a
conclusion admitted by the Director of the Harvard University Program on
Nonviolent Sanctions, Gene Sharp. He conceded: "Both moral injunctions against
violence and exhortations of love and nonviolence have made little or no
contribution to ending war.” Therefore attention must be focused on what
actually did bring about the cessation of the cold war and other ongoing
threats. Agreement on this point may also be found among sociologists. We have
J.S. Coleman’s presidential address to the American Sociological Society in
which he observed that “Moral values which compel persons to attend to
another’s well being are weak forces unless reinforced by self interest.” Yes,
weak, but not absent and not without some effect. We have previously noted that
even Kant deprecates the role of reason-derived will.
As for real-life causes and cases of the failure and
inconsistency described above, any number could be used to display the enormous
gap between expressed moral-ethical-religious principles and actual behavior.
There is no space or need for any catalog of these, but we may take one that is
current and illustrative. Robert Block, writing in The New York Review of Books, reported on his
visit to Bosnia, entitled "The Madness of General Mladic". Mladic was the military leader
of the Bosnian Serbs, responsible for the massacre of about 4,000 Muslims.
Mladic justified this by his fear of "Islamization". One witness of the event (at Potocari) said
he (Mladic) could barely contain his delight at the prospect. "There'll be blood up to your knees”,
he said. Away from the killing fields,
Mladic would issue statements about how opposed he was to war and weapons
proliferation. Block began his account
by reporting a packed church attended by Mladic. When the general left the church, "He was mobbed by adoring
fans. Old women cried and tried to hug
him. Babies were held up for him to
touch...“He is God” one well-dressed middle- aged woman told me... He is our
savior.” People who regard a mass
murderer as God, support all-out war and "ethnic cleansing" share the
"madness" and are far indeed from surpassing military control. The civil war in Yugoslavia reportedly
rested on a long smoldering ethnic conflict, fanned into flame by
hate-propaganda on both sides, but especially by the Serbian
"cleansers"...a Christian people.
There is little understanding of science in the
preceding interpretations. From a scientific point of view, a hypothesis which
failed regularly to correspond with the facts (in this case the facts of
behavior) would have been replaced long ago by one that did. We must understand why people act as they
do, in terms of tested theory, before we can start talking about why and how
they are going to change. Preaching at
them (a la Bertrand Russell) has never been very effective, certainly not about
violent conflict. Wars have continued
to be massively destructive of life even when the contestants both claimed conformity
to religion, even the same religion.
The elements of a bio-social theory have been
outlined earlier. We can now apply them
more particularly to violent conflict.
Sociobiology has made a start toward scientific analysis of war and
killing. It shows that the basis for
this conflict in animals and humans has undergone an evolution. Wilson (in HUMAN NATURE) provides cases
showing a transition from the vertebrates, to primitive humans to modern
man. The conflict is at first over
food, territories and mates, so Wilson invokes the gene-controlled struggle for
survival and the process of natural selection.
He cites the Mundurucu head hunters of Brazil who
systematically kill members of other tribes because a head confers high status
and invests religious spirits of the forest on its possessor. However it is emphasized that game is very
scarce and hunting territories overlap and this strong competition for food
probably furnishes the real motivation for killing. Another South American tribe, the Yanomamo of Venezuela conduct
wars over women, or to avenge the deaths that trace back to competition over
women. Finally the Maori of New Zealand
waged almost constant warfare over territory, but always against those tribes
to whom they were least related. When
the white men introduced guns, the competing tribes took them up, with
escalating death, but Wilson observes that by this time, the violence had
become self-limiting and the tribes began to question the importance and value
of revenge and uncontrolled conflict.
As we move from animals to modern humans we observe
the reduction of war motives such as food, mates and territory, but the
increase in self or ego inflating motives such as status and power. There are also the factors of ethnicity and
religion that may appear, as well as fulfillment of the social need, which
comes from a common vital enterprise. Certainly modern man does experience
satisfaction of organic drives in the form of property and money, which may
result from successful conflict. The
motivating forces have become more numerous and complex.
We are genetically endowed with some basic drives
characteristic of our species, which will function, one way or another. Culture and experience, as well as some
individual differences determine the particular way in which these processes
will be fulfilled and satisfied-- by violent conflict under appropriate
circumstances. Our nervous system has
inherited the capability of conceiving and learning this great variety of mechanisms
or canalizations. It also creates the
possibility for people to change perceptions, thus leading to changes in
culture--however slowly. Modern war has
persisted because people perceived it as offering the possibility of
satisfying, their basic processes, or the equivalent, of protecting these from
probable frustration.
Acknowledging
that war has been rewarding to us is not a pleasant thought, but occasionally
social scientists will acknowledge it.
The anthropologist Ruth Benedict admitted, "It is a commonplace
that men like war.” She did not say
why. The sociologist Bernard enumerated
some of the satisfactions war has provided. The psychiatrist Erich Fromm may
not have been aware that he was supporting the idea (because he does not
anywhere follow out its logical consequences) when he made this statement: "The influence of any doctrine or idea
depends on the extent to which it appeals to the psychic needs.” War is an
institution that has appealed to many "psychic" needs. The physicist Freeman Dyson observed,
"The public is in love with war" and then went on to describe how he
was caught up in it.
In the last world war, workers who got high paying
jobs in government war plants and elsewhere (at least as compared with their
experience in the previous depression) were having their "psychic
needs" fulfilled. Industrialists
whose business, profits and plants were booming--likewise. It could even be argued that some men who
fought in the war found satisfactions that are often unappreciated--excitement,
cameraderie, accomplishment (but often death).
Decades after World War II, the old movies are in demand, replaying the
battles and glories--even in Japan, a defeated nation! Brave men were lost, to be sure, but this is
an accepted part of the venture, and they were in the minority.
A question arises about the losing side. Should not its reaction be different? Almost everyone is aware of the history of
Germany as a model in this situation. A defeat, or even two does not
necessarily change the perception of war as a possible satisfying procedure, at
least immediately and so long as we think we only need to "do a better job
of it". The alternative of not
fighting has always seemed more intolerable.
In this way, military action has been deeply conditioned into us. We are in a real sense its captives
In America there has been a long cultural
conditioning in which people have experienced organized conflict as more a
benefit than a cost. The Viet Nam
experience put something of a damper on that, but the rewards of the Persian
Gulf victory restored military policies and practitioners back to the highest
level, where they rest at the moment.
This explains the fact that in a time of heavy budget cutting, military
appropriations remained firm. This does
not presage serious disarmament and preparation for peace. The priorities will have to be shifted. (It does explain why military leaders are at
the top of the social respect scale in the U. S.)
It was accepted that our guarantee of peace was
building the most and best armaments.
Coupled with that belief has been the conviction that, as the world's
super-power we can use our arms to police and neutralize those countries which
represent too much of a threat. Recent
events show these beliefs are increasingly illusory such as Viet Nam and
Korea. The people are becoming
increasingly uneasy about foreign involvements.
Former Secretary of Defense, Schlesinger straddled
the fence. Referring to "world
wide military equilibrium" he said, "The burden of responsibility has
fallen on the U.S. to carry it.” In
another place, "The Crisis of Confidence" he declared "We cannot
be the permanent guarantor of stability in a world of turbulence.” The nation
is still schizophrenic on this subject for reasons already discussed. If some other nation, say Russia or China,
said they had the necessity of maintaining world military equilibrium we would
loudly protest--if we questioned their concept of military equilibrium, which
we surely would.
A "peace dividend" was anticipated when we
started arms reduction after the cold war was over, but the Pentagon and the
defense industries were gearing up to recover this because they feared any
reduction of their own business, as well as the nation's status in the world. One striking example of this pressure was
provided when reporter and columnist Richard Reeves asked then-Secretary of
Defense Cheney what the Department’s mission would be in five years, if he had
his way. Cheney answered with these six
points:
1. A dominant strategic and tactical nuclear force
2. Military alliances around the world
3. Forward deployment of U. S. troops to guarantee those
alliances without Japanese rearmament or German military expansion.
4. Control of the seas
5. Capability to project force anywhere Americans are threatened,
and
6. Maintenance of our defense related industrial base.
The sweeping nature of this plan (not excluding
readiness for nuclear conflict) led Reeves to ask if the U. S. would then be
"the world's policeman".
Cheney replied "That phrase has had a bad connotation since the
Viet Nam war, but its not inappropriate.
We don't want to tell other people how to run their business, but we'll
let them know we're there.” The
policeman role is needed in the world, but any one nation cannot fill it
without making troubles. There is now a
definite power vacuum of law enforcement.
A strong UN is unwanted, and collective action is weak-to-nonexistent,
as in Rwanda and the Balkans.
A later case of nationalistic militarism was provided
by the ECONOMIST. It recognized
repeated "revolutions" in the nature of warfare. The one currently under way was seen as
information technology. The U.S. was
the only nation in process of mastering it, not because of any present threat,
but because "generals want to play with the new technologies to meet
future threats. This new revolution is
built on getting, processing and acting on intelligence”. It was contended that
there are increasingly strong incentives to "fire first" with the new
weapons and the U.S. wants to be there first with the most.
Admiral Owens declared, "We'll be in a far
better position to shape the world rather than react to it, than at any time
since World War II" The conclusion was: "The new revolution will
greatly expand American power in the years ahead.” Here we have a re-statement of the putative role of super
policeman "shaping the world" which Reeves elicited from Secretary
Cheney, plus the idea that war was coming.
The motivation behind the U.S role as world policeman was revealed by
the Defense Planning Guidance (from the Pentagon), which appeared in the New
York Times (1992). It contended that
the U.S. must continue to dominate the international system. The aim, as stated
by Schwarz in the Atlantic Monthly was to "Discourage advanced industrial
nations from challenging our leadership, or even aspiring to a larger regional
or global role.”
It must not only be able to control "nuisances
like Iraq and North Korea, but it must also protect Germany's and Japan's
access to middle eastern oil, otherwise these advanced countries would have to
develop their own military forces of global power”. Schwarz concludes:
"No wonder the U.S. must spend more on its ‘national security' than
(all of our potential enemies) combined.” He went on to predict (correctly) the
strategic defense plan to "expand NATO eastward" NATO was and still
is conceived as a military organization.
The average amount, estimated by the Pentagon, that the NATO expansion
would cost the U.S. during the next decade was 1.75 billion. The Congressional Budget Office estimated it
would be 11.8 billion, as reported by Morin. The new NATO nations were expected
to spend 10 billion dollars on fighter jets, in preparation-- for what?
The militarists bow regularly to the icon of national
security and assure the public that their role alone makes this possible. Ronald Reagan could declare himself against
arms races at the very moment he was carrying out the biggest buildup of
weapons in peacetime history. He
said: "We must find ways to
reverse the vicious cycle of threat and response which drives arms races.” His
threat, or response (whichever) was an integral part of the race. Each nation sees all other additions as a
threat, no matter what the opponent calls it.
There is another element of national security, often
unrecognized. A congressional study
identified a major force necessitating arms control and the elimination of
unlimited conflict: "National
security requires a stable economy with assured supplies of material for industry... Security means more than safety from hostile
attack. It includes the preservation of
a system of civilization.” Let us consider
two statements on the subject by two presidents, first Dwight Eisenhower: "The problem in defense is how far you
can go without destroying from within what you are trying to defend from
without”. Now Reagan, an admirer of Eisenhower: "Strategies which depend
on unrealistic or unachievable assumptions about resource availability are
doomed to failure... This means that the administration and our military
leaders cannot and must not base their plans on resources that are beyond the
nation's ability to provide.”
Nearly
everyone agrees, but true meaning only enters when we pass rhetoric and get
down to operations. Reagan demonstrated
that his record spending was not excessive, as judged by the public, since
about 2/3 of the people agreed that we have to be pre-eminent in military
power--while also calling for reductions in defense spending. The military expenditures (for 1993) by the
U.S. almost equaled the total spent by all other major nations, including
Russia. A statement by the Pentagon revealed its military motivation: "U.S. forces will be structured to
achieve decisive victory in two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts.”
If two, why not three? Or if help from
NATO or the Security Council is to be considered, why not call for this on the
very first occasion?
We can better understand developments, like the
U.S. News describing the "spending
binge" in which military research and development increased from 14.6
billion in 1980 to 41.7 billion in 1988.
Fifty new weapons systems were going into production, presaging what it
called " a tidal wave of deficits"...and a related cost was drain on
talent. A Congressional Budget Office
study provided percentages of various scientists employed by the Defense
Department. The military got 30% of the
mathematicians and 25% of the physicists.
Considering the top engineers (those with PhDs) then 70% were working
for defense.
J.R. Munro, chairman of Time Inc. said, “We now spend
45 billion a year on military research.
That’s 75% of the money the government allocates to all R & D for
cancer, diabetes, birth defects, optics and electronics and high speed
computers. In Japan the ratio is
reversed. The Japanese spend 2% of
their funds on military research.”
(Since that time the numbers have changed, but not the ratio) This is
all in the name of security but there is another element of national security
equal to or perhaps greater importance.
A congressional study identified a major force, which is necessitating
arms control and elimination of all-out conflicts, namely economic costs:
"National security requires a stable economy with assured supplies of
materials for industry. Security means
more than safety from hostile attack.
It includes the preservation of a system of civilization.” Polls show
that the public favored reduced defense spending during the 80s, with
majorities fluctuating between 57 and 66%, which might represent ideals but
operationally there was little protest to robust military budgets for
succeeding years, which the Pentagon treated as a heavy but necessary diet.
In spite of the fact that the Russian threat had
about disappeared, the administration, congress and the Defense Department have
extended plans for spending a quarter of a trillion dollars per year over the
next five years. When dealing with
billions, hundreds of billions, most minds are boggled by and incapable of
grasping them. One observer tried to
bring this down to common experience by imagining silver dollars stacked
up--one billion on top of each other.
How high would the pile be? It
turns out that that the stack would 1,000 miles high. A trillion would go to the moon four times.
In an effort to bring defense spending "down to
earth" in the same way, the Center for Defense Information, among others,
described what modern weapons cost in terms of various social needs, for
example one B-2 bomber (two billion dollars) translates into 424 elementary
schools for a quarter of a million students.
One F-117 fighter would fund 4,200 policemen to help cities fight crime,
etc. Is the technique effective in
changing priorities or in making a noticeable difference in expenditures? Judged in operational terms-- whether it has
reduced the military budget, the answer must be No, because "things go
along about as usual.” Until the costs become personally manifest, in school
crises and tax squeeze to maintain defense, little change is to be
expected. We seldom appreciate the
total business value of perpetually re-arming America.
The
corporations involved are dealing with what Time called “the largest single
market in the world.” An editorial in
The New York Times described the relationship in this way; "The largest
centrally managed economy in the world, outside the Soviet Union, is run by the
U.S. Defense Department. Hating the
discipline of free markets, the Pentagon bureaucracy insulates its contractors
from competition. They in turn lobby
congress to keep paying the bills, and the service continues to buy gold plated
weapons, no matter what the plane costs or how badly it performs.”
Kennedy in
THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GREAT POWERS observed that "Today's armament
industry is becoming increasingly divergent from commercial, free market
manufacturing". They enjoy a
special relationship with their own Department of Defense, protected from the
marketplace. Many books have been
written describing this business, for example by Fox, Melman, Thayer and
Duscha. This is not capitalism but a
form of state socialism, never labeled as such. Keynes pointed out how business men "are apt to reach a preference
for wholly wasteful forms of loan expenditures because they don't have to be
judged on strict business principles.” The arms business is about as wasteful
economically as it is possible to be (everyone hopes the product will never be
used).
From time to time, it will be revealed that profits
on defense contracts are far above those on private consumption products,
averaging 35% during the 1980s. Ex-
Senator Proxmire proposed legislation that would require the O. M. B to keep
records of defense profits. This was
opposed (by McDonnel-Douglas and Lockheed) as being "bureaucratic". Without
this data the legal counsel of the Senate Joint Economic Committee concluded
that congress would be in a "blind position.” It is fascinating that making most of their profits from dealing
with government bureaus is not bureaucratic, but having the government publish
the relevant data IS bureaucratic.
A common and related counterclaim is that its
contracts maximize jobs and employment, therefore even though these may be
military in nature there are non-military spin-offs. The actual facts came back from the Employment Research
Associates, where it was found that military spending COSTS jobs as compared
with private, non-military business.
They recorded the number of jobs per billion dollars spent for military (25,000, transit (30,000), housing
(36,000), education (4l,000) and health care (47,000).
As to international military expenditures, Adams
reported that according to the U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,
world-wide sales of weapons first broke the trillion dollar barrier in
1987. Our share of this business has
been rising sharply ever since and is justified by profit, by helping the trade
deficit and by political expediency.
The U.S. government did its part, contributing 477 million dollars for
promotional activities on the part of its arms dealers.
It may be claimed that recent progress has been made,
which has not been acknowledged here. A
report by the United Nations Development Program summarized the ongoing
relation between world development and the military. Since World War II over 20 million people have been killed in
civil and regional conflicts. Denzer
who reviewed the report (in U.S. News) said world arms expenditures "have
dropped by almost 1 trillion dollars between 1987 and 1994 chiefly because the
U. S. and the USSR "have drastically cut defense outlays, but global
military spending still totals 7 trillion dollars per year.” It is not possible in reason to credit the
U.S. with truly significant reductions when it is spending a quarter trillion
dollars every year on the military--as analyzed by The Center for Defense
Information’s Defense Monitor, l998. These facts are not promising.
In America there has been a long cultural
conditioning in which people have experienced organized conflict as more a
benefit than a cost, with few exceptions, such as Viet Nam. This explains the fact that in a time of
alleged heavy budget cutting the military appropriations remain rather steady. Before significant change occurs, priorities
will have to shift. The question then
arises as to what will cause, or is causing to any degree the nations to
control production and use of armaments.
Significant steps have been taken on the cold war and nuclear threat
It is readily apparent that over-investment in the
military could be counter-productive, but how much would be required to meet
that qualification is uncertain. There
is an economic-ecological factor that is often ignored. Lester Brown asserted that threats in the
future will "arise less from relations of nation to nation and more from
the relation of men to nature.” It must
be added that relations between nations will be increasingly influenced by the
ecological requirements faced by all.
Isaac Asimov foresaw the not too distant future when "Even a non-nuclear
war cannot be fought because it is too energy rich a phenomenon... We are going
to have to use all our energy to stay alive, with none to spare for warfare.”
Barry Commoner added: "To make
peace with the planet, we must make peace among the people who live on it.”
Unfortunately, and as usual, we require some severe stimuli for
motivation.
What will cause us to stop polluting, destroying,
wasting and arming our world for profit with bloated military budgets? The motivation must come from consequences
severe enough to "get our attention". As long as military operations
are perceived as glorious, as long as it appears "profitable" to
ignore the ecological debt and the economic deficits appear to be postponable,
and as long as investors, both national and international continue transfusing
our economy, the established tradition will be pursued and our present
priorities will continue.
Pressures to change may be expected not only from
environmental deterioration and economic stringencies but the rising costs of
ethnic conflicts, not just in money but in human suffering and protest. To the degree that violent conflicts
interfere with trade and business activity--or seriously threaten to do
so--there will be motivation to prevent and control these. It is of interest that Imanuel Kant in his
essay PERPETUAL PEACE foresaw this as a restraining or limiting factor. He
said, “The commercial spirit cannot co-exist with war, and sooner or later it
takes possession of every nation, for of all the forces which lie at the
command of a state, the power of money is probably the most reliable.”
What can we predict about the future of terrorism and
guerrilla warfare? Guerrilla conflict
seems assured of continuation and even some growth, as other forms of violent
conflict become too expensive. As for
terrorism, Hanle claims it is the NEWEST FACE OF WAR. He defined and subdivided both terms, thus identifying certain
forms of terrorism as war. To qualify
it must have a political purpose, and lethal force if involved must be on both
sides--a requirement which would seem to declassify it as war because most
terrorism is one-sided. Kupperman says terrorism has low firepower but high
leverage; also that it is a low cost, low risk form of conflict, used mostly by
small groups and small, fanatical countries. It would seem safe to conclude
that terrorism will expand wherever it produces the desired result, but it can
at best only be accessory to military operations.
We previously noted that Schwarz's prediction on the
expansion of NATO was confirmed.
Cultures have habits that resist change--in this case military beliefs
and practices. The NATO was formed as a
military alliance against the USSR.
When the USSR collapsed as a military peril, the NATO was left without
its traditional justification. There
was pressure, internal and external, to find another motivation. This ambivalence was exemplified by two
analyses in the NATO Review, one by a general (Kehoe), that first called for a
military "joint task force, which will embed the capability of a command
structure.” The following analysis by a
Dutch scholar of international relations stressed the need for attention to
refugee and economic crises, including cooperation with Russia. The NATO is apparently
changing into a peace- keeping organization.
The proposal appeared for Poland, Hungary and the
Czech Republic to join NATO. This was
approved, with the announced opposition of Russia, which received no
invitation. The American people when
polled said Russia should be a member, when it "stabilized" and met
the usual qualifications. The Russian
leader, Lebed, responded to these developments as follows: "The cold war is over. They won...so why have you decided to reopen
the competition?..as reported by the Defense Monitor.
The persistence of the military function as a top
priority was demonstrated in the expected/required arms expenditures by the
three new nations. The costs to Poland
alone were estimated to run into the billions of dollars. The Czechs announced plans to buy 30
advanced fighter planes, such as the F-16 Falcons costing 21 million dollars
each, when its entire budget for the military in 1997 was 816 million, only a
small part of which was for new procurements.
Even the Dutch commentator emphasized that none of the NATO nations
should be free riders", i.e. those failing to hold up their end of the
military modernization. If those
nations under the Warsaw Pact had expressed the intention of "modernizing
their arsenals" we would have reacted as negatively as Russia did to this
project.
Efforts are constantly being made at reducing
systematic killing at all social levels between individuals, communities,
ethnic groups and nations. These do
make some contribution to its reduction.
Unfortunately a very long period of "lighting candles against the
darkness" is required. At present
the putative benefits in southern
Africa, Israel, Kashmir, Afghanistan et al are as yet to be confirmed. In the meantime more pervasive bio-social
forces determine the outcomes, as will be seen in the following chapter on the
nuclear phase of mass killing where they have enforced a social change of world
significance.
CHAPTER 3
Ehrenreich,
B. BLOOD RITES, Holt, 199l, p. 240
Lorenz,
K. ON AGGRESSION, Atheneum, l968,
Introduction
Eibesfeldt,
E. ETHOLOGY, Holt, l97l, p. 324 ff
Mead,
M. SEX AND TEMPERAMENT IN THREE
PRIMITIVE SOCIETIES, Morrow, l935
Kolata,
G. ! KUNG: Hunter-Gatherers, Science,
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Nance,
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Shor,
J. AFTER YOU, MARCO POLO, McGraw-Hill,
l955, p.266
Norberg-Hodge,
H. ANCIENT FUTURES, Sierra Club, l99l
Wilson,
E. SOCIOBIOLOGY, Harvard, l975, p.
246-7
Wilson,
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Andreski,
A. “The Case for War”, TIME, 3/8/70, p.
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Lorenz,
K. ON LIFE AND LIVING, St. Martin’s,
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Wilson,
E. Op. Cit. P.119
Skinner,
B. SCIENCE AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR,
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Bigelow,
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Waltz,
K. MAN, THE STATE AND WAR, Columbia,
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Brzezinski,
Z. OUT OF CONTROL, Macmillan, l993, p.
229-30
Johnson,
R. PATHS TO PEACE, (Ed. V. Wallace)
Cambridge, l957, p. 339
Kluckhohn,
C. MIRROR FOR MAN, McGRAW Hill, l949,
p. 273
Kant,
I. PERPETUAL PEACE, Liberal Arts Press,
l948, p. 28, 32
U.N.
Report “Impact of World Conflict on
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Irving,
D. THE DESTRUCTION OF DRESDEN,
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Wright,
Q. A STUDY OF WAR, Univ. Chicago, l983,
p. 392
Russell,
B. WHY MEN FIGHT, Century, l9l6, p. 260,266
Coleman,
J. “The Rational Reconstruction of Society, Am. Sociol. Rev. 2/93, p. ll
Sharp,
G. THE POLITICS OF NONVIOLENT ACTION,
Sargent, l973, Preface,
Block,
R. “The Madness of General Mladic, New
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Wilson,
E. ON HUMAN NATURE, Op. Cit. p. 111
Bernard,
L. WAR AND ITS CAUSES, Holt, l944, p. 3
Fromm,
E. ESCAPE FROM FREEDOM, Rinehart, l944,
P.65
Dyson,
F. WEAPONS AND HOPE, Harper & Row,
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Schlesinger,
A. A THOUSAND DAYS, Houghton Mifflin,
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Reeves,
R. Column, (UPS) July 3l l990 and
December 26, l989
Editors THE ECONOMIST, “The Future of Warfare.
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Schwarz,
B. “Why America Thinks It has to Rule
the World”, Atlantic Monthly, June, l996
Morin,
R. “Getting Behind a Bigger NATO”,
Washington Post NWE, 3/24/97, p. 35
Reagan,
R. “The U.S.-Soviet Relationship”,
Address: l/l6/84, Policy 537, p.2
Eisenhower,
D. Speech, January l8, l953; Comments
by President Reagan: Speech, “National Security and the Strategy of the U.S.,
January, l987
Editors,
THE DEFENSE MONITOR, Vol. XXIII, No.5, l994, p.3
Department
of Defense “Report on the Bottoms Up
Conference”, October, l993
Editors U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 3/18, 1985,
P.22
Congressional
Budget Office, “Economic and Budget Outlook, August, l987, p. 47
Munro,
J. “Whose Business Is Defense?” Vital
Speeches of the Day, Harvard Club, January l6, l987
Congressional
Research Service, “Major Issues Review” l/87, p.3
Editors TIME, 12/63 AND 2/15/63, P. 106
Editors New York Times, Reported in The Washington
Spectator, August l5, l988, p.l
Kennedy,
P. THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GREAT
POWERS, Random, l987, p.442
Keynes,
J. GENERAL THEORY, Harcourt Brace,
l935, p.129
Simon,
P. “Profiting from Uncle Sam”, Common
Cause, May-June, l987, p.20
Employment
Research Associates: Study reported in Washington Spectator, 2/1/90, p. 2
Adams,
J. ENGINES OF WAR, Atlantic Monthly
Press, l990, p. ix, l34, l99, 294
Denzer,
B. U.S. News and World Report, 6/13/94,
p.70
Editors The Defense Monitor, Vol. 27, No. 4, l998
Brown,
L. “Redefining National Security”,
Worldwatch Paper No. l4, l977, p,6
Asimov,
I. “The Future Is No Fun”, Washington
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Commoner,
B. MAKING PEACE WITH THE PLANET, 1990,
P. 239 ff.
Hanle,
D. THE NEWEST FACE OF WAR, Pergamon,
l989, p. 233
Kupperman,
R. “Terrorism and Public Policy”, in AMERICAN VIOLENCE AND PUBLIC POLICY, L.
Curtis (Ed) Yale Univ. l985
Kehoe,
N “Sustaining a Vibrant Alliance” and
DeWidjk, R.
”Toward a New Political Strategy”, NATO
Review, Summer, l998
Editors Defense Monitor, Vol. 27, No. 2, p. 2-3