PREVIEW
Our
Captive Culture
and the Bio-Social
Forces that Will Free Us
Start
End Table of Contents
Bib Discuss
All cultures inculcate into
their members certain beliefs and practices that include some that are sound
and others that are contradictory and inconsistent with facts. Ours is no
exception. This book examines and contrasts two different paradigms—the
normative and the bio-social paradigms—that exist side by side in our culture
and provide alternative approaches to understanding our social world. The
normative paradigm concentrates on how the world should be, how humans should
behave, and aims to guide social change by encouraging people to follow
“higher” values and social ideals. The bio-social or scientific paradigm
examines how the world operates, how humans behave, and the consequences of
different personal choices and social policies. In the past humans applied the
normative paradigm to both the natural world and to ourselves. Today, most of
us accept the relevancy of the scientific paradigm to the natural world, but
neglect much of its relevancy to our personal or social worlds. Instead, we
cling to key elements of the normative paradigm and its approach to personal
and social change
The first thesis of this book challenges this neglect
of the bio-social paradigm and examines the social forces that keep the
normative paradigm dominant for so many people. The second thesis suggests we
are fast assembling information from which an alternative scientific paradigm
of social progress can be constructed. This bio-social paradigm is built upon
some discernable, simple bio-social laws and regularities. Its linkages of
behavior to consequences can enable us to select more widely what actions will
best meet personal and social needs. This alternative is still incomplete, but
it is developed within the scientific perspective, so future improvements are
possible and almost a certainty.
These preview pages will
briefly outline these two alternative paradigms for understanding and changing
human social behavior, then:
1)
Discuss the forces that keep
the normative paradigm in place and those that prevent serious consideration
of a bio-social alternative,
2)
examine how these two paradigms
differ in their perspectives on the nature of humans, social progress, values,
and freedom,
3)
illustrate how these two paradigms
differ in their explanation of some key social changes,
4)
analyze the concept of freedom
in bio-social terms, and
5)
note problems with the rising
anti-science attitudes among some groups.
Although the author believes
the bio-social paradigm more accurately reflects the reality behind social
change processes, readers must ultimately test this belief with respect to
their own experiences.
Thomas Kuhn has suggested that
intellectual or scientific paradigms have several related components, including
models, exemplars, and assumptions. The key part is a “model” that provides the
imagery and analogies used to understand the subject matter. In the normative
paradigm of human behavior there are two key elements in its model:
1)
A belief in the effectiveness
of appeals to moral standards or values as a way to change human behavior.
These standards, which define “right” and “wrong” behavior, do not arise from
within the individual. They come from some authority greater than the individual
and are templates for judging the individual’s own inclinations or actions.
2)
A belief in “free will” —the
ability of individuals to “escape” from any predispositions imposed by genetic
makeup, prior experiences, and past socialization. In effect, the latter belief
implies that humans are capable of making a decision that has no causal or
deterministic connection to the past.
Kuhn suggests that every
paradigm is typically learned via “exemplars,” which are concrete illustrations
of the paradigm. For example, an exemplar for the normative paradigm is a
religious sermon or religiously based exhortations to live the “proper” life.
In this particular example, the normative standards come from religious text or
authority, but other normative approaches exist. Some people might propose
standards based upon humanistic philosophy and urge that we should live by
these standards as a way to advance humankind. According to the normative
paradigm, our personal value systems ultimately come from these sources.
The exemplars often convey
tacit knowledge or assumptions that are also part of the paradigm. For example,
a common assumption, especially in the religious version, of the normative
paradigm is that humans are “naturally selfish,” which is held in check by
moral instructions that distinguish between “right” and “wrong.” These moral standards are often assumed to
be fixed and permanent features of the best behavior for all humans. Another
assumption is that social change is the result of changing individuals one at a
time. This individualistic approach tends to ignore social structures and other
behavior of aggregates of people.
In contrast to the normative paradigm, which is
widely shared and needs little exposition, the bio-social paradigm needs more
discussion. It works from a model of human behavior that recognizes two main
sources of behavior: internal forces encoded in our genome and external forces
of the surrounding environment—variously acting in tandem to determine what we
think and do.
Internal forces originate from our phylogenetic
motives as a species, and to a lesser extent as individuals. These internal
processes are of several kinds, some strictly autonomous nerve functions, such
as breathing, hunger, thirst, and avoidance of pain. Others are more complex
functions of the nervous system, such as sex, social interaction, sense of self
or ego, and rational activity. All will be examined more fully in later
chapters. One may seek satisfaction of these internal forces in innumerable
ways, some constructive and heuristic, others destructive and ultimately
unworkable. There is often a conflict between these internal motives. For
example, uncontrolled sex impulse may endanger sociality, the self, or
rationality. Extreme hunger has been found to reduce social standards as well
as reasoning power. Exaggerated ego may do the same.
External forces such as our upbringing or other
environmental experiences condition us in both positive and negative ways. They
may be so strong that we are almost “imprinted” from early years with local
beliefs and behavior patterns. Sharing them may provide social and mental
security—one way to satisfy these needs. The brain considers these cultural
stimuli, both positive and negative ones, as it selects, consciously and
unconsciously, the actions that seem to best fulfill our internal drives. This
determination rests on the brain’s ability to forge links between actions and
consequences. The links are forged from personal experiences and observations.
They are continually tested against anticipated consequences and kept or
discarded on the basis of how well these links serve these basic needs. This
internal process lies at the heart of our “value system” according to the
bio-social model. In other words, we might label as “natural values” the
actions humans actually take in their efforts to satisfy various constellations
of their bio-social needs in their daily lives. These values come largely from
within us and are not based upon those imposed by outside authorities. They
vary by individuals, situations, and time as experience provides feedback about
the effects of various choices and actions.
Although these comments might
suggest that humans are basically selfish, the bio-social model recognizes that
humans have a variable sense of “self” that can include others with whom we
identify, such as close kin, loved ones, and even non-kin members of our social
groups. Much of humanity’s social “progress” can be attributed to our ability
to consider the long-term consequences for our expanding sense of self.
It must be emphasized that the
determinism in the bio-social paradigm does not reduce people to mechanical
robots responding to external stimuli. Our brains are the active
decision-makers, even if it is an unconscious process. But we are not
completely free to make any choice because the brain’s actions are dependent on
past experiences, observations, and anticipated outcomes. If the links based on
past choices and their outcomes are erroneous, then decisions based on these
links may be ineffective or even destructive. It follows that action choices
will be changed when rational ability or information changes or we encounter
new experiences that affect our ability to identify and empathize with others.
Social progress will be more rapid as we develop more accurate links and broaden
our consideration of future consequences.
In the coming pages concrete social issues
will be examined from each paradigm’s point of view. This unique analysis will
show that the bio-social paradigm is more effective at explaining historical
events and why the normative paradigm is ineffective at this explanation. In
some cases the bio-social paradigm will be used to suggest possible future
developments.
It is necessary to recognize
that every individual has some personal preconceptions dear to the heart;
therefore any alternatives are distressing in themselves and difficult to
entertain, especially if broad paradigm views are being questioned. The normative thread runs through beloved
books, creates the heroes and villains that populate our history, and offers
comfort that someday unselfishness will overcome selfishness and the world will
be both just and loving. It so permeates every aspect of our lives and is so
widely applied to problems without being challenged that its pertinence seems
axiomatic.
In an unpredictable and dangerous world any belief
that offers certainty and ultimate knowledge has a strong appeal. Since science
cannot offer this, many people, in order to sustain their own inner security,
turn to subjectivisms which are comforting, but not confirmable: the direct
word from God or from Gurus who tap the ultimate or many of the "New
Age" doctrines. The Canadian psychologist Alcock has described this
"Engine of Belief" in The Skeptical Inquirer. Similarly, Eric
Hoffer characterized the intellectual delight of The True Believer:
"To be in possession of absolute truth is to have a net of familiarity
spread over the whole of eternity...no surprises, no unknowns.”
Earlier still, Sigmund Freud addressed the religious
aspect of this phenomenon in his book The Future of an Illusion. He
addressed the comfort provided by a just and loving God and concluded that
these (beliefs) "are not precipitates of experience or end results of
thinking. They are illusions, fulfillments of the oldest, strongest and most
urgent wishes of mankind.” Although Freud identified this process about 80
years ago, it is still current. Gallup surveys show broad acceptance of
religious beliefs. For example, a 1995 survey found that about 3/4 of the
people believed in miracles and angels. Such true believers are dominated by a
distorted form of the basic need for rational comprehension of the surrounding
world. Unfortunately, confidence that one has the correct and final answer
fixates the belief so it is neither modifiable, nor subject to change and
growth. The ego or self can easily become imprinted on this position.
The normative paradigm also
seems to facilitate a common desire to play an active role in making the world
a better place. This paradigm’s emphasis on the transformative power of
adopting new moral values, the ability of individuals to escape from all their
previous conditioning, and an individualistic focus on the nature of social
change would suggest that we can improve the world one individual at a time.
Thus individuals can make small, but significant, social changes, which grow in
their effects as more people join the effort. Any failures are due to
inadequate efforts of targeted individuals to adopt the “higher” values by
exercising their free will. Unfortunately, this approach tends to ignore the
power of prior conditioning and the interconnectedness and strength of social
structures.
We have used concepts from the bio-social paradigm to
explain why so many are captured by or loyal to the normative paradigm. Such
bound-behavior is just one manifestation of the bio-social processes which
underlie all human action. While captivity by the normative paradigm makes it
difficult to consider other paradigms, it would be an error to label either the
paradigm or the captivity to it as “bad” and needing to be changed for that
reason. In an analogous fashion, during the transition from horse-drawn buggies
to automobiles, people did not abandon the buggy in favor of the automobile
because one was “good” and the other was “bad” in some generic sense;
automobiles replaced buggies because they were more effective at satisfying
basic bio-social needs. In the same way the normative paradigm will be replaced
by the bio-social paradigm as it develops further and is seen as a more
effective approach toward social change. Normative tools for effecting desired
changes do not address the forces that actually effect our actions. The
next two sections suggest some processes that will produce this change.
There are many developments that will eventually
undermine the normative paradigm. Four will be briefly mentioned here and
expanded later.
1)
One of the commonest assumptions
is that normative thought is the most helpful in producing constructive changes
in behavior because people are urged to seek superior moral ideas and values.
The bio-social paradigm moves this idea from an assumption to an empirical
question and asks “when is this approach effective at social change?”
Unfortunately, as many psychologists now recognize, this approach can
prove trouble-making because it may produce blame, guilt, fault-finding and
condemnation. Such moralistic efforts are often counterproductive because
they attack or threaten the self or ego—a basic human drive in the bio-social
paradigm. A natural reaction is to defend the self, which diverts our attention
away from seriously weighing all proposed approaches.
2)
The growing recognition of the
extent of our genetic determinism and the doubt it casts on our ability to
exercise “free will” strikes at the very heart of the normative paradigm.
3)
The frequently noted gap between
our moral “talk” and our “walk” casts doubt on the power of moral persuasion.
The bio-social paradigm can explain this phenomenon.
4)
It is increasingly possible
to use the bio-social paradigm to explain and even influence behavior. An
illustration of this may be helpful here.
One of the most significant errors in comparing these
paradigms is to think of bio-social forces as keeping us captive, i.e. producing
static conditions, or as having only negative effects. However, they also can
be a positive influence—compelling us to proceed in a more constructive and
successful way, even when we may not recognize this or be favorably disposed to
adjust. An example, which is elaborated later, is the nuclear arms race between
the U.S. and the USSR after World War II. In the beginning both countries
thought they could win or at least not lose the race. The race did end, but not
because of moral principles invoked and implemented by willpower, although
there were numerous appeals to many different moral ideals. We were compelled
to change because we finally recognized that (1) mutual destruction was
inescapable,- after long resistance to this thought, and (2) the economic
cost was too large, even as it brought about the collapse of the USSR.
Reality put an end to the contest, not normative
appeals to abstract values. It was not rational anticipation and modification,
but a matter of “doing it the hard way”, being dragged into the future
vigorously resisting. Bio-social forces produced positive change in this case,
which increased opportunities for greater satisfaction of human needs. Had
these forces and consequences been clearly understood earlier, we might have avoided
the arms race with its tremendous waste of resources and lingering threats to
human survival.
The constructive approach, which most effectively
directs us toward needed change, is clear identification of which actions have
had or probably will have negative consequences in the long run. Science is
usually the best source for such information, if it is requested. In this
instance the “nuclear winter” warnings of scientists had little effect because
the bio-social approach was not influential among the general public or key
leaders.
Of course, this uses hindsight
to see what was less obvious then, which raises another misconception, held by
almost no informed person: that science offers, or can offer final truths or
conclusions that are 100% dependable. In reality science only deals in closer
approximations and higher probabilities, made possible by repeatedly testing
its laws and theories against the empirical evidence, and by consistent
reasoning—processes that are not exclusively experimental. Hindsight can aid
this process and suggest new links not previously recognized. There are those
who believe that since science cannot produce certainty, then "everything
is relative," so other beliefs become equally valid. This fallacious
argument will be addressed later.
There are times when alternative paradigms will
explain the same events differently. Sometimes normative appeals to new values
seem effective in changing behavior. Such incidents need to be examined
carefully. The normative paradigm introduces values derived from outside the
individual, while the bio-social paradigm identifies “ natural values” by what individuals experience as fulfilling.
There can be an overlap of the values taught and one’s own experience. This may
not be obvious to an observer. When a new paradigm is in the offering, the test
is whether it can explain both what the old can explain and what it has
difficulty explaining. For example, community leaders or one’s friends may
suggest that we ought to behave differently on the basis of specific values and
we change our behavior. This apparent evidence for the effectiveness of moral
appeals can also be explained by the bio-social desires for social status in
the community or among one’s friends. Status serves the ego, which is a basic
human need.
If we practice the value in one
place, but not in another, or fail to “walk our talk” altogether, this too has
to be explained and the alternative explanations checked for inconsistencies. A
major portion of this book will examine many incidents where we fail to “walk
our talk” and offer possible explanations for this common occurrence.
Recognizing the ramifications
of a new and challenging paradigm is not instantaneous. Many authors have
previously discussed these contrasting paradigms, but have failed to fully
apply the implications of the bio-social paradigm. For example, many authors,
who express support of the bio-social paradigm, end their contrasts of these
two paradigms with the suggestion that we “ought” to adopt the bio-social paradigm
as our guide to the analysis of social change. That is, they find the normative
paradigm as inappropriate, but then use it to advocate change to the better
paradigm.
This book does not advocate a change to the
bio-social paradigm but attempts to clarify the working principles of
that paradigm so the two paradigms can be accurately compared. To the degree
that the bio-social paradigm accurately identifies the bio-social forces
shaping our behavior, it can be an effective tool for future changes. Its relevancy
does not depend on either acceptance or
advocacy - any more than the relevance of gravity depends on whether we
accept it. Our acceptance can speed the process of working with nature in ways
that serve us. Although the author recognizes his task is to question, inform,
present—not to prescribe—it is his hope that the experience of reading and
pondering these pages will encourage the reader to step outside the normative
paradigm, at least for a moment, and view social problems and progress through
this different paradigm.
At best this is a difficult
task. Each paradigm has its implications and ramifications that need close
attention. Such complications make it easy to dismiss evidence that is
inconsistent with a chosen paradigm, but the shift to a new paradigm will occur
if the established approach fails to coincide with reality, its application
creates sustained failure and adverse consequences, and awareness of an
alternative paradigm spreads.
Kuhn identified a similar
process even in science itself as a discipline endures a period of “crisis” in
the shift from one old paradigm to a new one. Established authorities
representing what he called "normal science" in the old paradigm
produce much of that resistance. Kuhn concludes that strong and persistent stimuli
are required for alteration. Those scientists who lead in this transition may
feel that by strong advocacy and partisanship they can "convert" the
resisters, but Kuhn correctly states that the change "cannot be
forced". Each theory or paradigm must stand on its own as members of the
scientific community assess it.
Kuhn acknowledged that factors other than reason and
evidence play a role in the origin and acceptance of paradigms or theories. He
noted "the importance of subjective and aesthetic considerations” and that
the process is “intrinsically sociological.” This suggests that scientific
knowledge is more trustworthy than other knowledge systems for several reasons:
(1) it is produced by a group of specially trained and motivated individuals,
who emphasize the development of and reasoning from empirical evidence, (2)
this training includes shared standards of reasoning and evaluation of research
results that are both logical and aesthetic, (3) these individuals work within
a “community” that uses peer review for the distribution of rewards and esteem
(e.g., grants, publications, and promotions are based upon peer evaluation by
other members of the community), and (4) this internal peer review helps
isolate the scientific community from political, religious, and economic forces
in the larger society. Some common misunderstandings about the nature of
science are among the reasons that people will resist the bio-social
paradigm.
Many readers may have reservations about the wisdom
or the relevance of science and the scientific method to the resolution of
social issues. The challenge of established beliefs and the intrusion of
science—here the bio-social analysis—are usually resisted. John Dewey
recognized this in the following words:
"Science is not welcomed, but rather opposed when it ‘invades’ the
field now pre-empted by religion, morals and political and economic
institutions.” Recognition of this cultural captivity is resisted, but it is
well to remember that over the last 100 years the most productive solutions to
our medical problems have come from employing the methods of science. This
book’s thesis is that the most productive solutions to social problems will be
found by the same process.
Much
of the resistance to this thesis is based upon misconceptions of science;
misconceptions that spawn a variety of fears. Those readers, who hold science
responsible for the misuse of technology, may feel technology and science must
be guided by moral values. Others may believe science can say nothing relevant
to the direction of societal development and fear a void in direction if moral
guidance is discarded. Others may believe that science is only relevant to the
physical world and view the bio-social paradigm as “bad science” intruding where “good science” would not go. They
fear conflicting approaches. They mistrust anything that questions assumption
so widely accepted and cherished. However, challenging assumptions that may be
false will be beneficial in the long run for both individuals and society.
As we clarify the concept of science and explore the
bio-social approach, many of these fears and misconceptions will fall away.
Science is an effort to understand (not change) the forces at work in
our universe. Science never controls those forces. It may discern the outcome
of different combinations of those natural forces, but it cannot change that
outcome, except by adding a new component from among the natural forces.
Individuals or groups who set technological goals are acting outside the
realm of science, but may employ what science can tell them about how things
work. Science’s role in these decisions is to supply knowledge pertinent to the
selected goals.
Jacob Bronowski’s definition of science states this
succinctly: “I define science as the organization of our knowledge in such a
way that it commands more of the hidden potential in nature.” Later he writes:
”Man masters nature not by force but by understanding… We cannot even bully
nature by any insistence that our work shall be designed to give power over
her. We must be content that power is the by-product of understanding.”
Behavioral science is only concerned with the objective
causes of our actions. The bio-social paradigm introduced in these pages is
an attempt to identify the biological, social, and environmental forces shaping
our decisions and actions. It drops the concept of free-will, it questions
the belief that we solve social problems by teaching moral values that will
make humans more loving and more concerned for others, and it challenges the
assumption that without such instruction humans will remain dangerously self-centered.
Instead the bio-social paradigm
explains past success in terms of human’s genetic nature, which includes the
ability to draw causal relationships between actions and consequences, plus an
ability to modify these when anticipated consequences of an action do not
occur. Our drives to avoid pain and to survive in general are natural forces
behind all actions and values, but humans are not just self-centered. Instead
they are genetically wired to develop a variable sense of the
self-to-be-protected, which can include others besides close kin. This sense of
the self expands or contracts because of experiences not because one is told to
do so.
When clearly
understood, this is a revolutionary concept that challenges the .heart of our
most cherished beliefs. It challenges the tools we presently employ when we
wish to change hearts and minds. It has the audacity to argue that we cannot remove
humans’ self-centeredness, but when we fully understand the natural human
capacity to identify with and care for others, we can design more effective
solutions to social problems. Within this new perspective we will find that
some old concepts, such as captivity and freedom, have new meanings and
implications.
The previous discussion has
compared elements of both paradigms of human behavior, but not in a systematic
manner. To give a more systematic set of contrasts, the editors have elaborated
and included a table that systematically contrasts the two paradigms under
central issues of human behavior. (It is based upon a table that Bruce had
started.) Each contrast gives a brief summary of the positions of the
normative/free-will paradigm (NP) and the bio-social paradigm (BSP). Later
chapters will develop these contrasts in greater detail.
WHAT IS THE BASIC ESSENCE OF “HUMAN” BEHAVIOR? WHAT DISTINGUISHES US FROM OTHER ANIMALS?
NP: At the
“highest” level humans are capable of exercising free will that is able to
supersede temptations and escape the causality of the “laws” of behavioral
science. We are moral animals.
BSP: Human
behavior is always the result of bio-social forces acting on and within us—comprehensible
to an increasing degree, but never perfectly. What might appear to be an act
of “free will” only reflects a void in this imperfect knowledge. What sets
us apart from the lower animals is our greater ability to communicate, consciously
weigh our choices in terms of long term need satisfaction, and reason from
our experiences. We differ from lower animals because of our greater capabilities
in these areas, not because we are moral, but because a combination of these
forces make us weight the fate of many others beside ourselves and our nearest
kin.
NP:Our values
are guideposts to moral behavior. They supersede empirical-logical treatment
and are what a person or group (with the help of authorities) judges to be
worthwhile and morally sound. The best moral values are universal and fundamental
guides for human choices.
BSP: Our
“natural values” are what humans perceive as fulfilling to their constellation
of basic drives and bio-social requirements as a species. They may differ from
individual to individual, be affected by personal and unusual circumstances,
and change in response to new experiences. They are the guidelines individuals
or groups formulate from their own experiences and evolve over time. They may
coincide with normative paradigm values, but that coincidence does not create
their validity for the individual or group.
NP: While
humans share basic drives similar to other animals, they also are motivated by
moral/ethical appeals to exercise free-will choices. This ability to act toward
what we “ought” to do separates humans from other animals and we look to moral
leaders for guidance in selecting the best moral values.
BSP: The
most effective guidance is provided by accurately foreseeing the consequences
(either aversive or rewarding) of possible acts. Because of our superior mental
ability and use of language, we are able to anticipate consequences better than
lower animals, but not as well as we like to think. We always select the action
deemed most protective to ourselves and those whom we wish to protect,
even though moral values condemn such selfishness. When there is conflict
between these sets of values, we do not “walk our talk.”
NP:
Despite current conflicts between the moral ideals and values of different
cultures, there are eternal principles of human behavior to be found in the
best ethical-religious teachings. These are always right and dependable.
BSP: The
natural values on which we all act are those we deem necessary to our needs,
including our survival. Cross-cultural imposition of values and moral ideals
typically involve coercion with attendant social costs. Scientific consensus on
social causes and consequences is pertinent to everyone and is unforced; even
though it is never final or perfect and always subject to modification and
replacement in the self-correcting manner of science. Since the basic
bio-social needs exist in all societies, a setting that increases
cross-cultural communication and a recognition that we share basic human needs
can move us toward similar values. This
is a slow process that can’t be forced
but its development aids the resolution of conflict. Resolution of conflict is
always easier if moral judgments are absent.
NP: Logic
can be an effective tool, but it must be subordinated to human moral/ethical
values and the will to love and serve others. The emotions of love and concern
are more likely than pure logic to lead to workable solutions of social ills. Moral instruction speeds this
process because humans are naturally self-centered.
BSP: Logic
is seldom used effectively, but it is an essential tool for identifying the
causal relationships in the bio-social paradigm. Social progress depends upon
correctly identifying these relationships. Emotions exist and play a role
in all behavior and help us identify our primary needs and whom we naturally
include in our significant others, but are less certain guides to assessing
causal relationships than logic. However, just urging people to be more logical
is ineffective—as most normative commands are—and it may even promote illogical
behavior that seems “logical” to the actor. Logical analysis has its best
chances within communities, such as science, where outside social pressures
toward certain conclusions are minimized and where polarizing moral judgments
are not present.
NP:
Human’s natural selfishness must be overcome. Egocentric, self-centered,
dangerous behavior can be lessened if leaders advocate policies and practices
supporting desirable ethical/moral values. Praise for “good” behavior and
condemnation of “bad” behavior have been necessary for human growth, social
change, and avoidance of personal or social evils. Our ability to act upon what
we “ought” to do separates humans from other animals. Our problems are simple
enough that good intentions with dedication to democracy and moral values can facilitate
solutions to social problems. Systematic, objective analyses of society by
“value-neutral” scientists are insufficient for human progress because they
cannot provide the moral leadership that assures human progress. You cannot get
from an “is” to an “ought.”
BSP:
Self-centeredness and self-preservation are natural elements of human nature.
Self-fulfillment is a basic drive for everyone. Efforts at suppression are
futile. However, throughout history our concept of the self-to-be-preserved has
been expanding to include larger groups of others, but not because of moral
exhortations to do so. Humans’ natural sense of empathy can expand to more
people as technological progress permits more contacts and reduces the
competition for essential goods. In addition, strict self-interested behavior
has social costs that curtail it. Progress also occurs as humans gain greater
success in properly linking causes to the consequences for their bio-social
needs. Science can best provide us with accurate knowledge of long-range
consequences. The bio-social forces that slowly push us toward workable
solutions include awareness of our needs and the needs of others, the presence
of empathy for those with whom we identify, and a sense of our interdependence.
If we misjudge what is workable, ensuing conflicts or other punishing social
consequences will force new approaches. Partisanship and advocacy for moral
standards are superfluous and often divisive. Values taught by others are
observed only when they make sense to the individual within the context of
their own experience. “Oughts” are ineffective when they are not supported or
confirmed by personal experiences and judgment. If they are so confirmed, they are unnecessary.
NP: It
is difficult to counteract a society that accepts and even encourages
self-indulgence, ignores moral instruction, and dulls our moral conscience. In
such a setting, man’s undesirable natural selfishness flourishes. Although it
might be tempting to give up on those who lack the will power to follow higher
values and resist these self-indulging social pressures, it is morally better
for us to renew our efforts to encourage such people to follow the higher
values.
BSN: We
do not understand adequately the bio-social forces operating in the situation.
Important aspects of this failed understanding might include (a) inadequate
understanding of the bio-social forces operating in the situation itself, (b)
not distributing accurate knowledge widely enough to effect key decision
makers, (c) not understanding how others will integrate this knowledge, or,
when relevant, (d) the lack of shared experiences that create an extension of
empathy to relevant others. Even when the best knowledge of bio-social
processes is used, predictions and results may be inconsistent and
non-rewarding. The response should be new analyses of the bio-social processes
and problems by scientific means, which requires empirical and theoretical
analysis by the scientific community. To the extent that the analyses of the
problems are done by politicians, religious leaders, or others with vested
interests in the conclusions, the conclusions will be less constructive in the
long-run than those produced by the scientific community. Finding blame,
punishing others (for non-criminal conduct), condemning opposing views,
pressing a normative approach, or turning to other non-scientific approaches
will only compound the problems.
Some critics may misread the bio-social paradigm as
implying a danger they refer to as “scientism:” the fear of science taking over
all human thought, illegitimately moving into areas where it cannot perform and
exceeding its mandate and therefore its relevance. Fuller and McMurrin describe
the scientism of the early sociologist August Comte and his followers, who
believed in a quasi-religion of science, complete with a new God—humanity—and
some formalities to accompany it, which were appropriately referred to as
“positivism.” However, few people today are captives of scientism. Most
scientists appreciate the legitimate limitations identified and represented
here. They almost never anticipate final answers on any subject, only the most
fruitful and testable working hypotheses and theories that are possible at the
time. The public may be dissatisfied with this prospect and demand something
more fulfilling to their sense of security, but they can be helped toward this
approach without scientists specifying final goals or values. (How this might
develop is described in Chapter 8 of my previous book, A Science of Social
Issues.)
There is another factor that
has made inquiry and change difficult in this area. We live in an age of
specialization. There are now hundreds of disciplines, and many thousands of
authorities in different specialities. With increasing specialization there was
a decline in exploring and testing general concepts because they were not
subject to controlled experimentation or mathematical formalizations, so they
could not be tested and confirmed in this manner. The benefits of specialized
knowledge and technique are surely unexceptionable, but it is fallacious to
think that there is no benefit to general concepts because they cannot be confirmed
experimentally. For example, Darwin’s general theory of evolution was accepted
without the use of mathematical or experimental evidence because it provided a
general theory that explained and organized previously “unrelated”
observations.
Even though few scientists explicitly study very
general theories about human behavior, everyone consciously or unconsciously
accepts and is guided by some general principles regarding the interpretation
of mass behavior. Rote or unconscious acceptance of such principles may conceal
the need for revision.
Keynes made a mordant
commentary on this: "Practical men
who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any ‘intellectual' influences
are usually the slaves of some defunct economist.” We regularly try to protect established theories, and one of the
commonest methods is by demanding more intricate evidence from theories we
oppose. In the social issues considered in this book, present shortcomings in
the public’s understanding are not the result of an insufficiency of detailed
and specialized information. The chief obstacle will be that it is difficult to
confront or adapt to the implications of generally recognized principles or
even facts when these conflict with cherished beliefs.
Preliminary
Illustrations
Although the arms race was used to illustrate the
bio-social paradigm earlier, a few other illustrations will help the reader
understand how the normative and bio-social models differ in their ability to
explain the directions of previous social changes. Each of these topics will be
considered in more detail in later chapters after Chapter 2 provides a more
complete discussion of the bio-social paradigm.
The nation currently rates
crime and violence high on the scale of its social concerns. The public's
answer to criminals is to "lock ‘em up”, build more prisons (already
overflowing with minor drug violators), employ more police, and give tougher
sentences--rigidly enforced. This ministers to the public’s demand for
retribution and getting the problem immediately out of sight. It does little
about the real causes of crime and violence, and in some cases may increase
these. We are in subjection to our desire for a "quick fix" and
simplistic answers. Moral pronouncements have been contradictory and ineffective.
The causes of crime are
difficult and expensive to change; they cannot be immediately transformed,
because they are a product of continued, inadequate and defective
socialization, which is in turn an outcome of a social climate that directs
personal and family attention elsewhere. For example, many people are bound by
a struggle to keep afloat in a world that threatens loss of employment or
marginal incomes and gives little time for preparing offspring. Even for the
more fortunate, there is captivity to the me-ism and monetarism of our culture:
make money for status or pleasure, even at the expense of socializing offspring
adequately—a demanding and time consuming process. Such causes of crime are not
something we prefer to address because the major antecedents lie within our
shortsightedness and ourselves. Therefore, any “improvements” in crime with
current policies will be temporary. Really significant improvement will occur
slowly as new experiences and increasing social costs force us to reevaluate
the problem within the bio-social paradigm.
We may consider the relatively
recent case of Vietnam. Gallup's sequential polls recorded the changing public
beliefs on this subject. In 1964, amongst those expressing an opinion about
this conflict, three times as many favored fighting over negotiation or
withdrawal. By 1966 there was almost an even split and in 1969 those favoring
escalation/continuation of present policies dropped to 20%. Asked in 1971 if
Vietnam was a mistake, 61% said Yes (vs. 28% No). Over 20 years later (1993)
the same question got a 68-24% response. When asked in that same year if
Vietnam was a "just" war, 71% replied in the negative. Such data
support the conclusion that the public mind was at first captivated by
nationalistic and military considerations as the answer to international
problems of this kind. There was no questioning or inquiry into the preparatory
Tonkin Gulf affair, a manufactured incident. Then within a few years people
began to realize that they were not going to be able to do what Ronald Reagan
predicted: “Pave the country over and be out by Christmas”. It was painful to
admit that the sacrifice of our men was nonproductive, and that our military
power was not always all-prevailing. The disparagement and ill treatment of
returning veterans (for answering the call of their country's leaders) was an
offense to elementary reason. The prevalence of psychic stress and
dysfunctional behavior among these veterans could have been predicted from the
bio-social paradigm and illustrates how the quilt and shame associated with the
normative approach can have negative consequences.
Normativists might argue that
Americans were negatively reacting to the war because it violated our values
against killing others, especially the innocent civilians shown in newscasts on
TV. So it might seem that values against killing others were an effective
stimulus for change, once people became aware of the facts. Simple bio-social
processes provide alternative explanations, such as our basic capacity for
empathy and the rising costs as more soldiers were lost for a dubious goal and
without victory. Most Americans were initially entrapped in the conflict by
their preconceptions and ignorance. More informed observers had recognized the
conflict was neither "just" nor wise from the beginning, as we shall
see. It required repeated failures to change the perceptions of the leadership
and public, not increased normative appeals to follow “higher” values.
{From the editors: Bruce
died before the Iraq war was a topic of public concern. We think he would have had many insightful
comments about it, even with the limited information currently available. If
the discussion board shows sufficient interest, we would be willing to try to
outline what we think he might have said about this war.}
Another historical change compelled by bio-social
forces, without our recognition and prompt adaptation, was the end of slavery
in America. The Civil War put an end to it, at least formally, but beneath the
political surface, slavery was becoming an unrewarding practice, as brought
about by the growth of technology. Max Weber observed that slavery would have
disappeared without the Civil War. Why?
He concluded, “The special features of slaveholding made for the
impossibility of the modern factory.” A
social practice which was rewarding under one set of circumstances was losing
its function under a new set. A crisis was required to generate the transition.
Another (northern) motivation for the conflict was political—the
threats to the union, including the possibility of secession. Pro and con
religious arguments on slavery were equally strong. The Nobelist, Weinberg
(at an AAAS conference) reviewed the history of antislavery and concluded,
“It is certainly true that the campaign against slavery was greatly strengthened
by devout Christians (but) as far as I can tell the moral tone of religion
benefited more from the spirit of the times than the spirit of the times benefited
from religion. Where religion did make a difference it was more in support
of slavery than in opposition to it. With or without religion good people
can behave well and bad people can do evil, but for good people to do evil,
that takes religion.”
Subsequent chapters will expand these examples and
add others to show how many of our current problems are premised upon two key
elements of the normative paradigm: (a) human behavior is changed most
effectively through moral appeals to seek certain values and ideals, and (b)
humans have willpower that can overcome most, if not all, forms of prior personal
and cultural conditioning. From the perspective of the bio-social paradigm
these are “myths” that mutually support each other and provide a satisfying,
but false sense of freedom of thought and action, which actually causes poor
analyses and solutions to pressing problems, if not additional problems.
Furthermore, these myths cause us to misunderstand and even resist any
bio-social interpretation because we are personally committed to normative
models of “what ought to be done” or “what ought to be.”
Social Change,
Freedom, and “Constructive Autonomy”
As the previous examples illustrate, large-scale
social change is seldom the product of anticipated and intelligent
pre-adaptation, but is compelled by interactions between external circumstances
and our internal drives. Individuals can create a harmonious integration of
these forces more readily than groups or nations, but it is difficult in either
case. It has been argued here that moral ideals and values played a minimal
role in these changes, even delaying resolution of problems. The bio-social
paradigm suggests that continued use of the normative paradigm will cause
ineffective choices and aversive consequences until we develop new concepts
more consistent with the facts of our behavior. Continued captivity or loyalty
to the normative paradigm can hinder the rise of a more scientific, accurate
analysis of the forces shaping our decisions, but the transition will
eventually occur.
America's prominent historian of science, George
Sarton, perceived the long term, large scale growth of dependable knowledge in
these words: "The resistance to
scientific novelties was due to an intuitive if unconscious appreciation of
their revolutionary nature. The slightest and most innocent scientific
innovation is but a wedge that is bound to penetrate deeper and deeper and the
advance of which will soon be impossible to resist. Conservative people are
undoubtedly right in their distrust and hatred of science, for the scientific
spirit is the very spirit of innovation and adventure into the unknown, and
such is its aggressive strength that its revolutionary activity can neither be
restrained nor restricted within its own field.”
Sarton failed to appreciate that "liberals"
or humanists may also resist with vigor. They also tend to believe that we must
be guided by how we ought to behave; that each person has a great deal of
freedom in what he/she chooses to think and do, which is the source of all our
progress and change for the “better.”
This response is to be expected, but ultimately the
result of the "revolutionary" activity of science has proved to be
more workable and rewarding. The "dissatisfied" may insist on some
alternative which they feel provides them with a greater sense of security, but
Freud ended his book with the following conclusion: "Our science is no illusion, but an illusion it would be to
suppose that what science cannot give us, we could get elsewhere.”
When the bio-social forces that caused our social and
political errors, such as our policy in Vietnam, are pointed out, the common
normative response is: “We are free to do better! We can escape these causes because we are not automatons.” This response reflects a basic misunderstanding
of the bio-social paradigm. This paradigm recognizes our ability to make
changes but does not rest that ability on the presence of free will. We are
“free” to improve to the extent that we are able to recognize and surpass the
previous conditioning (the forces acting on us at the time), but such
“recognition and surpassing” are themselves a product of bio-social processes –
including new experiences that changed our interpretation of past experiences.
For example, no agency was pressuring us to pursue the arms race. The policy
makers and public could perceive no other course. The Russians were reacting as
they did, not only because of conditioning, but also out of fear both of our
strength and of their own government’s reaction to dissension. The countries
were not disposed to change until they became sufficiently aware of the cost
(financial and otherwise) of the course they were pursuing. Confronted with
punishing consequences they “chose” a new path. Such deterministic views about
the nature of social change raise associated questions as to the nature of
freedom in bio-social terms. This must now be briefly addressed.
What is the alternative condition to captivity,
either mental or physical? The usual
response is “freedom”. However, Isaiah Berlin found the word “porous” – with
more than “200 senses”. We are not concerned here with its complexities but
with minimal essentials. What are the basic attributes of sound mental
freedom—not as allegedly derived from ideal norms, but from bio-social
science? Many writers have identified
conditions necessary for free mental inquiry. Oppenheimer in his book stressed
the importance of The Open Mind in science. Bronowski refers to the
importance of tolerance and dissent. A broader bio-social definition was
offered by the anthropologist Malinowski in his book on the subject. He
regarded it as the opportunity of individuals to “use their natural gifts as
well as their trained skills and services.”
While humans are not free to defy the laws of nature, including their
own organic needs, “the enormous extension of freedom through culture consists
primarily in reshaping environmental conditions and resources.”
Freedom operates under
different headings in different areas of life. We need a concept that permits
and encourages free inquiry, that frees individuals from coercion and the
threat of harm for thoughts, speech, or harmless neutral behavior, while
helping avoid social conflict and malfunction. Restated: What parts of the
freedom concept produce operational success for individuals and society rather
than personal or social disasters? That
is, what reformulation of the freedom concept makes it harmonious with
bio-social realities?
Perhaps the phrase "constructive autonomy"
can be used for this condition in which the basic drives (including mental
inquiry and expression) may be filled without risk and for all people.
This concept is in harmony with Jacob Bronowski’s observation: “If we are to
study conduct, we must follow it in both directions; the duties of men, which
alone hold a society together, and also into the freedom to act personally
which the society must still allow its men…. The concept of values are profound
and difficult exactly because they do two things at once: they join men into
societies, and yet they preserve for them a freedom which makes them single
men.”
Constructive autonomy could describe any successful
balancing of individual and societal needs without contamination by the varied
interpretations and moral overtones of the traditional values of liberty and
freedom. This concept is not offered here as a goal or value. It is a
term for a heuristic process that incorporates the bio-social forces at work
within and around us. It does not include freedom to do as one pleases
regardless of consequences to others because it recognizes that such action
eventually creates such social unrest that freedom is reduced.
A normativist might ask “if
constructive autonomy is not taught as a moral principle why would it be
practiced?” From the bio-social paradigm this question is similar to “If flying
in airplanes is not taught as a moral principle, why would it be practiced?”
and the answers are similar. Our knowledge of physical laws has allowed us to
design planes that will advance our need satisfaction. This knowledge frees us
from harm and increases our liberty. Bio-social freedom lies in adapting to the
basic processes or laws of human behavior, modifying actions in accordance with
the consequences and anticipating these to whatever degree is possible. To some
this may sound as though freedom is conformity, to which Malinowski responds:
"We see that freedom consists in obedience to the constraint of drives and
to the natural laws of the environment to which the animal is adapted.” That is
what science is all about--identifying the laws of nature and adjusting our
thoughts and actions in harmony with them. This has maximized, not minimized
what we refer to as freedom.
However, what if we are still unable or “unwilling”
to adjust to bio-social forces? In that case the negative consequences must
become sufficiently intense to compel a change (and the advantages of such
change must be perceived as sufficiently rewarding). That may sound like behaviorism
and therefore less liberty. This fear is justified, if such changes are imposed
from an external authority, However, when people are able to recognize that
they are suffering from some particular destructive behavior and that life
will become better if they turn to a more promising and constructive replacement,
then they are autonomous and adapting with intelligence to bio-social processes.
Consistent punishment for destructive behavior is a
form of cultural conditioning. The experiments of Azrin, Holtz and Hake
demonstrated that an intense negative stimulus is often necessary to compel a
significant change in response. Lesser stimuli were ineffective, even when
repeated. Williams noted an important addition: "In the lab it was found
that there is a greater suppression of the punished response when an
alternative response is available.”
Therefore it would seem that the function of social “reformers” is to
make this alternative very clear (without moralizing) and make just as clear
the obvious costs of sticking with the old, then wait patiently for the process
of learning to develop. Moralizing only slows adoption.
Unfortunately the human record shows that crises are
usually necessary to stimulate serious change. Rational leadership is
ordinarily invoked with reluctance. There is a semi-humorous saying, variously
attributed to Russell, Churchill and Abba Eban that "We resort to reason when
all else fails." Perhaps the
magnitude of the failure can be reduced with time, but apparently the human
genome assures its presence.
Previous Commentators
on the Conflict between the Two Paradigms
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Many people might claim that our general captivity to
the normative paradigm and consideration of the bio-social alternative would be
widely understood, given our freedom of speech and publication. They will point
to the variety of magazines, books and other publications, to the opportunity
to express one’s self to the legislators and also to "talk shows".
One radio hostess (Diane Rehm) even pointed out that the Unabomber was able to
get his 35,000 word essay in the Washington Post with the help of the New
York Times—hardly a free and accessible method to all serious analysts.
The above argument is legitimate in one limited
sense. Publications with a small, specialized market may challenge some
treasured beliefs, but that hardly represents the dissemination necessary to
contact the numbers that really count in a mass society. When we get into the
wider domain, silence and avoidance are in operation. Editors will say, quite
accurately and understandably, that they cannot afford to venture into these
realms because of monetary and other costs, which illustrates the present
thesis.
There have been very few books that (1) describe the
captivity in our thinking and (2) deny complete free will. One might think that
London and Weeks’ book, Myths that Rule America, would tackle this
subject, but they actually take the opposite perspective and illustrate that
the normative approach to human behavior is still pervasive in society. These
authors identify and characterize18 myths that dominate our national thought,
but the most basic is the “Myth of Psychology” that deals with the motivation
of behavior and underlies all their other cases.
They believe psychology is mythical in that its
practitioners stress liberation of the self from moral values and
responsibilities, gratifying their needs without such restraints. This leaves a
vacuum which science is thought to be incapable of fulfilling. Unfortunately
London and Weeks have little understanding of science. For example they charge
Kuhn's classic, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, with contending
that scientists are not just guided by the facts but "they make the facts
fit their presuppositions,” which could hardly be further from the truth. Given
their poor analysis of the problem, their solution is even worse. They argue
that the only hope of freeing ourselves from the myths is by returning to the
moral standards of religion, to a belief in free will and to the power of
prayer. As they put it, "One cannot know what is believed, one simply
believes.” They look to belief and faith
as saviors. London and Weeks offer no word about the causes for their myths
(except as simple habits); nor do they explain why myths rule people's minds.
They are interested in curing these "ailments," but—to borrow from
medical science—effective treatment is almost impossible without a clear and effective
diagnosis.
Some famous scientists have questioned the free will
concept. For example, Darwin said “the general delusion about free will is
obvious.” Einstein added” “Neither the rule of human or divine will exists as
an independent cause of natural events.”
Neither developed the implications as much as the landmark book—The
Non-Reality of Free Will by Richard Double. Writing on extensive
philosophical grounds, he contended that complete free will is unsupportable
and unnecessary as well as misleading. Additionally he denied the existence of
"moral responsibility", because "neither of these beliefs can
have discrete references" and therefore "They cannot be counted as
candidates among the class of real entities.”
This criticism reduces us to the requirement of scientific
operationalism as the basis for meaning. Unfortunately, Double does not get
down to extensive and specific illustrations of this "non-reality" in
any systematic way, to say nothing of its replacement by science, which is the
function of the present book. Theoretical attacks on free will are much more
tolerable than displaying actual cases of our failure to implement the kind of
freedom we claim. Analyzing cases of this kind is largely absent, as we would
expect.
A book that attempts to examine links between science
and morality is Investigating the Biological Foundations of Morality,
whose contributors address the relation of neo-Darwinism to human morality.
Most of them argued that natural selection of genes only relates to species, but
not to their interests in the morality of individual behavior. Darwin had
supported the idea that natural selection might also work on the traits of
social groups, which is not generally accepted today. However, it would seem
plausible that early human groups with a culture of cooperation would succeed
better than those that were uncooperative—see Chapter 2. If so, this would
likely characterize processes occurring for early human groups better than
modern nations. Certainly the cooperation was an outgrowth of higher mental
processes, which must have been adaptive, but in modern society natural
selection for genes favoring moral beliefs is probably minimal.
This logic would support rejecting the relevance of
Darwinism for individual morality, but the authors of Investigating only
offer choice as the alternative basis for morality: choice to overcome
biological impulses, choice to resist stimuli, choice to pursue altruistic
behavior, etc. Unlimited choice is here equivalent to free will. Their case for
choice is bolstered by examples such as Mother Teresa, resisters of the
holocaust, Gandhi, Jesus, etc. However, science requires that we search for
perceptible causes for this behavior, such as an amalgam of biological drives
coupled with cultural conditioning. The science phase is analyzable and
testable. The normative is not. These traditionalists find support for their
thesis by citing sociobiologist G.C. Williams who says: “Nothing resembling the
golden rule or other widely preached ethical principles seems to be operating
in living nature. It could scarcely be otherwise, when evolution is guided by a
force that maximizes genetic selfishness,” so they conclude the unselfishness
must come from choice.
The “uncaused” self-sacrificing behavior cited above
can be explained in at least three ways by the bio-social paradigm: (l) a firm
belief in appropriate rewards in the after-life, (2) the individuals had been
instilled during their early years with strong conditioning toward empathy for
others, and (3) other life experiences increased contact with others in
situations that produced positive identification with them. All three could act in tandem. Normative
thinkers will charge that strict adherence to cause and effect is a
“naturalistic fallacy,” but anyone who starts transcending causation has in
effect surrendered orderliness, at least in the social world. This can
appropriately be called the “normative fallacy.”
E.O. Wilson identifies what he called “hard core”
altruism—the Corinthian love, even for enemies, with no expectation of
reciprocation, as opposed to “soft core” altruism, having a pragmatic
anticipation of reply in kind. The Investigating book and the
sociobiology of Wilson are similar in paying insufficient attention to the
power of culture. They are also similar in their academic approach, which pays
insufficient attention to current social problems and the institutions of
modern society—a deficiency the present book addresses.
In each subject addressed by this book, the normative
interpretation is shown by repeated illustrations to be dominant. The few
claims of greater consistency with science commonly succumb to moral-ethical
presuppositions. For example, R.D. Masters developed what he called a
naturalistic theory on The Nature of Politics. In the midst of an
otherwise sound performance, we have: "The new naturalism can therefore
best be interpreted in terms of self-imposed moral obligations”—an obvious
contradiction to the original idea that naturalism itself provides superior
conception and guidance.
Jacob Bronowski, in his insightful discussion of Science
and Human Values, recognizes that “the values of science derive neither
from the virtues of its members, nor from the finger-wagging codes of conduct
by which every profession reminds itself to be good. They have grown out of the
practice of science, because they are the inescapable conditions for its
practice.” This statement is in harmony with the bio-social paradigm’s
description of the origin of values—we embrace those that meet our individual
needs. However, Bronowski doesn’t escape captivity to the normative phraseology
when he states his social axiom: “ We ought to act in such a way that
what is true can be verified to be so” (emphasis added). This axiom can be
stated in a more scientific manner—without an “ought”—by noting that scientific
values, such as free-expression and independence, grow out of the social needs
of the scientific community to discover reality. They are honored because they
are necessary to the practice of science.
Wright (in The Moral Animal) came to the
surprising conclusion that “It is now clearer than ever how the moral
sentiments are used with brutal flexibility, switched on and off, in keeping
with self interest, and how naturally oblivious we often are to this switching.” Wright could also state: ”Morality makes us
mindful of the welfare of others.”
Wright’s aim in his book is to rehabilitate morality, not replace it.
Wright believes that moral codes can be constructive and beneficial, but also can
be the opposite. The question becomes: Is there a superior way to
comprehend and guide us toward the beneficial?
The answer proposed in this book is in the affirmative. We can be at
least as “mindful” of others via the bio-social approach as by the
moralistic—and more consistent with the rest of science.
These various authors have
directly or indirectly addressed the differences in normative and scientific
approaches to human behavior and social change. However, none of the authors
escaped the captivity to the normative paradigm that pervades our society. Most
value a scientific approach, but this has not penetrated into their analysis of
social behavior. Other supporters of the normative paradigm do not value
science or the scientific method, so the final section examines this position.
Debasing
Science
There has lately been an ill wind blowing in today’s
culture--an irrational attack on science, its works and methods. An analysis by
Sommers in the Wall Street Journal noted that "until recently,
professional scientists studiously avoided reacting to these sorts of
critiques.” The reason they have given the anti-science movement little
attention is probably because they are too busy doing research to spend time
correcting misrepresentations and cleaning up the intellectual confusion left
behind. However, some scientists are starting to notice: in 1995 the New York
Academy of Science sponsored a high level conference of over 200 participants
addressing "The Flight from Science and Reason.”
This conference included many illustrations of
fashionable irrationalism. For example Professor Holton, Harvard historian of
science, described how the American Chemical Society commissioned an exhibit on
"Science in American Life" at the Smithsonian, assuming it would
display positive accomplishments of modern science. After five years and five
million dollars, the finished display concentrated only on the negative--a
series of "moral debacles and environmental catastrophes"--Hiroshima
and Nagasaki, Silent Spring, Love Canal, Three Mile Island, and the
explosion of the space shuttle. These represent failure of technology and
politics over which American science has had little control.
Scientists did lead in making the atomic bomb, where
everyone agreed that national survival was at stake, but this was a highly
atypical event. Generally scientists cooperate with constructive applications,
such as the control of disease. Science has been used for harmful ends
accidentally or deliberately, which is part of the story, but it was
indefensible to omit the beneficial part in any description of the
accomplishments of science. When science was misused—as technology—it is rare
to find a scientist, or at least very many, giving support. Technology
is more susceptible to going along with the decisions of politicians and
business organizations, whose aims have been less objective and more partisan.
Professors Gross and Levitt (mostly responsible for
the New York Academy meeting) wrote a book they titled Higher Superstition.
It concentrates on the academics of the New Left and postmodern age, i.e. those
who call for more radical changes on issues such as race, feminism, and the
environment. These authors conclude:
"Surprisingly there is open hostility toward the actual content of
scientific knowledge and toward the assumption which one might have supposed
universal among educated people, that scientific knowledge is reasonably
reliable… It seems to mock the idea
that on the whole a civilization is capable of progressing from ignorance to
insight, notwithstanding the benightedness of some of its members… They accuse science itself of a reactionary
obscurantism and they revile it as an ideological prop of the present
order.” These anti-science proponents
ignore the fact that scientific history has demonstrated pre-eminence in the
challenge of established beliefs. The criticism is based on a demand for quick
change and not on the requirement for extended testing of explanations and
predictions. These opponents also confuse the differences between science for
knowledge advancement and technology—science aimed at achieving practical
goals. Finally, these critics illustrate the basic normative paradigm by
believing that constructive social change is based primarily on exhortation and
idealizing. Unfortunately, Gross and Levitt also take a normative stance as the
solution to this problem.
This analysis describes our captivity to the
normative theory, a captivity that has caused serious widespread failure to
utilize in social decisions what science can tell us about ourselves and the
likely consequences of a contemplated action. Although science can give no
final answers, it has the ability to work from a simple theory which best fits
the known facts, then continually modify it to conform to later information in
a developmental process.
Some of these social problems,
such as efforts to reduce crime, are being addressed with policies and beliefs
about causes that are inaccurate and will yield poor results. Other problems
occur because our mass behavior is at odds with the guiding principles we
proclaim, such as the opposition of Americans to some of the most basic
elements of democracy while proclaiming general allegiance to it. Such
discrepancies indicate a misunderstanding of the forces shaping our actions and
must be examined and explained. They raise many significant questions: What
needs are in conflict? What punishing
consequences lie ahead if we don’t harmonize our beliefs and actions? What forces are moving us closer to
constructive autonomy?
Using the terms of bio-social science we will analyze
both the appeal and the failures of the normative approach on the topics in the
following chapters. We will then present and consider a bio-social analysis of
the problems we face, an interpretation that will help us integrate the data in
a comprehensive manner and relate it to our goals. This will supply heuristic
guidance, whether or not people are “ready” for it. The bio-social paradigm
also gives a base for predicting under what conditions our contradictory
behavior will lessen and we will significantly change the way we approach our
problems.
Challenging well established and congenial beliefs is
usually an unwelcomed project. In any preliminary analysis there will be errors
to be corrected, but our ability to refine concepts has governed much of human
progress and lies at the heart of our survival. This book will have succeeded
if it arouses interest in further exploring how deeper knowledge of our selves
and our world can provide a base for action that does not create a chasm
between avowed “belief” and behavior. It is the author’s belief that this
transition is necessary and can be accomplished, but it will be protracted and
requires much pooling of knowledge and reformulation.
REFERENCES
CHAPTER 1
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References
are always listed in the order of appearance in the text.
Kuhn, T., The Structure
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