Our
Captive Culture
and
the Bio-Social Forces that Will Free Us
Bruce Stewart
Natural
Science Professor (ret.)
Michigan State University
Copyright © 2005 John A. Stewart
Copyright © 2005 John A. Stewart
Table
of Contents
Discussion
Board
Forward
(Last revised 2/8/2005)
This Forward was written by May Louise Stewart
and John Stewart—the wife and a son of Bruce Stewart. Bruce had nearly completed
his rough draft of Our Captive Culture when he sustained a serious
head injury while jogging early on the morning of February 3, 2001. (He was
either hit by a car or stumbled.) His partial recovery from his brain injuries
was setback by contracting two antibiotic-resistant infections. During one
of his more conscious moments, he chose to give up the fight and came home
for hospice care, as he had specified in his living will. He died on March
29, 2001 at the age of 82.
Shortly before his death, May Louise had promised Bruce that should he not recover she would try to publish his manuscript, which contrasts “normative” and “bio-social” explanations for social change. Since his death we have been reviewing the status of the manuscript. We have decided that we lack the expertise and time to bring the manuscript up to the standards for publication as a printed book.
There are several reasons for this. First, the manuscript
covers many subjects that lie outside the knowledge areas of John, a sociologist,
and May Louise, a grade school teacher with training in psychology and biology.
Second, it provides only limited, and often dated, coverage of many areas,
so book referees in these areas would—with some justification—criticize his
lack of knowledge of their specialized areas. Bruce—with equal justification—felt
that such referees could not see the “forest” because of their intense interest
in particular types of “trees.” Third, Bruce let a more negative attitude
intrude into this manuscript than in his earlier manuscripts and book contrasting
these two paradigms (Stewart, 1950, 1971). This grew from the unwillingness
or inability of editors and his colleagues to question either the validity
or power of the normative approach that permeated our culture as truth, not
assumption. Even though we believe that Bruce would recognize that this negativity
might make his message harder to hear, we have not tried to remove it from
the manuscript. Finally, the manuscript has some serious organizational and
structural problems.
Despite these problems we think that Bruce has outlined
an exciting challenge to the common way of thinking about how social change
occurs in society. We have managed
to read a few recent books that tackle similar topics, but none seem to have
put together the same elements that he has. Thus, we feel it is very important
to publish the manuscript in some form so that Bruce might have some chance
to contribute to the developing ideas about the relationships between science,
“morals,” and social change. We would prefer that we had time to fully revise
the manuscript, but this would cause years of delay at best and most likely
no final version. So we present it as it stands and will work on it as time
and interest permit. Comments or feedback from others would certainly increase
our interest to continue this work: see the e-mail addresses at the end.
In the rest of this Forward we will give a brief summary
of the basic themes in the manuscript. A much better, but longer, summary
is provided in Chapter 1, which we
edited substantially.
Like many theories in social science, Bruce Stewart’s
theory was developed to account for the failures of the predominate “theory” or
view about how humanity improved its conditions through personal and social
change. Most people, at least in Western societies with Christian traditions,
accept most elements of a normative model of personal and social change. In the
purest form of this view moral instruction can persuade people to accept new
values and can change the general conception of the proper life. The presented
standards for behavior and the values supporting such behavior are justified
because they are right according to some authority or personal perception.
Examples: “Good children don’t interrupt;” “Masturbation is bad;” “Thou shall
not kill;” “Do not lust after another man’s wife;” “All people are created
equal;” “Be logical, not emotional;” and “Preserve all life forms.” Scientific
knowledge of consequences might support the wisdom of some of these
exhortations, but the absence of such an examination, the emphasis on good and
bad, and the declaratory nature of the statements make them normative
injunctions. Continued failure to accomplish this implies the person is
“defective” in some way. Forces that appear to block “right” behavior may be dismissed
as evil. Why they surface is not germane.
Looking back over historical developments from the
normative view, major social changes occurred when peers or social/political
leaders were able to persuade enough citizens that old values supporting current
social or political practices were wrong (immoral) and superior moral values
should be embraced. Slavery was opposed then abolished as people realized that
it conflicted with the value that all people were created equal. The Civil Rights movement was motivated by
the same value and was successful as others were persuaded to adopt the moral
values that supported the movement.
Current instances of the moral approach would be the environmental
movement when it stresses the morality of preserving all life forms;
anti-abortion movement when it stresses the fetus’s right to life, and the
pro-choice groups’ emphasis on the woman’s right to control her body.
Justification for these values and their “oughts”
about how we should live usually rests on unquestioning acceptance of the
wisdom of some authority. “Oughts” may also be derived from personal experience
or insights. They become normative “oughts” when presented as final answers not
to be questioned and with no need seen to examine possible consequences of the
prescribed actions.
The normative paradigm recognizes that scientific analysis
of possible ways to achieve chosen goals may be useful, but contends that
science can say nothing about what values are worth pursuing. This is commonly
stated as : Science can tell us what “is” or sometimes predict what “will
be,” but it has no role in moving us from an “is” to an “ought.”
Bruce Stewart’s theory or paradigm is a general
construction built upon a combination of previous theories and research, but
reorganized around an unorthodox assumption about human nature and its primary
role in motivating behavior. He makes the assumption that there are very
complex, possibly never fully understandable, bio-social causes for every human
action and thought. He challenges the heart of the normative approach that
people have “free will” which enables them to escape at will their basic
bio-social drives and set aside all previous conditioning. Many social
scientists would accept this view in principle, if not in practice.
However, Bruce goes one step further and argues that
the basic motivation for all human behavior is the same as for the lower
animals: the desire to satisfy the needs of the species and to avoid punishing
circumstances. We have inherited the genes of our ancestors who were most
successful in this endeavor. This genetic inheritance includes a complex brain
that constantly forges links between actions and consequences. This combination
of genes and our forged causal-links directs the choices we make in our search
for a fulfilling life. If we misjudge cause-and-effect, the resulting
punishment forces us to restructure those linkages and try new approaches.
Behavior changes, albeit slowly, in response to this continuous self-correcting
process.
He argues that the above forces can account for all
choices and social change. We select that course of action we expect to be most
satisfying—moral exhortations fall on deaf ears if the change prescribed
appears self-punishing. This does not mean that “oughts” and experience are
necessarily contradictory. They may coincide. The argument is that we accept
and practice only those “oughts” that are supported by our own experience and
perceptions. We do not “walk the talk” when we believe that to do so would
imperil us or bring harm to those with whom we identify. This makes “oughts”
superfluous. (Possibly vocally honored for status sake, but not effective in
changing behavior.) This is a more radical position and one less likely to be
accepted among social scientists in both principle and practice.
Bruce agrees that science cannot get us from an “is”
to an “ought,” but since “oughts” are ineffective and we change because of
anticipated consequences, he argues that science can play a major role in
the choices we make. That role will not be to replace moral injunctions by
“scientific” ones. Its responsibility will be to help us understand the “is”
of human nature and the possible consequences of human action. Only to this
degree can science give guidance. The motivating power behind all our choices
will remain our natural drives.
This thorough rejection of normative appeals as even one of many causes of social change has strong implications about how social change will occur and what may aid the resolution of pressing social problems. Stress on what is morally right, what we ought to do, who is wrong and who is right, what is good behavior, and what is evil can divert attention from the factors that actually produce a change and from the necessary anticipation of how long term consequences of an espoused action may affect the well being of ourselves and those with whom we identify.
It is a temptation to translate personal experience into “oughts” for the guidance of others. This analysis suggests that our almost universal reliance on normative advice about what we or others should do is ineffective. Further, stress on acceptance of what authorities label “right” may discount personal experience and force many to dissemble or doubt their own perceptions. This can be damaging and counter productive. It can hinder open, objective examination of all needs and lead to secret efforts to meet neglected needs. Moral judgments can lock us into righteous action against each other. This too can be counter productive and in the long run too costly for all concerned.
The theory suggests that such factors as knowledge of
probable consequences of the different choices before us, experiences that help
us identify what can be fulfilling, and growing awareness of our
interdependence may guide us to workable resolutions of current problems. If we
misjudge the consequences of a chosen act, the ensuing punishing circumstances will
force re-evaluation of the forces creating the task before us. This can be a
rocky road but it is the road that has enabled us to reduce the perils of our
physical world and it is the best approach we have to living harmoniously in
our social world.
We have been conditioned to think of ourselves as
moral animals, superior because we can perceive moral choices and make moral
decisions in response to moral instruction. The disconnect between “our walk”
and “our talk” belies this. Our efforts to change behavior have not focused on
the motivations that actually drive us. We are amoral animals capable of
bonding with and caring for each other when experiences disclose how protective
and how fulfilling this can be. Professor Stewart predicts that this recognition
can free us to direct our energies into more productive channels for
constructive change than those now offered by our faith in man’s moral nature
and the efficacy of moral instruction.
It would be easy to misunderstand Bruce’s purpose in
writing this book. He is not advocating that we ought to change our beliefs
about human nature and social problems. He believes “oughts” are not effective
causes of change. Instead, he is predicting how new beliefs about human nature
arise over time and some of the causal processes that will produce those
changes. As we learn that old beliefs are producing actions that are not as
fulfilling to human needs as other beliefs, we will adopt the new ones. He
hoped that the ideas in this manuscript would play a part in this process.
Future revisions of this forward will include some discussion of:
1) the development of Bruce’s views,
2) some differences he has with recent publications on related topics.
Our incentive to make these changes will be increased
when other readers make positive (or negative) comments
John Stewart: Jstewart at hartford.edu
May Lou Stewart: Stewarts at Spiritone.com.
References:
Stewart, Bruce. 1950. Humanics: The Scientific Method in Human Problems. Typed text for course taught at Missouri Valley College.
Stewart, Bruce. 1971. A Science of Social Issues.
Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press.