CHAPTER 2

THE DYNAMICS OF CAPTIVITY AND FREEDOM

from

Our Captive Culture
and the Bio-Social Forces that Will Free Us

by
Bruce Stewart
Copyright ©2005 by John A. Stewart

Readers should read the Forward and Chapter 1 before this chapter.

Start End Table of Contents Bib Discuss

The function of this chapter is to lay a foundation for scientific analysis of our captivity. Central to all science is the identification of fundamental processes which give rise to the phenomena in question, be it molecular processes giving rise to chemical changes, genetic processes giving rise to heredity, bacterial and viral processes causing disease, nuclear causing atomic energy. In the case of individual and social behavior, it is necessary to assume dynamic processes of several kinds--physiological, psychological, and cultural.

Intellectual captivity must be explained in terms of these laws governing behavior. It is not enough to say we are prisoners of ignorance or a lack of knowledge. Even scientists have sometimes been unable to escape their preconceptions when the evidence was at hand and the reasoning straightforward. Lord Kelvin opposed the discoveries of Roentgen, Soddy and Rutherford; Huyghens fought against Newton's gravitation; Millikan attacked Planck's quantum concept--in spite of the fact that he furnished strong experimental evidence in support. Bacon sneered at "theoreticians” like Kepler, Gilbert and Copernicus.

Why could these men not adjust their thinking to the pertinent information? We say they were prejudiced, but what factors affecting them from within and without produced this result? Seldom in science but frequently outside, vital information may be withheld or ignored. Again, we must assume that forces motivating people caused them to react in this way. Even with the necessary data, we find that social concepts are far more resistant to change than are "scientific" concepts. A functional theory must explain this.

Psychologists and sociologists usually believe that only a very sophisticated theory can help much in explaining, predicting and guiding social behavior. They tend to neglect simple theories because, in their view, behavior is very complex, thus simplicity is useless and misleading. The first of these reasons is sound but the second is not. (This reaction is contrary to the long standing principles in science of simplicity and parsimony) All sciences have grown by starting with rather elementary theories, gaining the analytical advantage of these, then adding qualifications, special postulates (or even replacement) to accommodate greater knowledge. The social scientists at present tend to concentrate their attention on limited and intensive studies, which they feel are subject to a reassuring amount of control. They set aside major problems of today and large scale changes because these are uncontrollable and alleged to involve values, which removes them from the possibility of systematic analysis.

No one can reasonably denigrate the intensive studies and they may indeed be contributory and essential to macroscopic analysis, but even if this is conceded, we will describe failures to follow out the logical consequences of even an elementary paradigm such as employed here. A physical parallel would be continuing to use the geocentric theory. In our common life there is work to be done even at the low level. Too many contradictions (and associated failures) are ignored—as will be demonstrated in the chapters to follow. The failure of policies pursued can be, and has been predicted, but with little effect. Therefore it can scarcely be claimed that the theory is deficient or lacking in possible constructive guidance, or that it is inadequate because of its simplicity. Until we implement what is logically and scientifically obvious we cannot condemn it or claim that "we have really tried.”

Unfortunately, raising this subject sometimes results in cavilling over technicalities by specialists committed to one particular conceptual scheme, e.g., ethologists analyzing behavior in terms of instincts and lower animal experiments, anthropologists stressing the determining power of the culture. Behaviorists committed to conditioning supported by positive reinforcement and punishment, psychoanalysts interpreting actions in terms of the ego-id apparatus. Psychotherapists (like Maslow, Rogers and May) emphasizing the importance of the self and other human needs. These theorists usually concentrate on elaborating their unique concepts and shortchanging the avenue of integration.

All the various "schools" of behavioral science have important insights, and the scientific procedure would be to integrate these elements into a unified structure. Gardner Murphy observed that "psychological schools may fight about these, but the conflict is not in nature but in the scholastic schemes”. Sought here are minimum essentials that are reconcilable with the sound aspects of all relevant theories. In this endeavor, the words used are less important than the benefits of re-interpretation.

Some Basic Processes Start End ToC Bib Discuss

The processes operating to produce mass behavior can be classified as internal or external. Directing attention at the former, the limitations on our thinking are rooted in the same forces, which cause all our actions and may therefore be considered as our “laws of motion". Manifestly there are physiological processes within our nervous systems, which give rise to bodily requirements. All persons experience hunger, thirst, and sex impulse. They seek optimum temperature, absence of pain and other bodily requirements.

The idea of universal drives was attacked long ago. For example, Allport made an oft-quoted complaint: "Not four wishes nor eighteen propensities nor any and all combinations of these even with their extensions and variations seem adequate to account for the endless variety of goals sought by an endless variety of mortals". Allport then proposed his concept of functional autonomy-that basic needs of our early years disappear and are modified by learning to create motives which become independent and generate their own dynamics.

Individuals do indeed modify basic needs in many ways and cultures do canalize these needs in thousands of different forms, but drives do not disappear with age or in recognizability, as will be seen in examples to follow. The crux of this matter is that psychologists like Allport are primarily concerned with the attributes and behavior of individuals, so their concepts are directed to that end. (Allport returns to individual cases like Tolstoy or the ex-sailor who longs for the sea etc.) Here we are analyzing large- scale behavior: problems, institutions, common beliefs and practices. It must be assumed there are social forces at work--testable and comprehensible. There is, of course, no magic number of these factors, and we can only conform as closely as possible to the principle of parsimony, recognized in all science.

Behaviorists may object to any assumptions about the influence of unseen processes, but no one has seen atoms or nucleons or gravity operating as we assume they do, yet quite elaborate concepts are built around these. The real test is: Does the assumption work? Does it explain what we see happening? Does it imply successful predictions? If the experimental subjects studied were not hungry, motivated by avoidance of pain or by self- fulfillment, they could not be positively reinforced and would ignore stimuli.

Similarly the functioning of the cerebral hemispheres gives rise to the characteristic human curiosity and attempt to make sense out of the world, however elementary or unsophisticated the level, however much the activity may be thwarted by poor data, emotionalism and other nonlogical factors. This is the source of human insight, imagination, to integrate information and bring something new from it. However poorly understood this process may be, we have to assume it is at least partly comprehensible if social science is not to become futile. The role of cognitive processes in human behavior was analyzed by Festinger in his Theory of Cognitive Dissonance. Here was his starting point: "The human organism tries to establish internal harmony, consistency or congruity among his opinions, attitudes, knowledge and values. There is a drive toward consonance among cognitions”. Therefore we are uncomfortable when there is dissonance between our cognitive elements and we attempt to reduce it. Festinger's theory goes back to the Greek idea of the rational animal; it resembles some teachings of Dewey; also Cantril's "pursuit of meaning" does not differ greatly from Festinger's pursuit of consonance.

All such rationalistic theories fail to recognize that in real life, a person can harbor far more inconsistencies than is here implied, as will be abundantly displayed. In this connection it is significant that Festinger did little with his second postulate: (When dissonance is present we try to avoid situations and information which would increase it)... to be considered later. We do need to realize that dissonance is frequently the necessary first step to a new and superior concept.

The cortical processes also guarantee that humans will engage in social activity and seek it out, except in abnormal situations. No one can engage in very complex activities alone, and the mind is certainly constructed for complex functions. The very existence of a speech center in the brain guarantees the operations characteristic of our species. Again we find that social activity usually enhances the fulfillment of other processes, but it can make for their frustration.

Brain activity also generates a need for excitation. Zuckerman postulates a biological need for high stimulation. Zuckerman said his study indicated that: (1) such a need was at least 50% hereditary and probably had a biochemical basis and (2) people varied in the amount of stimulation they sought. It seems safe to say that everyone reacts negatively to boredom and seeks new experience. This tendency can be related to great explorers and scientists, but it can also be seen in outburst of crime, drugs and violence. It must be added that people also require a certain security or stability and these apparently conflicting needs must be balanced.

All humans are endowed with the potential for a sense of self. While this scarcely appears in the neonate, it inevitably grows, given any approximation of a normal environment. People are impelled to enhance its development and protect it from attack. An important adjunct is the expression of abilities and capacities that the person possesses. In this connection, Maslow spoke of "self-actualizing.” The technicalities concerning the evolution of the self are not pertinent here. However much individual differences or cultural influences may modify it, there remains a sense of individuality, which guarantees fulfillment in a great variety of ways. Failure to gain satisfaction results in malfunction and conflict.

It may seem that concern for the self is "bad" and leads to "selfishness". The latter term is little used by the scientists because it is misleading. They perceive that constructive, mutual self-fulfillment of others around us is about as necessary to a healthy and productive individual or society as the fulfillment of, for example, hunger. It begins to appear among the apes. Gardners found that when Washoe looked in the mirror, he gave the signs for "me", "Washoe". Goodall found behavior in the wild chimpanzees reflecting a primitive sense of self and the ability to show sympathy and identification with the plight of another chimpanzee.

An important part of the self is expression of abilities possessed. If this requirement is suppressed, the individuals will be unproductive, and not only because of the simple absence of opportunity. Social systems respond to the presence or absence of such opportunities. Merton described how 17th century England outstripped other European nations because the system opened up new opportunities for intellectual advance. Pioneer scientists "devoted themselves to the prosecution of both theory and practice.” This advantage was soon recognized and imitated by other European nations.

Cultural Forces Start End ToC Bib Discuss

Thus far we have considered primarily internal factors shaping behavior but there are also external or cultural forces at work that are very influential. The culture operates on us in several ways. It largely determines the ways in which basic processes are satisfied, i.e., culture canalizes these energies in forms which are characteristic of most of its people. It does this by providing positive reinforcement for approved activities and punishment of various kinds for those that are unapproved. The power of the culture to do this is usually underestimated. The culture cannot make "anything right"--as Sumner claimed--but it can put the stamp of approval on activities which would cause horror in other places.

The cultural anthropologists have analyzed the power of culture in detail and they have provided countless illustrations of how we are regularly conditioned and almost imprinted toward the beliefs and practices of those around us, even in surprising detail. White, in summarizing the analysis of culturologists such as Durkheim, Kroeber, Wissler and others, states: "Culture will determine how an individual will think, feel and act. It will determine the language he will speak, what clothes, if any, he will wear, what Gods he will believe in, how he will marry, and select and prepare his food, treat the sick and dispose of the dead.”

It is an inescapable conclusion that we are shaped in large part by these collective forces, and it is also true that we are largely ignorant of how many of these customs arose. However some anthropologists go too far when they say that cultural control is absolute, and that we must disregard the individual entirely in the effort to explain our collective behavior. Every detail of our material and non-material culture was conceived by some individual (s). Therefore the psychological factors shaping behavior cannot be omitted because they are also forces shaping our society. Moreover, cultures do change, however slowly, so control is not absolute. Most of these changes are explainable in terms of how possibilities for drive fulfillment are perceived. (See Appendix B)

Ehrlich has objected to an exaggeration of cultural influences, as represented by Benedict’s assertion that "Social thinking at present has no more important task before it than that of taking adequate account of cultural relativity". She was speaking of the "Coexisting and equally valid patterns of life.” Ehrlich says Benedict means: "We cannot pass moral judgment on the destructive patterns which exist”, as he believes we must do. On the contrary, it is enough (in science) to recognize objectively their dangers and the necessity of adapting to their consequences, without moralistic judgments. Benedict just argues for understanding, not for approval, or disapproval.

There is another kind of force acting on individuals and groups, which is culturally generated, caused by the impact of technology. Today it is fashionable to emphasize the dangers of technology in books like THE TECHNICAL SOCIETY by Ellul. These threats are real and require attention, but there is another effect that contributes to social benefit, even though with some pain and substantial unawareness by most people.

Technology has brought cultures closer together, magnified their conflicting differences and introduced a closer competition (regarding their relative satisfaction of human drives). As a result practices such as headhunting, witch burning, killing and eating parts of Inca maidens lose out and diminish. Technology also tends to centralize decisions and concentrate them in the hands of managers. This will be addressed later, but sufficient at this point to recognize that such centralized power is not entirely negative. Skinner in his fictionalized community WALDEN II put more constructive criteria in the mouth of the imaginary director (Frazier). Frazier recognized these realities as follows: "Are the people strong, productive, progressive? If not, then the culture will eventually be replaced by competing cultures which work more efficiently. Our planners know this. They are aware that any usurpation of powers would weaken the community as a whole and would eventually destroy the whole venture.” That would assume some conquest of political myopia, but leaders today are observably superior to those of several centuries earlier in most countries of the world.

The difficulties of technology are real enough, but attention must be given to the beneficial effects which contribute to social evolution, albeit with some pain and substantial unawareness on the part of most people. A few examples: (1) The technology of transportation and communication has forced cultures together and made them increasingly interdependent politically and economically, whether they were ready for this or not. Nationalism is being forced (however slowly) under control. The role of the supranational agency has been growing concomitantly, at the same slow rate. (2) The technology of manufacturing has necessitated a labor force more highly trained and therefore more informed, with higher expectations. It is not possible to operate a technological system with serf-like workers. We have noted Max Weber’s description of this as the primary cause for the disappearance of slavery in America. (3) The growth of female equality was made possible by technology. Only after machines made physical strength less important and reduced the burdens of family rearing could women be freed to seek self- expression and development. In a democratic society this was joined with new training and knowledge. The trend will not stop short of complete social equality of the sexes (although there will always be certain physiological difference to which we must adapt) (4) Technology revolutionized war in many ways, but the most recent and significant was when it eliminated any possibility of winning one involving nuclear weapons. Nations were then faced with control or chaos, the answer to which they are now in the process of implementing. Conventional warfare still has some life ahead of it and guerrilla types may endure indefinitely, along with the possibility of revolutions

In all these instances, technology has increased the punishing stimuli attendant upon trying to retain old institutional relationships and practices--slavery, discrimination against races or sexes, maintaining war as a feasible procedure for all-out conflict, holding people in poverty, and what else? These cultural forces are the product of internal processes, in particular the functioning cerebral cortex which gives rise to scientific and technological discoveries. The latter could never come to fruition were it not for other human attributes such as social activity and the self, to say nothing of purely physical equipment such as the manipulative forelimb plus the power of speech.

Testing Theories Start End ToC Bib Discuss

In general there are two ways in which scientific theories are tested: (1) by their ability to explain or make sense out of present and past events which would otherwise be anomalous and conflicting, and (2) by their ability to predict the outcomes, by that we mean the consequences explained and predicted by the theory in question.

In natural science, the germ and viral theories enabled us to explain the occurrence of disease, to predict its onset, and do something about it (technology). The atomic theory enabled us to account for chemical reactions of all kinds, which were previously incomprehensible. The gene theory could explain physical attributes passing between the generations, etc. Large scale social theories are admittedly more difficult to test, but whether this can be done more successfully (than by chance, or by some competing theory) must await the examples to follow.

In pre scientific times, individual behavior of all kinds was "explained" by a person’s own will or desires, the sources of which were seldom considered because they were "self-generated" and could not be probed or tested. Today, bio-social causes are identified. We can perceive from whence the motivation arises, how certain behaviors are reinforced by the culture, acting upon basic drives encoded in the genome. It also enables us to modify behavior somewhat, making it more constructive and rewarding. As for mass behavior, the chapters to follow will provide illustrations of how we can account for it now, better than in the past.

The defects of normative interpretation were demonstrated early in science history. To take one example, we may consider the Ptolemaic explanation in astronomy. It was established, or was based on an ideal of how celestial bodies ought to behave, i.e (1) travel in circular orbits and (2) around the earth. This was not only because the earth had to be the center of the universe but also because a circle was the perfect geometric figure. The replacement of this theory by the heliocentric explanation is a long story, which has been studied in detail by many science historians, most notably Kuhn. This transition in science is now being repeated for the interpretation of human mass behavior. We can use as a brief example the case of racial interaction.

What has caused basic changes in race relations (in the U. S.)? The study of this transition by historians and sociologists (Woodward, Ratner, Voegeli) demonstrates that it has not been primarily a matter of moral and ethical principles, or what we ought to do, moving us toward increased social equity--starting with the emancipation of the slaves and continuing today. In another book I have reviewed the results of these studies in some detail, contrasting the consistencies between the normative and bio-social explanations. The former has throughout a long history failed to correspond with social behavior. The latter does account consistently for the changes that have occurred, however painful and protracted. Even in astronomy the transition did not occur readily and easily, as is often assumed.

The critic will be quick to point out that how planets ought to behave and the moral ought of humans are different. That is correct, because people set up ideals and stars do not, however they are alike in that both involve humans in establishing an ideal of how and why events should occur (in the minds or in the sky). It is believed that if we work hard enough or argue long enough, any lack of correspondence between ideal and occurrences can be reconciled. This does not encourage a change in mental orientation or the development of a superior theory.

Social Prediction Start End ToC Bib Discuss

Almost all scientists look with askance upon the possibility of testing social theories by predictive ability. For example, Garret Hardin asks: "Can we predict now what future successful human measures can be taken on population control? I don't think we can.” Hardin also refers to the possibility of predicting a meltdown in Chernobyl, or a document like the Constitution, as too slight for serious consideration. Another Hardin-supported objection (with Runciman) was as follows: When people know of the prediction, they can negate it. This is only possible when the predictor (and the prediction) are well known—almost never the case, and certainly not here).

We would have to start with the universal recognition that social predictions could never match the precision of natural science. This must be followed by the recognition that some success is possible, and at a level above random guessing. Systematic support of the feasibility of social prediction would require many cases, at some length, for which we have insufficient space. We can briefly review some social predictions to follow, which have been confirmed. (l) The political scientist Reddaway clearly anticipated the Gorbachev switch in policy on the cold war and thought control. Reddaway wrote (in the NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS) an item, “Waiting for Gorbachev” anticipating that the USSR “was about to change course”. Arthur Miller attended a (secret) Moscow meeting in which Gorbachev announced it in advance. (2) George Ball made his famous (or infamous) prediction about the failure of the Viet Nam War and its aims. Confirmed. (3) Lester Brown predicted that China would fail to produce enough grain to feed its people within a few years, and then would be forced to important large quantities. This was denied by Chinese political leaders, but is now coming true. (4) As for Chernobyl, no one could predict it exactly as to time or place, however several physicists had expected trouble somewhere in Russia. In particular Medvedev in his LEGACY OF CHERNOBYL said that his conviction of defects “was confirmed by the media reports of the disaster.”

In a similar way no one could predict an American Constitution, of a particular date. We may refer to Charles Beard reporting (in BASIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES) that Alexander Hamilton demanded the calling of a new convention to draft a constitution (in 1783). Four years later (l787) it assembled. Surely Hamilton’s anticipation deserves some recognition. Unfortunately general predictions have never gotten due credit. No records were, are kept of the prognoses of recognized students of society. There is fear of the attempt partly because it is very difficult and because the wrong criteria are used to judge what constitutes success, as illustrated above.

The critic may insist that the guiding theory must first be specified (which it was not in the above cases) then it is deduced to a specific outcome—necessary to confirm a successful prediction. This syllogistic form is (practically) impossible to find in real life. Moreover it is unnecessary. Of the cases reviewed here, two (Brown and Medvedev) are based on ecology and physics. The others are, and were well known to contemporary people. The assumptions undergirding them are harmonious with bio-social science. Indeed the writer can remember all of them (except Hamilton), having reached similar conclusions at the time.

Some purist may press further and object that the assumptions behind Ball, Reddaway and Hamilton may be different and even unsound, therefore they arrived at their prediction by error and accident. That is possible, but very much against the logic of probability. Sufficient to say, these cases call for a greater assemblage and study. Frequent advice received: Go to the FUTURIST Magazine for assistance from futurists on prediction. Unfortunately these people direct little attention to social prognosis, and sometimes their predictions reflect a money dream- world, e.g. They predicted that public education in the U.S. will be replaced by a money-making, private enterprise system. (See reference at chapter end) Not one word about the costs to people of making a new national school system or of entrepreneurs making huge profits from it--an emergence from the modern dogma: “Privatize everything you can.” (See Chap 9)

Returning to Hardin’s contention about the impossibility of predicting future measures on population control. Reproductive specialists should be able to have some success, however there is is a hidden, misleading assumption buried here—that we need more and better methods and this is the important objective. Techniques now available will do the job quickly and easily. The problem is not in the methods but in the motivation. Logically we should be more concerned with predicting the social change and what will cause it, and with getting adequate methods to where they are needed and demanded. There will be little resistance to the prediction that change will be driven primarily by the growing awareness in the poor nations of the advantages to their basic needs of population control. This awareness of costs vs benefits of more children takes time to”soak in” and overcome primitive beliefs.

Macroscopic social science cannot be considered scientific—or even possibly so—until it uses prediction to test its theories, as do all other sciences, with the proviso that modest standards must be employed. This area cannot be left to the mystics.

Perception and Reinforcement Start End ToC Bib Discuss

In order to understand how we attempt to fulfill the processes reviewed earlier, it is necessary to consider how we perceive the world in which we do it. Perception as defined here is the act of forming a unified meaning. The raw sensations brought to us by our senses are converted into a meaningful whole, based on our previous experience and our present constellation of drives. In the past we have experienced one procedure or another as satisfying (to be considered individually or collectively). In the latter case we are concerned with the extensive area of common reinforcement.

The experimental work of psychologists on perception, in particular Ames and Cantril, has led to certain conclusions. These are summarized as follows:

¨ Our perceptions are determined by how we have learned (and been culturally conditioned in the past). This shapes our values, how we see our world and adapt to it, or failing to do so, seek a change.

¨ Kowledge alone seldom changes our perceptions. The reason is because we have been previously reinforced and that must be changed--not easily accomplished. The failure of old patterns usually require increasing intensity of costs. Intellectual recognition alone is insufficient.

¨ We change perceptions by working within the new environment toward a goal defined in terms of our canalized drives. When an alternative is perceived as possibly, then actually rewarding, increased meaning leads to change.

¨ Errors are inevitable; they are not a subject for opprobrium, but can be used to learn about change more promptly. Effort to put a buffer against the consequences of mistakes is counterproductive.

We learn from (l) punishing effects of the inevitable errors, and (2) positive reinforcing effects of changed behavior (of a heuristic nature). Reference has already been made to the behaviorist experiment, which found that an established response was suppressed only by an intense aversive stimulus so that replacement became feasible.

It would, of course, be more efficient to increase the number of sound, heuristic policies which are positively reinforced and to diminish the number which are punished, however the human scene is much more complex and less manageable than the behaviorist experiment. In this respect it is more accurate and fruitful to think about human social problems as resembling the science of astronomy rather than the science of physics. In the first case, the fact that mass phenomena are subject to little control does not prevent us from analyzing them systematically and with increasing degrees of success.

The question naturally arises: How do these guiding principles relate to real social behavior and its problems? Two examples will be addressed later. The reader can stop here, “look ahead” to this case (in Chap. 7) or in the two paragraphs immediately below.

Myrdal described a population in Old Delhi, India, living on the bare edge of survival, with an income of about four dollars per day. Myrdal asked how they felt about lowly life. Surprisingly 90% responded that they were satisfied with it and said they expected nothing more. The probable explanation for this response is that they had been culturally conditioned to accept their lot, and even calling contrary facts and logic to their attention would produce no protest or effort to change it. Therefore their perceptions had been adapted to their existence. (Possibly their religion (reward in the afterlife), gave them additional support).

We can perceive a similar response in the U.S. today. Over the last few decades, people in the low income levels have been slowly sinking while those in the upper levels have been rising strongly. We see no organized protest. Calling the disparate developments to the attention of the former group makes little or no difference.
They accept their situation and do not even exercise the franchise at the same level of the affluent, which is their one avenue of public expression. All of course at a much higher level than India, but in the same pattern. Cultural experience and perception make for acquiescence, as long as they are “getting by” at what they consider an acceptable level. Notably, Americans even during the great depression never turned to socialist Norman Thomas or other strong reformers. The mass media are a great help in keeping them entertained, happy and acquiescent.

Thought Warps Start End ToC Bib Discuss

A fundamental relationship between these basic processes is found to be very pervasive in most efforts to understand and react to the problems of our society. It explains most failures to proceed in a reasonable and objective manner, and it lies near the heart of much of our intellectual captivity. This mechanism was first clearly identified by the psychiatrist Eugen Bleuler. He introduced two terms related to this mechanism--autistic and dereistic thinking. These words apparently referred in general to any mental activity divorced from logic or even from the realities of the external world. When referring to autism, Bleuler said, "Everything involving an emotional state operates toward the same effect; it directs thought through certain definite channels, indifferent to the value of truth or reality. Every emotional state has a tendency to canalize whatever is in agreement with it, and to inhibit and filter out what is contrary.”

The editor's introduction to this book added, "such negative autism is expressed through undisciplined, incorrect and false thinking when applied to our scientific and general worldly activities.” This was illustrated by the fact that Bleuler found it common in the science of medicine (of his time). Gardner Murphy appropriately defined autism as "movement of the cognitive processes in the direction of need satisfaction.” More recently psychologists have borrowed the term for thought fantasies of children and since this has prevailed, it is better to let the majority rule and use an alternative.

Dereistic thinking was characterized by saying it "totally ignores any contradiction with reality". Bleuler did not concentrate much attention on the source of this phenomenon, but he did say it was the "constellation" which determines the course of our thought. He did refer specifically to the case of a hungry person, who will be more likely to think of food, "starting from any idea at all”... We take constellation as referring to the configuration of basic non-cognitive processes. Every species and every individual human has a pattern of needs, which is unique in some degree, in addition to those fundamental ones in common. In both Bleuler's account, and in the cases to be examined, the effect of dereistic thinking is seen to be negatively affecting efforts to resolve problems.

Some students may prefer the word “rationalization” as more commonly used than dereistic. Unfortunately the former term implies only a cognitive foible, whereas the latter includes deeper, emotional involvement and greater difficulty in control. Also one dictionary definition of rationalization is “to make reasonable or rational”, which introduces contradiction and confusion. A classic statement of Nietsche can be used to illustrate the concept here: "My memory says that I did it, my pride says that I could not have done it, and in the end my memory yields.” When a particular belief or practice is perceived as satisfying to one or more of the basic drives, the individual is often bound to it so tightly as to be relatively impervious to facts and logic. We may say we are "ego-involved", or we have a "vested interest" in maintaining that position. Breaking this linkage to discrimination, to a particular economic or religious conviction may not be possible immediately, until circumstances are changed.

Some writers, for example Pareto's classic volume, may summon an abundance of cases demonstrating how people throughout history have rationalized contradictions in their beliefs and behavior, to which will be added more recent illustrations of this phenomenon. On the other hand there is danger of minimizing and neglecting the operation and effects of cognition. As Freud concluded, the voice of reason may often be weak, but it is persistent and given time will make itself felt. Unfortunately it also requires some breakdown of "normal" operations, some crises and aversive stimuli to spur our cortex into action, as we shall see.

Sources of Captivity Start End ToC Bib Discuss

We have differentiated external and internal causes for behavior, therefore our freedom, or its lack, can be explained in terms of these causes. Our beliefs and practices are largely the product of cultural conditioning. Some of these are more sound and workable, some are more short-sighted and dangerous. It is the latter, which are of greatest concern as imprisoning concepts, but even the former must sooner or later fail to fit a changing world and must therefore be questioned, revised or replaced.

We focus on two main sources of captivity (not culturally instilled):

1. Dereistic thinking, in which basic drives warp cognitive processes, producing dangerous, unworkable policies and behavior

2. Normative attitudes, moral/ethical thinking which interfere with systematic analysis and misdirect our energies (Skinner's autonomous man myth)

The first has already been outlined. The second is more pervasive and unappreciated, therefore it will require further development and illustration.

A recognized authority, William Frankena (in ETHICS) concludes that the moral and ethical represent normative thinking, which he defines as "What is right and ought to be done.” This “moral ought” is based on a norm which has its origin in custom, authority or in our subjective desire. It involves an ideal which we believe ought to govern events and toward which it is proper for us to move. Applied more specifically to human action, almost everyone agrees that the way to understand behavior most effectively, and to control (improve) it is by appeal to these ideals and to one's will to conform to them. Failure is met by several responses--often by condemnation, sometimes retribution and quite frequently guilt on the part of the transgressor. It may meet with the spirit of forgiveness, which then redoubles the moral appeals and request for commitment to the norm. (See Appendix A)

In the examples to follow we can see that this procedure has been less than effective and in the case of blame, guilt and retribution they may have actually compounded the problem. The typical response is that scientific laws are a kind of ideal, and to the extent that scientists are urged to conform to these, they are also in the same mold. Even an elementary understanding tells us that laws and theories of science do not come from custom, authority or subjective preferences, but from accurate observations, rigorous thought acting on novel paradigm concepts (whose source is often unknown), but the test of science is how it is then processed. A scientific principle is a kind of ideal, since it never corresponds exactly to what really happens, and it is therefore only an approximation, but scientists do not greet this discrepancy by urging nature to change (in this case human nature) but by revising their concepts. Nor can they consistently "sell" their theory to others, a practice that slips easily from objectivity to subjectivity. It must be added that neither of these attitudes--adaptability or objectivity can be totally attained; it is a matter of greater or less.

What is the origin of normative thinking? It arises from the capacity of the human cortex to conceive of the future and to conceptualize models or ideals toward which we tend, but never reach. Scientific laws are of this type. Difficulty enters when we conceive ideals or models for behavior, then assume that we only need to hold these up and people will conform to them, with sufficient exhortation and commitment. We believe that rationalistic free will motivates and guides, us, however the matter is not so simple. There are other forces at work. To the degree we fail to take these into account, we are prisoners of normative attitudes and thought. The second kind of internally generated captivity has been discussed.

In addition to the above internal forces, there is the external kind--those beliefs and practices imposed on us through long conditioning by our culture (already summarized). We are able only with extended troubles to perceive when these established patterns are counterproductive and impractical in the long run. In this way, changes may be introduced. We return again to a simple example of our cognitive captivity abetted by cultural conditioning is seen in the history of civil rights and racial equality in America. Prior to the Civil War, almost everyone perceived the Negro as a being somewhat inferior in nature to the whites. The culture had reinforced this belief in many ways, and it was nourished because it satisfied a cluster of drives in the Whites, even though there were no sound facts or logic for denying them social and political equality. Ethical and moral teachings were warped to fit the prejudice, particularly in the South; however long after the Civil War, even in the North, most people did not perceive the Negro as equal in ability basic needs and rights. Although a vocal minority preached against all forms of discrimination this did not change general practice a great deal.

The first big change occurred during a relatively few years in the 1960s and 70s. At this time Negroes began to disrupt orderly government and business at home. They had served with ability and great effect in America's recent conflict. The colored nations were beginning to make themselves felt in the United Nations. The Afro-Americans began to impose some costs, as well as demonstrating some benefits. As opportunities were grudgingly enlarged, it was found that they could develop knowledge and skills in a normal way and the constructive integration began to pay off. Needless to say, technology played an important role, as already described.

Short sighted self interest has been forced to enlarge and widen, gradually giving the cognitive processes a chance to shape our conclusions and practices. These changes have not resulted from untrammeled reason or commitment to moral and ethical principles. The old practices simply began to fail and they produced punishing stimuli, which could only grow more intense. Then our perceptions altered and our course changed, however inadequately. In proportion as a new course was more rewarding, we were culturally reinforced and it became established, at least as long as it performed acceptably.

The Fear of Control Start End ToC Bib Discuss

Increased scientific knowledge produces the possibility of increased "control" over nature. When human behavior is the subject of study and knowledge it is often feared that this might produce a dangerous technology of control over people. The fear of social control has been a perennial subject for successful fiction, such as Orwell's 1984, and Huxley's BRAVE NEW WORLD. The former prognosis is now safely in the past, and the latter shows no sign of materializing, even though genetic science has advanced far beyond Huxley and no one is setting up for mass-controlled embryology, either for production or administration--to say nothing of compulsion.

The psychological school most closely associated with the aim of controlling people is Behaviorism, exemplified in the novel WALDEN II. Misgivings about this system reflect the fear that there is always a conditioner and a conditionee, more or less under control, with no secure limitations on practice. However this danger has been exaggerated, because there is no way now visible in which millions of people can be made to submit individually to the technique, guided by the great experimenter.

Any procedure or belief imposed by custom or social pressure is ultimately tested by its consequences. If these are consistently negative (i.e. produce deprivation instead of reward—for most of the people) then it will eventually be modified and replaced. This change can occur more expeditiously if there is contact with other competing cultures having different practices that will be perceived as superior, i.e. offering more and broader satisfactions. In the modern technological society, that contact is not only broadened but made more certain.

There is public concern, titillated by novelists, reporters and orthodox religious individuals, that new chemical and electrical techniques can be used to control behavior. An analysis contained in Psychology Today, by Valenstein revealed: The idea that "Brain stimulation can repeatedly evoke the same emotional state or behavior in humans is simply a myth.” The analyst neglected to point out another fallacy: that millions of people would stand still to be wired up, probed or stimulated by electricity or chemicals. The "mad scientist" is a great rarity, despite the stereotypes in common fiction. He gets short shrift from his colleagues, and science (it must be remembered) is a large scale, cooperative enterprise. These seemingly optimistic deductions must be tempered by the realization there are powerful individuals working to self- advantage. There are potent special interests. Having reviewed the sources of captivity and the prospects of control, it is essential to survey, however summarily, the dynamics of freedom in terms of biosocial theory.

In the American culture, freedom is the Holy Grail. Everyone is in favor of it, from the criminal who wishes to ply his role freely, to the foremost scientist whose work would be impossible without unfettered thought, speech and press. A term, which comes to mean everything to everyone, is to that extent meaningless and misleading. Isaiah Berlin refused to define a term that had hundreds of different connotations. Nevertheless we must offer an antonym for captivity. Freedom, toward which we move but never consummate may be phrased approximately and in bio-social terms as the maximum opportunity on the part of any individual to fulfill his unique constellation of canalized drives consistent with a similar opportunity for others. This implies mutual sacrifices and it is with the sacrifices that serious dissent originates. Only by working through specific problem situations can the real meaning of freedom become clear. A sufficient number of cases should be examined later to perform this function.

Since the captivity under study is primarily those restraints on the mind, we are concerned accordingly with the maximum opportunity for fulfilling and expressing the mental processes. Hypothetically it would be possible to permit every conceivable inquiry and yet suppress the opportunity for communication, or for action once agreement had been reached as to a superior working hypothesis; therefore these must be included. A further contribution of science to the concept is a realization that freedom is greatest when our actions are brought into harmony with the laws of nature, including human nature. The better we understand and adjust our aims and operations to them, the greater our opportunities.

There is a close parallel between natural science and social science on the subject of freedom. We could not be free of disease until our practices conformed to the requirements of the germ theory. We were not free to travel rapidly on earth or in space until we followed the dictates of physical laws of force and motion. We will not be free of wholesale killing by war or starvation until we bring our political-economic policies and actions into conformance with the bio-social laws.

It may sound contradictory to define freedom in terms of conformity but as seen in the cases above, the conformity is to the demands of nature, not the demands of some human agency. When we talk about "conformity” we usually mean some powerful person or organization. These dictates often represent shortsighted, "selfish" and unworkable policies, i.e. ones that are out of harmony with the universal requirements of most people. This last interpretation--the naturalistic view--was stated by the anthropologist Malinowski: "We see here that freedom consists in obedience to the constraint of drives and to the natural laws of the environment to which the animal is adapted.” In this case, the animal is us and we are constrained to act in harmony with the dictates of our own internal processes and the requirements of the world we inhabit, which includes other humans as well as physical, biological and ecological laws. We pay a rising price for failure to do this, which is correlated closely with the magnitude and frequency of our social problems.

A somewhat different and operational definition of freedom has been provided by the psychologist Hadley Cantril: "Freedom if it is to be meaningful at all must be connected to some self-started action that brings about some desired results.” This brings the concept down to earth and putst it in terms of operations. Consequences must be confronted in order to reach a workable decision. The chief obstacle is not usually the lack of an appropriate theory; it is more likely to be the dereistic inability to recognize accurately the adjustments we must make in order to grant the same heuristic policies to others.

Contraventions Start End ToC Bib Discuss

We have outlined an elementary theory of internal and external processes common to humans, which give rise to our behavior. This theory, like any other, has been attacked from several directions. We can consider briefly two of these objections of representative nature, first Dorothy Lee, in her essay "Are Basic Needs Ultimate?" said that "basic need" theory was disproved by World War II, most effectively. (The word ultimate is misleading. Scientists are not operationally concerned with ultimates. During these troublous times, many people in occupied countries opposed the Nazis and joined the underground even though this course endangered their basic needs. Thus they were not pursuing the course which was most fulfilling—as the theory demands, according to Lee. In some cases they went against their “survival” instinct.

This argument is unsound, because we can postulate quite consistently that people of Western Europe, including Scandinavia opposed the Nazis (accepting all the risks) for the following drive-related reasons:

¨Cognitively they could perceive that in the event of a German victory, they would suffer deprivation of their other drives. The evidence to this effect was clear and abundant wherever the Germans had gone. No fine discrimination or altruistic fervor was required.

¨ The satisfaction gained from a common social enterprise for the good of the group to which these persons belonged is a factor often unappreciated. George Brochmann in HUMANITY AND HAPPINESS described vividly his transport of delight in this enterprise.

¨ So far as possible death was concerned, as a threat to the "survival instinct” (which is superfluous) survival is not so appealing if its conditions promise nothing but deep and indefinite frustration of most basic processes.

Lee does not deny the existence of "basic needs" but contends that they are subordinate to yet more fundamental factors, i.e. “values”. Unfortunately for this argument, values can be almost anything the individual, or group may manufacture. Does this mean all values are equal? Not unless we are prepared to exclude them permanently from the possibility of a logical and factual analysis.

How then do we recognize which values are sound? Presumably in this case (opposition to Nazis) Lee would have invoked such values as: Freedom and unselfishness are good. Democracy is better than dictatorship etc. It is logically consistent to define freedom as maximum opportunity for people to fulfill basic processes, to define unselfishness as granting others this opportunity equally; finally to specify democracy as a government aimed at facilitating the individual's fulfillment, relative to tyranny as the opposite (See Chap. 14).

In a little more detail we must analyze the objection of B.F. Skinner. We have acknowledged an important contribution of behaviorism to scientific social analysis: the necessity and importance of an intense stimulus in changing established responses, and (2) the influence of positive reinforcements in altering behavior. We must also identify an important scientific deficiency in its social diagnosis. (Failing this recognition, we would probably be criticized as conforming to a doubtful doctrine). According to Skinner, any “inner processes” are only imaginary. He referred to this as “mentalism”--unnecessary to explain and control behavior. All we need is stimulus, response, deprivation, reinforcement and punishment.

However were it not for the processes such as identified earlier, the organism could not be conditioned and would pay no attention to the reinforcers, and perhaps the stimuli or punishment. Nothing would be fulfilling, nothing aversive. Reinforcement only works at all because it can harness basic energy, which is universal and dependable. Objecting to these because they cannot be directly observed is to fly in the face of universal scientific theory. All sciences have involved the creation and testing of generalizations, theories, laws, hypotheses. We have not directly observed atoms, genes, electrons, quarks etc. These unseen concepts are tested operationally by how they explain and predict outcomes. Nevertheless many behaviorists say in effect,“Only seeing is believing”. Skinner starts with a three-link chain:

1.Deprive an organism of food, water, etc.

2.Nervous activity, at the molecular level leads to...

3.Response—The organism eats or drinks.

It also changes behavior in order to fulfill basic needs. Skinner concludes that Step 2 is not observable, so it can be omitted. In order to reveal a hidden error in this conclusion, let us use the same model to explain the behavior of water:

1.Deprive the water of heat

2.Molecular activity in the water leads to

3.Response: the water freezes

Actually if we omit assumed inner processes, we don’t have any explanation, only a description, however helpful it may be in controlling water or people. Molecular behavior enables us to explain other attributes of water, such as boiling, sublimation, vapor pressure etc. A scientific theory involves processes, be they relatively simple, as in water or complex as in behavior.

The behaviorists share this extreme environmentalism with some sociologists and anthropologists. For example, Ashley Montagu declared: "Everything a human being does as such, he has had to learn from other human beings.” Montagu goes beyond Skinner to reject all instincts and declare that heredity plays no (important) role in human behavior. Apparently Montagu would have us believe that humans would perish if not taught how to eat, drink or sleep. They would fail to reproduce if not taught how to copulate. They would never try to socialize unless enrolled in some group, never try to express the ego or self unless taught that they had one.

Attributing everything to hereditary instincts is an evasion, but no less so than attributing everything to environment. The latter preserves our illusion of power, depending only on our will to use it. (Here Skinner departs from other environmentalists). We can say in general that heredity sets the potential or limits, and environment determines the extent and direction of development. Basic processes are the given, and culture determines how and to what extent they are expressed and fulfilled. Science begins by recognizing the realities or "laws of nature" to which we must conform--and adapt. This is true freedom; any other kind is blowing into the wind. Both failure and success have their consequences, and these enable us to judge how well we have adapted to the requirements.

Finally we turn to J.B. Conant on the subject of scientific social analysis (in his book ON UNDERSTANDING SCIENCE). He appears to both deny and support it. He asked the question: “Is there such a thing as a scientific method of wide applicability in the solution of human problems?” Since Conant restricted his conception of science to experimental testing of concepts, he rejected the idea that “Scientific method is applicable to the solution of almost all the problems of daily life in the modern world.” He assumed that experimental control is largely inapplicable to social phenomena, especially those of macroscopic scale. These Conant objections are still common today and must be revised in order to proceed further.

In another place, Conant declared: “Few if any hypotheses on a grand scale can be directly tested”. This reduces us to the meaning of “directly tested”. Obviously not under controlled laboratory observation, however a sound bio-social theory will explain more consistently the ongoing collective behavior and make more sense out of what is, or has been occurring than will common beliefs, which are not so grounded. It will also anticipate with greater success the consequences and outcomes of procedure than will chance or the usual guesswork (not demanding of a high degree of performance).

Holton seemed to appreciate this role of theory, in the following conclusion: “Only the smallest part of reality impresses itself on us directly. To help us grasp the whole picture is the supreme function of a theory..it is a conceptual scheme which we invent or postulate in order to explain to ourselves, and others observed phenomena and the relations between them.” The object of this book is to provide many cases displaying the more consistent interpretation and superior guidance which is possible from bio-social explanation and prediction, but avoiding the widespread assumption that the superior concept will readily be recognized and implemented. We have identified some of the organic and cultural forces that prevent this from occurring.

In sum, Conant comes to a sound conclusion when he agrees that scientific objectivity can help in the process, that the scientific interpretation “can strengthen those rational elements in our civic life which make for the adventurous, yet orderly development of our free society.. Control over thought and behavior have more short term success than we like to admit, through the impact of money and propaganda via the media--playing on the common fears.”

This raises the question of the very largest canvas on which the whole picture of behavior is painted, namely human evolution. Darwin related his theory of natural selection to human motivation. Some anthropologists have applied the same concepts to organized social behavior, which is not directly genetic. It is now appropriate to review these ideas and their pertinence to the social problems and human captivity. Let it be clear at the outset that in what follows, Darwin is not talking about natural selection and genetic changes. He is discussing social selection of behavioral traits, why some persevere and others do not.

Social Selection Start End ToC Bib Discuss

It may seem that the idea of Darwinism is irrelevant to modern social behavior and problems. This objection is unjustified because our basic nature is a product of a million or more years of selective survival. Social selection is not a process of genetic change but a relatively short-term survival of behavior patterns which favor one group or social practice over another. There is not enough time in the historical period for “social” genes to change substantially by natural selection.

Darwin must have been extending the selective process along these lines, and the best way to show that is to consider a series of observations and deductions from his DESCENT OF MAN, and from some of his Notebooks. To begin with, Darwin did not believe that moral behavior was generated de novo out of an individual mind. Rather, he said, “It is improved by attending and reasoning on its action and on the results of following our conduct.” In other words, we are to be guided by the consequences of our behavior past, present and probable future. (It is often claimed that the consequences themselves must be judged by more basic moral principles. This is best answered by the many relevant cases to follow).

Our innate mental attributes not only make this possible but almost certainly insure that we will act in such a way, as best we can. Gruber and Barrett conclude (in DARWIN ON MAN): “The evolution of morality and the evolution of intelligence have always been inseparable, as well as their future survival in the body and brain of humanity.” Turning now to Darwin’s phraseology: “With increased experience and reason, man perceives the more remote consequences of his actions and the self regarding virtues. Ultimately our moral sense or conscience becomes a highly complex sentiment originating in the social instincts, largely guided by the approbation of our fellow men, ruled by reason, and self interest. . . A tribe rich in the above qualities (courage, sympathy, faithful members who were always ready to warn each other of danger) would spread and be victorious over other tribes. Selfish, contentious people will not cohere, and without coherence, nothing can be effected.” It is obvious that the members of the same tribe would approve conduct which appeared to be for the general good and would reprobate (the opposite)”. Clearly Darwin does not mean victorious in combat but in survival.

This is a straightforward recognition of selection for survival, but social selection, not genetic, as we shall see. In a tribe where mutual aid was dominant "the chance of the birth of still more ingenious members would be somewhat better and in a very small tribe decidedly better.” Dawkins attacked "group selection" (but did not address Darwin's defense). He argued for the entirely "selfish gene" and said such altruism would be undermined by at least one rebel who would be likely to survive and pass on his selfishness, eventually contaminating the whole colony. (Dawkins declared “At the gene level, altruism must be bad and selfishness good”). We must add a probable modifying event to this scenario--that reasonably intelligent members of the group would soon recognize such a parasite and throw him out. It must also be noted that Darwin was not talking first and foremost about the altruistic extremity of sacrificing lives but about the many acts of lesser cost that would have group benefit.

Genes do operate to maintain their existence and function, but some "altruistic" gene effects must be acknowledged. Dawkins refers to these only as something to be taught, e.g. “We must teach our children altruism for we can't expect it to be part of their biological nature.” Selfishness is counteracted in part by genes which produce other effects or ”instincts”, namely neocortical activity and sociality which confer the ability to: (1) anticipate the probable consequences of procedure and adapt to these-- as Darwin described, (2) recognize that other people have the same basic drives, and (3) realize that to be purely selfish and ignore the reality of #2 generally results in frustration and conflict. If the foregoing sequence had not existed for eons, humans would not have survived as a social group, and they could never have socially evolved and "civilized" any other way. Socialization is in their genome, however troublesome it may sometimes be. Darwin's explanation of mutual aid involves a combination of intelligence and sociality --both with a genetic base. Altruism as defined by Dawkins is behaving in such a way as to increase another's welfare at the expense of one's own, but it is not necessarily "at the expense of" because both can be benefitted, and the necessary mutual aid still operates--although not altruism as redefined. At this point, Wright would call in a “non zero sum” explanation.

Watson in his book, DARK NATURE, advances into the dilemma. He portrays the dangers of the selfish gene, which has little allowance for discouraging the evil and encouraging moral behavior. His answer is seen in the following statements: "We are all engaged in a struggle between the old genes and our new morality" "We are moral creatures in an immoral world". “ It is up to us to provide moral qualities, to give life on earth a conscience" "Science is now morally unconstrained". "All we have left, it appears is ourselves", (free will to the rescue).

Watson took the case of evil (Rudolf Hess, who calmly murdered two million innocent civilians in concentration camps). Watson does not perceive the non-normative interpretation. The dynamics behind Hitler and his Jewish scapegoats were described by Shirer in THE RISE AND FALL OF THE THIRD REICH. The most productive attention would be directed at the cultural causes of the anger and paranoia, which Watson identifies. It would avoid a nationalistic retribution of the inter-War period (which we avoided after World War II, with rewarding results for all concerned). We can better recognize the dangers and the cultural learning. This gives us better guidance than appeals to the moral ought and willpower. In other words, prevention is more productive than moral judgments.

Darwin does err in seeing the entry of mutual aid as being hereditary, by way of what he calls "habits". Of course habits are not inherited, nevertheless the tendency toward mutual aid and sociality is an inborn potential as described earlier. Whether and under what circumstances it becomes operational, or is diverted, this is another question. At least its operation makes for a more sustainable group and promotes survival, which is reasonably descriptive of what has actually occurred.

Since the gene connection was unclear six decades ago a constructive interpretation was introduced in terms of social selection. A.G. Keller developed a parallel between natural and social selection. Living things have always adapted to their environment and humans are no different except that theirs has been to a much greater extent "mental" rather than chance adaptation. A great step was taken when human groups were formed and competition between these groups became prominent. Says Keller: "Competition here as elsewhere issues in selection... sets of customs are selected for decline or extinction, while others survive as constituting a better adjustment.” Keller's first illustration was slavery in the south, which he said might have been adaptive under early conditions, but technological developments changed all that, as noted much earlier. A social practice that was perceived as rewarding to the power holders under one set of circumstances lost its function under a new set. Sumner added: "It has been singled out and removed by the process of societal selection”--as long as the circumstances prevail.

In more recent times, Wilson considered the case of the Maori of New Zealand prior to the arrival of the Europeans. Constant aggression occurred among the 40 tribes over territory but..."This terrible equilibrium was finally disrupted when firearms were introduced.” The costs became sufficiently intense that the people could perceive the necessity, even inevitability of change. The increased carnage became self-limiting. Selection forced a different response on them. In this case the competition was in killing. Modern nations have reacted similarly only after having reached the nuclear stage and began to retreat. Human institutions undergo a long term evolution which cannot be traced with precision, however Keller concludes, "It is better to know even vaguely what laws are at work and what to expect than to go it blind.”

Wilson also used the case of incest to illustrate a procedure that was rather easily perceived as genetically contra-indicated, for consequential reasons. Heavy inbreeding results in such an increased proportion of defective or early dying offspring that it did not escape notice, even among early humans. Albert Einstein, recognized for his penetrating insights on many different scientific and social-scientific subjects, zeroed in on the importance of social selection by observing: "A people that were to honor falsehood, defamation, fraud and murder would be unable, indeed, to subsist for very long.” This could be recognized, even unconsciously in terms of Darwinian guidance by way of probable consequences. Such recognition brought about the effort to formalize and reduce violation of these requirements by laws punishing homicide, fraud, perjury and libel. It did not require a great deal of perspicacity to see the threats to a functioning society, which led to laws attempting to control the destructive behavior.

Chapter 4 will address a nuclear case from recent history, the atomic threat wherein most of the social diagnostic and prescriptive books written during these years found the answer in normative terms. It will be shown that these pleas had little relation to what actually happened to stop the nuclear race and its universal threat, either in the U.S., or in the USSR (which we believed would be about the last nation to be governed by ethics and morality). Nevertheless significant leadership came from Russian leaders, especially Gorbachev, who as will be seen believed that scientific and technological discoveries were putting us all on a collision course with traditional ways of dealing with conflicts and problems of the cold war... leading to his glasnost and perestroika. Put in simplest terms, the consequences of the nuclear race enforced a basic change, which can best be interpreted as social selection for survival.

A similar case could be made for modern environmentalism. We were beginning to perceive, with increasing clarity that exploitation has costly consequences, both in small communities and the national-international, that people will survive better in various degrees by conservation, but the movement continues to confront strong opposition from the more short sighted special interests.

Ethical and Moral Motivation Start End ToC Bib Discuss

Those oriented toward philosophy and religion will complain that the preceding analysis in terms of science fails to take into account the role of ethics and morals (with some justification). We have previously taken note of the work of Piaget who studied the process of moral development in children through consequential thinking and experience. He formalized this learning as “rules”. He selected the game of marbles to illustrate how these rules governing the group evolve—necessarily—in order to make the game sustainable and enjoyable for the participants. We can perceive some similarity with how the “game of life” is played. Certain conclusions are justified:

by Bruce Stewart Copyright ©2005 by John A. Stewart